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Introduction
The significant growth of scholarship on the issue of money in American politics in recent 
years does not mean that the problems with these matters have emerged only recently. In 
fact, they have been there since the beginnings of the American political system, and the 
scope of their influence has depended on the given state of the regulations – legislative 
and Supreme Court opinions – as well as the creativity of candidates and campaign 
operatives.
In the 19th century the problem of money in elections was of little interest to legislators, 
though this did not mean there was a lack of regulations concerning the operation of 
the selection, appointment and election of public officers on the federal level. The laws 
implemented at that time, however, had limited range, and resulted either from political 
scandals or social concerns about corruption among government officers rather than from 
a general necessity to regulate campaign finance issues. In the 20th century, reformers 
began to see campaign laws as a way to solve the problem of the proper regulation of the 
growing impact of money on politics and politicians during election campaigns. Due to the 
changing perspectives of ideologically based political forces, electoral procedures became 
less important than questions concerning the proper functioning of American democracy, 
the rule of law, and the scope of such crucial individual rights as freedom of speech or 
broad access to information. Today, the discussion over the proper scope of campaign 
finance regulations is highly politicized and divides representatives of the two major 
political parties as to the scope of control over said regulations. Money and politics have 
always been connected, but the active participation of big business, corporations, and 
political action committees as contributors to congressional and presidential campaigns 
have made the system prone to and dependent on high levels of funding. The issue 
has never been so tense and challenging as it is now, as the amount of money pumped 
into political campaigns at the beginning of the 21st century increases the concern of 
various social and political circles over the proper functioning of American democracy. 
The problem of disclosure of financial reports by candidates and their contributors, the 
question of the scope of restrictions on individual and corporate funding, individual and 
aggregate limits on spending, proper enforcement of campaign finance laws, and many 
other vital issues regarding the operation of the electoral process seem today to be among 
the biggest challenges to democratic governance in the United States.
The question of who contributes, and how and why, has become one of the major 
problems analyzed by U.S. and international researchers, who discuss the issue of money 
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in politics either in a particular electoral cycle, or from a more general perspective, 
reaching conclusions about the direction of federal campaign finance reforms. These 
studies are later presented at international conferences and/or are the subject of edited 
or individually authored books regarding various aspects of the financing of election 
campaigns, contributing to the discussion on the constitutionality of contemporary 
regulations on the issue. Books authored and edited by Robert G. Boatright, Anthony 
Corrado, Kurt Hohenstein, Gerald C. Lubenow, David B. Magleby, Stephen K. Medvic, 
Michael G. Miller, Robert E. Mutch, Raymond de la Raja, John Samples, Frank J. Sorauf, 
and Clyde Wilcox, are just part of the large input of scholars into this debate. The Polish 
scholars Pawel Laidler and Maciej Turek, from the Institute of American Studies and 
Polish Diaspora of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, have also contributed to this 
field through their research on the evolution of federal campaign finance laws and its 
impact on the changing image of American democracy, derived especially from the 
discussion between Republicans and Democrats on the meaning of the First Amendment 
in connection with the compelling state interest to protect the society against the 
uncontrolled flow of big money and corruption of the electoral system. Thanks to 
the receipt of a grant from the National Science Center of Poland (UMO-2013/09/B/
HS5/01086), since 2014 Laidler and Turek have been focusing on an analysis of the 
contemporary scope of campaign finance law in the United States with special reference 
to the debate on the future of American democracy. Considering recent Supreme Court 
decisions, the issue is at the center of political and legal debate; therefore it is important 
to acknowledge the ways in which federal campaign reforms have evolved throughout 
American history.
The purpose of the volume Basic Documents in U.S. Federal Campaign Finance 
Law is to present that evolution of the meaning of money and politics in American 
governance, with a special focus on the regulations and norms which have shaped the 
current understanding of campaign finance in the U.S. It is important to acknowledge 
the main reasons for federal legislation on campaign finance, its outcomes, and the ways 
in which issues have been challenged in the courts, focusing especially on the changing 
interpretations of the Supreme Court towards the issue. The book contains a short 
introduction to every important piece of legislation or Court decision, in which the authors 
have presented the background of the legislation and its main purposes and substance, 
as well as the facts leading to legal disputes over the legislation’s constitutionality. 
Each introductory piece is followed by the most crucial excerpts from legislative acts 
or Supreme Court opinions on campaign finance, so that readers are able to analyze 
for themselves the substance and form of the regulations on the issue. According to the 
authors, all twenty nine documents presented in the volume (14 acts of Congress, and 15 
Court decisions), should be considered the main legal source of the debate on the proper 
scope of money in federal election campaigns. Although most of the excerpts presented 
relate to federal laws, there are a few references to state laws when the issue at stake has 
a direct effect on the national discussion on campaign finance.
All excerpts have been prepared on the basis of the original text of every piece of 
legislation and judicial opinion, which were extracted from various websites collecting 
historical documents on American politics and law, such as: Findlaw (www.findlaw.
com), Jurist (www.jurist.org), Oyez at the Chicago-Kent College of Law (www.oyez.
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org), The Avalon Project of the Yale Law School (www.avalon.law.yale.edu), and the 
Legal Information Institute at the Cornell University Law School (www.law.cornell.
edu). In preparing the volume the authors analyzed various books and articles on federal 
campaign finance law, which are listed at the end in the ‘Further Readings’ section. Due 
to the limited form of the volume, thorough research on the topic should be made with 
reference to the original documents, as the excerpts focus only on the most important 
provisions or most crucial arguments used in the discussion over the proper scope of 
campaign finance in the United States of America.
The Authors would like to thank the Editor of the Basic American Documents Series, 
Professor Andrzej Mania, who, as the Chair of American Studies at the Jagiellonian 
University, has always been of significant formal and substantive support. Our gratitude 
goes also to Professor Garry Robson, who was responsible for the proofreading of the 
commentaries to the documents.

The Civil Service Reform Act
22 Stat. 403 (1883)
The first campaign finance legislation on the national level was the provision in The 
Naval Appropriations Bill of 1867, which banned political contributions from workers of 
the navy yards. The law did not, however, change the character of the Gilded Age civil 
service, which was built on patronage and the so-called spoils system. The awarding of 
governmental posts often resulted in the funding of political parties by levies on the salaries 
of federal workers. After the assassination of President James Garfield, and particularly 
the midterm congressional election of 1882, civil service system reform became a leading 
issue in Congress. This led to the passage of The Civil Service Act in 1883, known as the 
Pendleton Act from the name of its sponsor, Senator George Pendleton.
The main purpose of the legislation was to create a new category of federal employees, 
who would be appointed through competitive selection on the basis of their qualifications 
for office. The establishment of entrance exams for the civil service hopefuls was aimed at 
building a more efficient and competent bureaucracy, loyal first and foremost to their office 
or government agency and not to politicians, to whom they would no longer owe their 
positions. Although, at the beginning, the Act referred to only 10% of federal workers, its 
scope broadened in the following decades to cover more than half of employees by the 
turn of the 20th century. It also forbade this class of employees from donating money to 
political campaigns. Based on the merit system, the Act was intended to lessen political 
power over the civil service. The Pendleton Act was the first serious regulation to reform 
the administration of elections, reduce the impact of political parties on federal employees, 
and aim at the de-politicization of government officers in the United States.
An act to regulate and improve the civil service of the United 
States. . .
SECOND. And, among other things, said rules shall provide and declare, as nearly as the 
conditions of good administration will warrant, as follows:
First, for open, competitive examinations for testing the fitness of applicants for the 
public service now classified, or to be classified hereunder. Such examinations shall be 
practical in their character, and so far as may be shall relate to those matters which will 
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fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the persons examined to discharge the 
duties of the service into which they seek to be appointed.
Second, that all the offices, places, and employments so arranged or to be arranged in 
classes shall be filled by selections according to grade from among those graded highest 
as the results of such competitive examinations.
Third, appointments to the public service aforesaid in the departments at Washington 
shall be apportioned among the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia 
upon the basis of population as ascertained at the last preceding census. Every application 
for an examination shall contain, among other things, a statement, under oath, setting 
forth his or her actual bona fide residence at the time of making the application, as well 
as how long he or she has been a resident of such place.
Fourth, that there shall be a period of probation before any absolute appointment or 
employment aforesaid.
Fifth, that no person in the public service is for that reason under any obligations to 
contribute to any political fund, or to render any political service, and that he will not be 
removed or otherwise prejudiced for refusing to do so.
Sixth, that no person in said service has any right to use his official authority or influence 
to coerce the political action of any person or body.
Seventh, there shall be non-competitive examinations in all proper cases before the 
commission, when competent persons do not compete, after notice has been given of the 
existence of the vacancy, under such rules as may be prescribed by the commissioners 
as to the manner of giving notice.
Eighth, that notice shall be given in writing by the appointing power to said commission 
of the persons selected for appointment or employment from among those who have been 
examined, of the place of residence of such persons, of the rejection of any such persons 
after probation, of transfers, resignations, and removals and of the date thereof, and 
a record of the same shall be kept by said commission. And any necessary exceptions 
from said eight fundamental provisions of the rules shall be set forth in connection with 
such rules, and the reasons there-for shall be stated in the annual reports of the com-
mission. . .
SEC. 11. That no Senator, or Representative, or Territorial Delegate of the Congress, or 
Senator, Representative, or Delegate elect, or any officer or employee of either of said 
houses, and no executive, judicial, military, or naval officer of the United States, and no 
clerk or employee of any department, branch or bureau of the executive, judicial, or military 
or naval service of the United States, shall, directly or indirectly, solicit or receive, or be in 
any manner concerned ill soliciting or receiving, any assessment, subscription, or contribu-
tion for any political purpose whatever, from any officer, clerk, or employee of the United 
States, or any department, branch, or bureau thereof, or from any person receiving any 
salary or compensation from moneys derived from the Treasury of the United States.
SEC. 12. That no person shall, in any room or building occupied in the discharge of official 
duties by any officer or employee of the United States mentioned in this act, or in any 
navy-yard, fort, or arsenal, solicit in any manner whatever, or receive any contribution of 
money or any other thing of value for any political purpose whatever. . .
SEC. 14. That no officer, clerk, or other person in the service of the United States shall, 
directly or indirectly, give or hand over to any other officer, clerk, or person in the service 
of the United States, or to any Senator or Member of the House of Representatives, or 
Territorial Delegate, any money or other valuable thing on account of or to be applied to 
the promotion of any political object whatever.
SEC. 15. That any person who shall be guilty of violating any provision of the four forego-
ing sections shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction thereof, be 
punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding three years, or by such fine and imprisonment both, in the discretion of the court.
The Tillman Act
34 Stat. 864 (1907)
Despite the intent of legislators, the Pendleton Act did not fully diminish the influence 
of politics on the operation of the government, especially in the selection and removal 
of federal employees. Furthermore, in the last decade of the 19th century the issue of 
money and politics became a major concern to party leaders and American society, when 
candidates for political posts raised unprecedented amounts of funding during election 
campaigns, particularly from private business and corporations. This was observed 
especially in the 1896 presidential campaign, when the Republican Party candidate, 
William McKinley, often collected more than $100,000 in a single donation, thanks to 
the implementation of an organized, corporate system of fundraising by party leader 
Mark Hanna. In sum, throughout only few election cycles, some candidates were able 
to spend more than $3 million in a single race, creating a social perception of corrupt 
government. As large companies were now filling the coffers of parties and candidates 
with large contributions- and the 1904 presidential campaign of Theodore Roosevelt did 
not avoid allegations of wrongdoing – in his State of the Union Addresses of 1905 and 
1906 the president urged legislators to establish a law which would control the flow of 
money during electoral campaigns and prohibit national banks and corporations from 
contributing to the electoral efforts of candidates for federal offices.
Democratic Party Senator Benjamin Tillman initiated a bill aimed at reducing the 
impact of corporations and big money on congressional and presidential elections. 
Despite Republican obstruction, The Tillman Act was signed into law in 1907, becoming 
in time one of the longest standing campaign finance regulations. It was the first to ban 
corporations from making campaign donations, and demanded the filing of financial 
reports after the election cycle.
An Act to prohibit corporations from making money contributions 
in connection with political elections
Be it enacted, that it shall be unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized 
by authority of any laws of Congress, to make a money contribution in connection with 
any election to any political office. It shall also be unlawful for any corporation whatever 
to make a money contribution in connection with any election at which Presidential and 
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Vice-Presidential electors or a Representative in Congress is to be voted for or any 
election by any State legislature of a United States Senator.
Every corporation which shall make any contribution in violation of the foregoing provi-
sions shall be subject to a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, and every officer or 
director of any corporation who shall consent to any contribution by the corporation in 
violation of the foregoing provisions shall upon conviction be punished by a fine of not 
exceeding one thousand and not less than two hundred and fifty dollars, or by imprison-
ment for a term of not more than one year, or both such fine and imprisonment in the 
discretion of the court.
The Publicity Act
36 Stat. 822 (1910)
The 1911 Amendments  
to the Publicity Act
37 Stat. 25 (1911)
The Tillman Act did not address all of the important issues concerning the regulation of 
campaign finance on the federal level, such as spending limits, and pre-election disclosure 
of contributions by political committees. From 1907, numerous representatives and 
Senators had pressed for the implementation of further campaign finance regulations, 
which would provide the system with greater transparency and accountability. As a result, 
three years later the Republican-led Congress created a new law, which established the 
system of public disclosure of campaign funds. However, not all committees contributing 
to the electoral process were subject to this legislation.
The problem was that The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1910, also known as 
The Publicity Act, made campaign committees operating in two or more states report 
their House of Representatives’ campaign receipts and expenditures. But as it did 
not require that the disclosure be made before the election and was limited only to 
election years, it was amended a year later. In 1911 Congress expanded the regulation, 
now demanding the revelation of both House and Senate campaign funds before and 
after elections, both primary and general. The 1911 amendment also established the 
first ever limits to campaign spending on the federal level, setting it at a total of 
$5,000 for House and $10,000 for Senate candidates. The law was in force until the 
early 1920s, when the Supreme Court struck down some of its key provisions in 
Newberry v. United States.
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An Act Providing for publicity of contributions made for the 
purpose of influencing elections at which Representatives in 
Congress are elected
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America 
in Congress Assembled, That the term “political committee” under the provisions of this 
Act shall include the national committees of all political parties and the national congres-
sional campaign committees of all political parties and all committees, associations, or 
organizations which shall in two or more States influence the result or attempt to influence 
the result of an election at which Representatives in Congress are to be elected. . .
Sec. 3. That every payment or disbursement made by a political committee exceeding 
ten dollars in amount be evidenced by a receipted bill stating the particulars of expense, 
and every such record, voucher, receipt, or account shall be preserved for fifteen months 
after election to which it relates.
Sec. 4. That whoever, acting under the authority or in behalf of such political committee, 
whether as a member thereof or otherwise, receives any contribution, payment, loan, 
gift, advance, deposit, or promise of money or its equivalent shall, on demand, and in 
any event within five days after the receipt of such contribution, payment, loan, gift, 
advance, deposit, or promise, render to the treasurer of such political committee a detailed 
account of the same, together with the name and address from whom received, and said 
treasurer shall forthwith enter the same in a ledger or record to be kept by him for that 
purpose. . .
Sec. 8. That any person may in connection with such election incur and pay from his own 
private funds for the purpose of influencing or controlling, in two or more States, the 
result of an election at which Representatives to the Congress of the United States are 
elected all personal expenses for his traveling and for purposes incidental to traveling, 
for stationery and postage, and for telegraph and telephone service without being subject 
to the provisions of this Act.
Sec. 9. That nothing contained in this Act shall limit or affect the right of any person to 
spend money for proper legal expenses in maintaining or contesting the results of any 
election.
*
An Act to amend an act entitled “An Act Providing for publicity of contributions made for 
the purpose of influencing elections at which Representatives in Congress are elected” 
and extending the same to candidates for nomination and election to the offices of 
Representative and Senator in the Congress of the United States and limiting the amount 
of campaign expenses. . .
Sec. 2. That. . . a new section be inserted after section seven of the said original act to 
read as follows: “Sec. 8 The word ‘candidate’. . . shall include all persons whose names 
are presented for nomination for Representative or Senator in the Congress of the United 
States at any primary election or nominating convention, or for endorsement or election 
at any general or special election held in connection with the nomination or election of 
a person to fill such office, whether or not such persons are actually nominated, indorsed, 
or elected. . .
No candidate for Representative in Congress or for Senator of the United States shall 
promise any office or position to any person, or to use his influence or to give his support 
to any person for any office or position for the purpose of procuring the support of such 
person, or of any person, in his candidacy; nor shall any candidate for Senator of the 
United States give, contribute, expend, use, or promise any money or thing of value to 
assist in procuring the nomination or election of any particular candidate for the legisla-
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ture of the State in which he resides, but such candidate may, within the limitations and 
restrictions and subject to the requirements of this act, contribute to political committees 
having charge of the disbursement of campaign funds.
No candidate for Representative in Congress or for Senator of the United States shall 
give, contribute, expend, use, or promise, or cause to be given, contributed, expended, 
used, or promised, in procuring his nomination and election any sum, in the aggregate, 
in excess of the amount which he may lawfully give, contribute, expend, or promise 
under the laws of the state in which he resides: Provided, that no candidate for 
Representative in Congress shall give, contribute, expend, use, or promise any sum, in 
the aggregate, exceeding five thousand dollars in any campaign for his nomination and 
election, and no candidate for Senator of the United States shall give, contribute, expend, 
use, or promise any sum, in the aggregate, exceeding ten thousand dollars in any 
campaign for his nomination and election: Provided further, that money expended by 
any such candidate to meet and discharge any assessment, fee, or charge made or 
levied upon candidates by the laws of the state in which he resides, or for his necessary 
personal expenses, incurred for himself alone, for travel and subsistence, stationery and 
postage, writing or printing (other than in newspapers), and distributing letters, circulars, 
and posters, and for telegraph and telephone service, shall not be regarded as an ex-
penditure within the meaning of this section, and shall not be considered any part of the 
sum herein fixed as the limit of expense, and need not be shown in the statements 
herein required to be filed.
The statements herein required to be made and filed before the general election, or the 
election by the legislature at which such candidate seeks election, need not contain items 
of which publicity is given in a previous statement, but the statement required to be made 
and filed after said general election by the legislature shall, in addition to an itemized 
statement of all expenses not theretofore given publicity, contain a summary of all proceed-
ing statements.”
Newberry v. United States
256 U.S. 232 (1921)
Until the early 20th century, the Supreme Court rarely adjudicated in cases concerning 
the scope of campaign finance laws, as there was no legislation on the issue that would 
be thought of as controversial. The situation changed when Congress began to regulate 
money in the federal election process, as the new provisions limited some aspects of the 
financial participation of various campaign actors. It was a matter of time before these 
laws would be challenged in the courts, and the first important Supreme Court decision 
on the constitutionality of federal campaign finance legislation was made in 1921, in 
Newberry v. United States.
In Michigan in 1918 Republican Truman H. Newberry won the U.S. Senate would 
primary against Henry Ford. According to official data disclosed by his campaign 
committee, Newberry spent much more money than was permitted by the Federal Corrupt 
Practices Act. The law provided for spending limits in federal election campaigns according 
to the regulations set by particular states, whereas funds used during Newberry’s campaign 
exceeded the Michigan-established limits by about 100 times. After the District Court 
convicted Newberry, he decided to appeal to the Supreme Court, which found the provisions 
concerning spending limits unconstitutional. In the Court’s view, issues regarding primaries 
and other nomination processes were not elections for office, and were thus beyond the 
scope of congressional regulation. Such an approach was changed in the early 1940s, when 
the Court overruled the Newberry holding in United States v. Classic (1941).
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court. . .
If it be practically true that, under present conditions, a designated party candidate is 
necessary for an election – a preliminary thereto – nevertheless his selection is in no real 
sense part of the manner of holding the election. This does not depend upon the scheme 
by which candidates are put forward. Whether the candidate be offered through primary, 
or convention, or petition, or request of a few, or as the result of his own unsupported 
ambition does not directly affect the manner of holding the election. Birth must precede, 
but it is no part of, either funeral or apotheosis.
Many things are prerequisites to elections or may affect their outcome – voters, education, 
means of transportation, health, public discussion, immigration, private animosities, even 
the face and figure of the candidate; but authority to regulate the manner of holding them 
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gives no right to control and of these. It is settled, e.g., that the power to regulate inter-
state and foreign commerce does not reach whatever is essential thereto. Without agri-
culture, manufacture, mining, etc., commerce could not exist, but this fact does not 
suffice to subject them to the control of Congress. Kidd v. Pearson.
Elections of Senators by state legislatures presupposed selection of their members by the 
people, but it would hardly be argued that therefore Congress could regulate such selec-
tion. In the Constitutional Convention of 1787, when replying to the suggestion that state 
legislatures should have uncontrolled power over elections of members of Congress, 
Mr. Madison said: “It seems as improper in principle, though it might be less inconvenient 
in practice, to give to the state legislatures this great authority over the election of the 
representatives of the people in the general legislature as it would be to give to the latter 
a like power over the election of their representatives in the state legislatures.”
We cannot conclude that authority to control party primaries or conventions for designat-
ing candidates was bestowed on Congress by the grant of power to regulate the manner 
of holding elections. The fair intendment of the words does not extend so far; the framers 
of the Constitution did not ascribe to them any such meaning. Nor is this control necessary 
in order to effectuate the power expressly granted. On the other hand, its exercise would 
interfere with purely domestic affairs of the state, and infringe upon liberties reserved to 
the people.
It should not be forgotten that, exercising inherent police power, the state may suppress 
whatever evils may be incident to primary or convention. As “each house shall be the 
judge of the elections, qualifications and returns of its own members,” and as Congress 
may by law regulate the times, places, and manner of holding elections, the national 
government is not without power to protect itself against corruption, fraud, or other 
malign influences. . .
The Federal Corrupt Practices Act
43 Stat. 1070 (1925)
Apart from the growing influence of money in the electoral process, and increased criticism 
of the legislation, there was another, more political reason for a legislative initiative on the 
issue of campaign finance in the 1920s: the Teapot Dome scandal. The controversial lease 
of Navy petroleum reserves by government officials to businessmen became a subject of 
investigation, which revealed serious corrupt practices among high ranking political 
officers. Although the scandal did not directly refer to the issue of campaign finance, the 
investigation proved that large contributions were made by big business to politicians 
during non-election years. Therefore, after the Newberry precedent and Teapot Dome 
Scandal, Congress decided to act by passing another Federal Corrupt Practices Act.
The legislation was aimed at enhancing the enforcement of the campaign finance 
laws by granting more powers to Congress and imposing stricter regulation. It placed 
more restrictions on the size and character of campaign contributions, as well as on the 
disclosure of financial reports, which now had to be filed quarterly. Every donation of 
$100 or more, made in both election and non-election years, was now reportable. While 
the limits on how much candidates were able to spend in U.S. Senate elections were 
now raised, these regulations were confined to general elections, in accordance with 
the Newberry decision. As time showed, the 1925 law became the major legislation in 
the area of campaign finance for the next four decades, until early the 1970s and the 
enactment of the Federal Election Campaign Act.
Sec. 301. This title may be cited as the “Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925”. . .
Sec. 303. (a) Every political committee shall have a chairman and a treasurer. No contri-
bution shall be accepted, and no expenditure made, by or on behalf of a political com-
mittee for the purpose of influencing an election until such chairman and treasurer have 
been chosen.
(b) It shall be the duty of the treasurer of a political committee to keep a detailed and 
exact account of –
(1) All contributions made to or for such committee;
(2) The name and address of every person making any such contribution, and the 
date thereof;
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(3) All expenditures made by or on behalf of such committee; and
(4) The name and address of every person to whom any such expenditure is made, 
and the date thereof.
(c) It shall be the duty of the treasurer to obtain and keep a receipted bill, stating the 
particulars, for every expenditure by or on behalf of a political committee exceeding $10 
in amount. The treasurer shall preserve all receipted bills and accounts required to be 
kept by this section for a period of at least two years from the date of filing of the state-
ment containing such items.
Sec. 304. Every person who receives a contribution for a political committee shall, on 
demand of the treasurer, and in any event within five days after the receipt of such 
contribution, render to the treasurer a detailed account thereof, including the name and 
address of the person making such contribution, and the date on which received. . .
Sec. 306. Every person (other than a political committee) who makes an expenditure in 
one or more items, other than by contribution to a political committee, aggregating $50 
or more within a calendar year for the purpose of influencing in two or more States the 
election of candidates, shall file with the Clerk an itemized detailed statement of such 
expenditure in the same manner as required of the treasurer of a political committee by 
section 305. . .
Sec. 309. (a) A candidate, in his campaign for election, shall not make expenditures in 
excess of the amount which he may lawfully make under the laws of the State in which 
he is a candidate, nor in excess of the amount which he may lawfully make under the 
provisions of this title.
(b) Unless the laws of his State prescribe a less amount as the maximum limit of campaign 
expenditures, a candidate may make expenditures up to –
(1) The sum of $10,000 if a candidate for Senator, or the sum of $2,500 if a candidate 
for Representative, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner; or
(2) An amount equal to the amount obtained by multiplying three cents by the total 
number of votes cast at the last general election for all candidates for the office which 
the candidate seeks, but in no event exceeding $25,000 if a candidate for Senator or 
$5,000 if a candidate for Representative, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner. . .
Sec. 310. It is unlawful for any candidate to directly or indirectly promise or pledge the 
appointment, or the use of his influence or support for the appointment of any person to 
any public or private position or employment, for the purpose of procuring support in his 
candidacy.
Sec. 311. It is unlawful for any person to make or offer to make an expenditure, or to cause 
an expenditure to be made or offered, to any person, either to vote or withhold his vote, 
or to vote for or against any candidate, and it is unlawful for any person to solicit, accept, 
or receive any such expenditure in consideration of his vote or the withholding of his vote. . .
Sec. 313. It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority 
of any law of Congress, to make contribution in connection with any election to any po-
litical office, or for any corporation whatever to make a contribution in connection with any 
election at which presidential and vice presidential electors or a Senator or Representative 
in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, Congress are to be voted for, or for any 
candidate, political committee, or other person to accept or receive any contribution 
prohibited in this section. Every corporation which makes any contribution in violation of 
this section shall be fined not more than $5,000; and every officer or director of any 
corporation who consents to any contribution by the corporation in violation of this section 
shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
The Hatch Act
53 Stat. 1147 (1939)
The 1940 Amendment  
to the Hatch Act
54 Stat. 767 (1940)
The lack of new general campaign finance regulations between 1925 and 1971 did 
not mean that the issue was not present in political debates in Congress, as well as 
during presidential and congressional campaigns, which saw increased interest from 
various organizations contributing to particular candidates. In the 1930s, such interest 
occurred on the side of labor unions, which saw in the electoral process a proper way 
of influencing changes in government policies. This was especially visible during the 
implementation of New Deal programs, which were supported by members of various 
labor unions and organizations. As a part of the New Deal coalition, these suddenly 
became important contributors to federal campaigns for Congress and the White House. 
Furthermore, there were allegations that the Democratic Party used employees of the 
Works Progress Administration to pursue their political and electoral goals. All this 
led to the implementation in 1939 of the Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, 
known as the Hatch Act, after its sponsor Senator Carl Hatch.
The authors of the law wanted to limit the political impact of those federal civil 
employees not restricted by the Pendleton Act and its extension. These individuals were 
now prohibited from contributing to all federal campaigns. The Act, however, did not 
control the flow of big money in federal campaigns. Therefore, a year after creating The 
Hatch Act, Congress decided to amend it by broadening the types of entities banned 
from contributing to presidential and congressional elections. It also introduced the first 
annual limits on individual donations in these elections. In practice, both laws limited the 
influence of political parties on the process of financing campaigns, which resulted in the 
growing impact of outside organizations on that process.
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An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities. . .
SEC. 5. It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or receive or be in any manner 
concerned in soliciting or receiving any assessment, subscription, or contribution for any 
political purpose whatever from any person known by him to be entitled to or receiving 
compensation, employment, or other benefit provided for or made possible by any Act of 
Congress appropriating funds for work relief or relief purposes.
SEC 6. It shall be unlawful for any person for political purposes to furnish or to disclose, 
or to aid or assist in furnishing or disclosing, any list or names of persons receiving 
compensation, employment, or benefits provided for or made possible by any Act of 
Congress appropriating, or authorizing the appropriation of, funds for work relief or relief 
purposes, to a political candidate, committee, campaign manager, or to any person for 
delivery to a political candidate, committee, or campaign manager, and it shall be unlaw-
ful for any person to receive any such list or names for political purposes. . .
SEC. 9. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person employed in the executive branch of the 
Federal Government, or any agency or department thereof, to use his official authority 
or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the result thereof. 
No officer or employee in the executive branch of the Federal Government, or any 
agency or department thereof, shall take any active part in political management or in 
political campaigns. All such persons shall retain the right to vote as they may choose 
and to express their opinions on all political subjects. For the purposes of this section the 
term “officer” or “employee” shall not be construed to include
(1) the President and Vice President of the United States;
(2) persons whose compensation is paid from the appropriation for the office of the 
President;
(3) heads and assistant heads of executive departments;
(4) officers who are appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent 
of the Senate, and who determine policies to be pursued by the United States in its 
relations with foreign powers or in the Nation-wide administration of Federal laws.
(b) Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be immediately removed from 
the position or office held by him, and thereafter no part of the funds appropriated by 
any Act of Congress for such position or office shall be used to pay the compensation of 
such person.
*
An Act to extend to certain officers and employees in the several States and the District 
of Columbia the provisions of the Act entitled “An Act to prevent pernicious political ac-
tivities,” approved August 2, 1939. . .
The Act. . . is amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 13. (a) It is hereby declared to be a pernicious political activity, and it shall here-
after be unlawful, for any person, directly or indirectly, to make contributions in an ag-
gregate amount in excess of $5,000 during any calendar year, or in connection with any 
campaign for nomination or election, to or on behalf of any candidate for an elective 
Federal office . . . or to or on behalf of any committee or other organization engaged in 
furthering, advancing or advocating the nomination or election of any candidate for any 
such office or the success of any national political party. . .
(b) For the purposes of this section –
(1) The term ‘person’ includes an individual, partnership, committee, association, 
corporation, and any other organization or group of persons.
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(2) The term ‘contribution’ includes a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of 
money, or anything of value, and includes an contract, promise, or agreement, 
whether or not legally enforceable, to make a contribution”. . .
The Act. . . is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
“SEC. 20. No political committee shall receive contributions aggregating more than 
$3,000,000, or make expenditures aggregating more than $3,000,000, during any cal-
endar year. For the purposes of this section, any contributions received and any expen-
ditures made on behalf of any political committee with the knowledge and consent of the 
chairman or treasurer of such committee shall be deemed to be received or made by such 
committee”. . .
The Smith-Connally Act
57 Stat. 163 (1943)
The problem of the growing participation of labor unions and organizations in campaign 
activities did not disappear after the implementation of the Hatch Act. Additionally, 
several strikes organized by the labor movement proved an effective tool in making 
labor leaders important actors in the political process. In order to limit their political 
power, in 1943 Congress passed the War Labor Disputes Act (or Smith-Connally Act). It 
was adopted over the veto of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose New Deal policies 
were backed by the representatives of the labor unions.
According to the most important provision of the Smith-Connally Act, the president 
was granted the power to seize industrial war plants if organized strikes endangered 
the war industry. From the perspective of campaign finance restrictions, labor unions 
were prohibited from contributing to federal election campaigns in the same manner 
as the Tillman Act banned banks and corporations. But the effectiveness of the bill was 
only temporary – it expired after the end of World War II, leaving the regulation of the 
problem of campaign contributions by labor unions to the next Congress.
An Act relating to the use and operation by the United States  
of certain plants, mines, and facilities in the prosecution of war, 
and preventing strikes, lock-outs, and stoppages of production, 
and for other purposes. . .
SEC. 9. Section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925 is amended to read as follows: 
“SEC. 313. It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority 
of any law of Congress, to make contribution in connection with any election to any political 
officer, or for any corporation whatever, or any labor organization to make a contribution in 
connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator 
or Representative in, or a Delegate or candidate, political committee, or other person to 
accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section. Every corporation or labor 
organization which makes any contribution in violation of this section shall be fined not more 
than $5,000; and every officer or director of any corporation, or officer of any labor or-
ganization, who consents to any contribution by the corporation or labor organization, as 
the case may be, in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $1,000 or impris-
oned for not more than one year, or both. For the purposes of this section ‘labor organization’ 
shall have the same meaning as under the National Labor Relations Act.”
The Taft-Hartley Act
61 Stat. 136 (1947)
The Labor Management Relations Act (known as the Taft-Hartley Act after its sponsor, 
Senator Robert Taft), which amended the famous National Labor Relations Act, referred 
to campaign finance law in only small part. It was aimed mainly at regulating the 
operation of labor unions, which meant imposing several restrictions on their powers, 
such as defining the types of strikes, which were prohibited, determining relations 
between employer and labor unions, and allowing the employer to use free speech rights 
against so-called “unionization.” In addition, however, the law permanently banned 
labor unions’ contributions to federal campaigns, as well as covering any expenses on 
behalf of the party, campaign committee, or candidate, or directly influencing primary 
elections, caucuses, political conventions and general elections.
As a result, labor unions and civil rights organizations tried to challenge the Taft-
Hartley Act in the courts, referring to the scope of the constitutional freedom of speech, 
but the judiciary did not answer these challenges in the affirmative. The only case which 
found part of the Act unconstitutional was United States v. Brown (1965), but the Court’s 
holding did not refer to the issues of campaign finance.
An Act to amend the National Labor Relations Act, to provide 
additional facilities for the mediation of labor disputes affecting 
commerce, to equalize legal responsibilities of labor organizations 
and employers, and for other purposes. . .
SEC. 304. Section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925, as amended, is 
amended to read as follows: “SEC. 313. It is unlawful for any national bank, or any 
corporation organized by authority of any law of Congress to make contribution or 
expenditure in connection with any election or any political office, or in connection with 
any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any 
political office, or for any corporation whatever, or any labor organization to make 
a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at which Presidential and 
Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident 
Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary 
election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the 
foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political committee, or other person to accept 
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or receive any contribution prohibited by this section. Every corporation or labor or-
ganization which makes any contribution or expenditure in violation of this section shall 
be fined not more than $5,000; and every officer or director of any corporation, or 
officer of any labor organization, who consents to any contribution or expenditure by 
the corporation or labor organization, as the case may be, in violation of this section 
shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. 
For the purpose of this section ‘labor organization’ means any organization of any kind, 
or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees 
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employ-
ers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, 
or condition of work.”
The Revenue Act
85 Stat. 497 (1971)
After a series of pieces of legislation concerning labor unions and their impact on political 
campaigns, a number of initiatives designed to reform campaign finance were brought up 
in Congress in the 1960s, with the most serious proposal coming from Louisiana Senator 
Russel B. Long. He pressed for new measures which would limit the amount of money 
pumped into federal campaigns, which would be essential in reducing the inequality 
stemming from the participation of rich donors in the electoral process. His argument 
rested on the concept of creating a system of public funding of elections, i.e. collecting 
subsidies for political parties which could be spent on political campaigns. He proposed 
establishing a special fund, called the Presidential Election Campaign Fund, financed 
from tax check-offs from federal taxes. Unfortunately for Long, his initiative did not 
survive strong opposition in Congress, and was defeated in 1967.
The concept of public funding through reform of the taxation system offered by 
Long remained one of the key ideas in the next Congress, which resulted in the passing 
of the Revenue Act of 1971, which was the first regulation to grant public subsidies to 
institutions and candidates involved in election campaigns. The Act created a system 
of voluntary tax check-offs for public funding programs, as well as minimum tax 
deductions for those who decided to give small contributions to candidates for federal 
offices. It established a system of public funding of presidential elections based on 
Long’s Presidential Election Campaign Fund, and determined the circumstances 
of public and private contributions in these races. The issue of public funding was 
further reformed in 1974 when Congress adopted amendments to the Federal Election 
Campaign Act.
An Act to provide a job development investment credit, to reduce 
individual income taxes, to reduce certain excise taxes,  
and for other purposes. . .
SEC. 801. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN FUND ACT
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is amended. . . CHAPTER 95—PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
CAMPAIGN FUND
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For purposes of this chapter—
(1) The term ‘authorized committee’ means, with respect to the candidates of a political 
party for President and Vice President of the United States, any political committee which 
is authorized in writing by such candidates to incur expenses to further the election of 
such candidates. Such authorization shall be addressed to the chairman of such political 
committee, and a copy of such authorization shall be filed by such candidates with the 
Comptroller General. Any withdrawal of any authorization shall also be in writing and shall 
be addressed and filed in the same manner as the authorization.
(2) The term ‘candidate’ means, with respect to any presidential election, an individual who 
(A) has been nominated for election to the office of President of the United States or the 
office of Vice President of the United States by a major party, or (B) has qualified to have 
his name on the election ballot (or to have the names of electors pledged to him on the 
election ballot) as the candidate of a political party for election to either such office in 10 or 
more States. For purposes of paragraphs (6) and (7) of this section and purposes of section 
9004(a) (2), the term ‘candidate’ means, with respect to any preceding presidential election, 
an individual who received popular votes for the office of President in such election.
(3) The term ‘Comptroller General’ means the Comptroller General of the United States.
(4) The term ‘eligible candidates’ means the candidates of a political party for President 
and Vice President of the United States who have met all applicable conditions for eligibil-
ity to receive payments under this chapter set forth in section 9003.
(5) The term ‘fund’ means the Presidential Election Campaign Fund established by section 
9006(a).
(6) The term ‘major party’ means, with respect to any presidential election, a political 
party whose candidate for the office of President in the preceding presidential election 
received, as the candidate of such party, 25 percent or more of the total number of 
popular votes received by all candidates for such office.
(7) The term ‘minor party’ means, with respect to any presidential election, a political 
party whose candidate for the office of President in the preceding presidential election 
received, as the candidate of such party, 5 percent or more but less than 25 percent of 
the total number of popular votes received by all candidates for such office.
(8) The term ‘new party’ means, with respect to any presidential election, a political 
party, which is neither a major party nor a minor party.
(9) The term ‘political committee’ means any committee, association, or organization 
(whether or not incorporated) which accepts contributions or makes expenditures for the 
purpose of influencing, or attempting to influence, the nomination or election of one or 
more individuals to Federal, State, or local elective public office.
(10) The term ‘presidential election’ means the election of presidential and vice-presi-
dential electors.
(11) The term ‘qualified campaign expense’ means an expense—
(A) incurred by the candidate of a political party for the office of President to further his 
election to such office or to further the election of the candidate of such political party for 
the office of Vice President, or both (ii) by the candidate of a political party for the office 
of Vice President to further his election to such office or to further the election of the 
candidate of such political party for the office of President, or both, or (iii) by an author-
ized committee of the candidates of a political party for the offices of President and Vice 
President to further the election of either or both of such candidates to such offices,
(B) incurred within the expenditure report period (as defined in paragraph (12)), or 
incurred before the beginning of such period to the extent such expense is for prop-
erty, services, or facilities used during such period, and
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(C) neither the incurring nor payment of which constitutes a violation of any law of 
the United States or of the State in which such expense is incurred or paid.
An expense shall be considered as incurred by a candidate or an authorized committee 
if it is incurred by a person authorized by such candidate or such committee, as the case 
may be, to incur such expense on behalf of such candidate or such committee. If an 
authorized committee of the candidates of a political party for President a n d  Vice President 
of the United States also incurs expenses to further the election of one or more other 
individuals to Federal, State, or local elective public office, expenses incurred by such 
committee which are not specifically to further the election of such other individual or 
individuals shall be considered as incurred to further the election of such candidates for 
President and Vice President in such proportion as the Comptroller General prescribes by 
rules or regulations.
(12) The term ‘expenditure report period’ with respect to any presidential election 
means—
(A) in the case of a major party, the period beginning with the first day of September 
before the election, or, if earlier, with the date on which such major party at its na-
tional convention nominated its candidate for election to the office of President of the 
United States, and ending 30 days after the date of the presidential election; and
(B) in the case of a party which is not a major party, the same period as the ex-
penditure report period of the major party which has the shortest expenditure report 
period for such presidential election under subparagraph (A) .
SEC. 9003. CONDITION FOR ELIGIBILITY FOR PAYMENTS
(a) IN GENERAL—In order to be eligible to receive any payments under section 9006, the 
candidates of a political party in a presidential election shall, in writing—
(1) agree to obtain and furnish to the Comptroller General such evidence as he may request 
of the qualified campaign expenses with respect to which payment is sought,
(2) agree to keep and furnish to the Comptroller General such records, books, and other 
information as he may request,
(3) agree to an audit and examination by the Comptroller General under section 9007 
and to pay any amounts required to be paid under such section, and
(4) agree to furnish statements of qualified campaign expenses and proposed qualified 
campaign expenses required under section 9008.
(b) MAJOR PARTIES—In order to be eligible to receive any payments under section 9006, 
the candidates of a major party in a presidential election shall certify to the Comptroller 
General, under penalty of perjury, that—
(1) such candidates a n d  their authorized committees will n o t  incur qualified campaign 
expenses in excess of the aggregate payments to which they will be entitled under section 
9004, and
(2) no contributions to defray qualified campaign expenses have been or will be accepted 
by such candidates or any of their authorized committees except to the extent necessary 
to make up any deficiency in payments received out of the fund on account o f  t h e 
application of section 9006(c), a n d  n o  contributions t o  defray expenses which would 
be qualified campaign expenses but for subparagraph (C) of section 9002(11) have been 
or will be accepted by such candidates or any of their authorized committees. Such 
certification shall be made within such time prior to the day of the presidential election 
as the Comptroller General shall prescribe by rules or regulations.
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(c) MINOR AND NEW PARTIES—In order to be eligible to receive any payments under 
section 9006, the candidates of a minor or new party in a presidential election shall 
certify to the Comptroller General, under penalty of perjury, that—
(1) such candidates and their authorized committees will not incur qualified campaign 
expenses in excess of the aggregate payments to which the eligible candidates of 
a major party are entitled under section 9004, and
(2) such candidates and their authorized committees will accept and expend or retain 
contributions to defray qualified campaign expenses only to the extent that the qualified 
campaign expenses incurred by such candidates and their authorized committees certified 
to under paragraph (1) exceed the aggregate payments received by such candidates out 
of the fund pursuant to section 9006.
Such certification shall be made within such time prior to the day of the presidential 
election as the Comptroller General shall prescribe by rules or regulations.
SEC. 9004. ENTITLEMENT OF ELIGIBLE CANDIDATES TO PAYMENTS
(a) IN GENERAL—Subject to the provisions of this Chapter—
(1) The eligible candidates of a major party in a presidential election shall be entitled to 
payments under section 9006 equal in the aggregate to 15 cents multiplied by the total 
number of residents within the United States who have attained the age of 18, as deter-
mined by the Bureau of the Census, as of the first day of June of the year preceding the 
year of the presidential election.
(2) (A) The eligible candidates of a minor party in a presidential election shall be entitled 
to payments under section 9006 equal in the aggregate to an amount which bears the 
same ratio to the amount computed under paragraph (1) for a major party as the number 
of popular votes received by the candidate for President of the minor party, as such 
candidate, in the preceding presidential election bears to the average number of popular 
votes received by the candidates for President of the major parties in the preceding 
presidential election.
(B) If the candidate of one or more political parties (not including a major party) for the 
office of President was a candidate for such office in the preceding presidential election 
and received 5 percent or more but less than 25 percent of the total number of popular 
votes received by all candidates for such office, such candidate and his running mate for 
the office of Vice President, upon compliance with the provisions of section 9003 (a) and 
(c), shall be treated a s  eligible candidates entitled t o  payments under section 9006 in 
an amount computed as provided in subparagraph by taking into account all the popular 
votes received by such candidate for the office of President in the preceding presidential 
election. I f  eligible candidates of a minor party are entitled to payments under this 
subparagraph such entitlement shall be reduced by the amount of the entitlement allowed 
under subparagraph (A).
(3) The eligible candidates of a minor party o r  a new party in a presidential election 
whose candidate for President in such election receives, as such candidate, 5 percent or 
more of the total number of popular votes cast for the office of President in such election 
shall be entitled to payments under section 9006 equal in the aggregate to an amount 
which bears the same ratio to the amount computed under paragraph (1) for a major 
party as the number of popular votes received by such candidate in such election bears 
to the average number of popular votes received in such election by the candidates for 
President of the major parties. In the case of eligible candidates entitled to payments 
under paragraph (2), the amount allowable under this paragraph shall be limited to the 
amount, if any, by which the entitlement under the preceding sentence exceeds the 
amount of the entitlement under paragraph
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(2)(b) LIMITATIONS—The aggregate payments to which the eligible candidates of a po-
litical party shall be entitled under subsections (a) (2) and (3) with respect t o  a presi-
dential election shall not exceed an amount equal to the lower of—
(1) the amount of qualified campaign expenses incurred by such eligible candidates 
and their authorized committees, reduced by the amount of contributions to defray 
qualified campaign expenses received and expended or retained by such eligible 
candidates and such committees, or
(2) the aggregate payments to which the eligible candidates of a major party are 
entitled under subsection (a) (1), reduced by the amount of contributions described 
in paragraph (1) of this subsection.
(c) RESTRICTIONS—The eligible candidates of a political party .shall be entitled to payments 
under subsection (a) only—
(1) to defray qualified campaign expenses incurred by such eligible candidates or their 
authorized committees, or
(2) to repay loans the proceeds of which were used to defray such qualified campaign 
expenses, o r otherwise t o restore funds (other than contributions to defray qualified 
campaign expenses received and expended by such candidates or such committees) 
used to defray such qualified campaign expenses.
SEC. 9005. CERTIFICATION BY COMPTROLLER GENERAL
(a) INITIAL CERTIFICATIONS—On the basis of the evidence, books, records, and informa-
tion furnished by the eligible candidates of a political party and prior to examination and 
audit under section 9007, the Comptroller General shall certify from time to time to the 
Secretary for payment to such candidates under section 9006 the payments to which 
such candidates are entitled under section 9004.
(b) FINALITY OF CERTIFICATIONS AND DETERMINATIONS—Initial certifications by the 
Comptroller General under subsection (a), and all determinations made by him under this 
chapter, shall be final and conclusive, except to the extent that they are subject to exa­
mination and audit by the Comptroller General under section 9007 and judicial review 
under section 9011.
SEC. 9006. PAYMENTS TO ELIGIBLE CANDIDATES
(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF CAMPAIGN FUND—There is hereby established on the books of the 
Treasury of the United States a special fund to be known as the ‘Presidential Election 
Campaign Fund’. The Secretary shall maintain in the fund (1) a separate account for the 
candidates of each major party, each minor party, and each new party for which a specific 
designation is made under section 6096 for payment into an account in the fund and 
(2) a general account for which no specific designation is made. The Secretary shall, as 
provided by appropriation Acts, transfer to each account in the fund an amount not in excess 
of the sum of the amounts designated (subsequent to the previous presidential election) to 
such account by individuals under section 6096 for payment into such account of the fund.
(b) TRANSFER TO THE GENERAL FUND—If, after a presidential election and after all eli-
gible candidates have been paid the amount which they are entitled to receive under this 
chapter, there are moneys remaining in any account in the fund, the Secretary shall 
transfer the moneys so remaining to the general fund of the Treasury.
(c) PAYMENTS FROM THE FUND—Upon receipt of a certification from the Comptroller 
General under section 9005 for payment to the eligible candidates of a political party, the 
Secretary shall pay to such candidates out of the specific account in the fund for such 
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candidates the amount certified by the Comptroller General. Payments to eligible candidates 
from the account designated for them shall be limited to the amounts in such account at 
the time of payment. Amounts paid to any such candidates shall be under the control of 
such candidates.
(d) TRANSFERS FROM GENERAL ACCOUNT TO SEPARATE ACCOUNTS—
(1) If, on the 60th day prior to the presidential election, the moneys in any separate account 
in the fund are less than the aggregate entitlement under section 9004(a)(1) or (2) of the 
eligible candidates to which such account relates, 80 percent of the amount in the gen-
eral account shall be transferred to the separate accounts (whether or not all the candidates 
to which such separate accounts relate are eligible candidates) in the ratio of the entitle-
ment under section 9004(a) (1) or (2) of the candidates to which such accounts relate. 
No amount shall be transferred to any separate account under the preceding sentence 
which, when added to the moneys in that separate account prior to any payment out of 
that account during the calendar year, would be in excess of the aggregate entitlement 
under section 9004(a) (1) or (2) of the candidates to whom such account relates.
(2) If, at the close of the expenditure report period, the moneys in any separate account 
in the fund are not sufficient to satisfy any unpaid entitlement of the eligible candidates 
to which such account relates, the balance in the general account shall be transferred to 
the separate accounts in the following manner:
(A) For the separate account of the candidates of a major party, compute the percentage 
which the average number of popular votes received by the candidates for President of 
the major parties is of the total number of popular votes cast for the office of President 
in the election.
(B) For the separate account of the candidates of a minor or new party, compute the 
percentage which the popular votes received for President by the candidate to which such 
account relates is of the total number of popular votes cast for the office of President in 
the election.
(C) I n  the case of each separate account, multiply the applicable percentage obtained 
under subparagraph (A) or (B) for such account by the amount of the money in the 
general account prior to any distribution made under paragraph (1), and transfer to such 
separate account an amount equal to the excess of the product of such multiplication over 
the amount of any distribution made under such paragraph to such account.
The Federal Election Campaign Act  
of 1971
86 Stat. 3 (1972)
The Revenue Act was not the most important legislation of 1971 regarding campaign 
finance reform. From the late 1960s Congress had been preparing a thorough reform of 
the system, and the scandals of Bobby Baker and Thomas Dodd involving financial issues, 
as well as the increasing amount of money spent by candidates in every presidential 
election, only confirmed the necessity of the reform. The ineffectiveness of the earlier 
regulations, and the financial situation of the Democratic Party after the 1968 election 
cycle during which it generated huge debt, sped up the decision of the legislators to 
announce the largest campaign finance bill up to that point.
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), signed into law by President 
Richard Nixon in early 1972, addressed various issues referring to the proper conduct of 
election campaigns on the federal level of government. Its major provisions concerned 
two types of limits, which were set for the amount of contributions and the amount of 
spending for media advertising, depending on the type of election, the contributing 
entity, and the character of the contribution. For instance, for media campaigns 
candidates were now able to spend as much as 10 cents per voter of the eligible voting 
population. FECA also limited the amounts candidates and their immediate families 
could themselves contribute to their electoral efforts. The law provided for a more 
complex system of quarterly public disclosure of receipts and expenditures. It now 
required the inclusion of every expense of $100 or more, and on the donation side 
it asked for every receipt of $100 or more, including the donor’s name, address, and 
occupation. The imposition of these restrictions was problematic, because in order to 
assure the enforcement of the laws, the Act gave the control over the disclosure system 
to various federal entities. House candidates were obliged to report to the Clerk of the 
House, Senate hopefuls to the Secretary of the Senate, and presidential candidates to 
the U.S. General Accounting Office (today the Government Accountability Office). In 
addition, candidates and campaign committees had to report to the appropriate secretary 
of state, depending on where the campaign funds were spent. It did not take long for this 
to prove ineffective. Although amended several times, the Federal Election Campaign 
Act, along with the Revenue Act of 1971, became a landmark piece of campaign 
finance regulation, consolidating the rules governing former pieces of legislation and 
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establishing a new approach to contributions and spending in election campaigns. It 
is today regarded as the main source of the evolution of political action committees 
(PACs), which are a significant part of the electoral process in the United States.
An Act to promote fair practices in the conduct of election 
campaigns for Federal political offices, and for other purposes. . .
SEC. 104. (a) (1) Subject to paragraph (4), no legally qualified candidate in an election 
(other than a primary or primary runoff election) for Federal elective office may—
(A) spend for the use of communications media on behalf of his candidacy in such election 
a total amount in excess of the greater of (i) 10 cents multiplied by the voting age pop-
ulation (as certified under paragraph (5)) of the geographical area in which the election 
for such office is held, or (ii) $50,000, or (B) spend for the use of broadcast stations on 
behalf of his candidacy in such election a total amount in excess of 60 per centum of the 
amount determined under subparagraph (A) with respect to such election.
(2) No legally qualified candidate in a primary election for nomination to a Federal elective 
office, other than President, may spend (A) for the use of communications media, or 
(B) for the use of broadcast stations, on behalf of his candidacy in such election a total 
amount in excess of the amounts determined under paragraph (1) (A) or (B), respective-
ly, with respect to the general election for such office. For purposes of this subsection 
a primary runoff election shall be treated as a separate primary election.
(3) (A) No person who is a candidate for presidential nomination may spend (i) for the 
use in a State of communications media, or (ii) for the use in a State of broadcast stations, 
on behalf of his candidacy for presidential nomination a total amount in excess of the 
amounts which would have been determined under paragraph (1) (A) or (B), respective-
ly, had he been a candidate for election for the office of Senator from such State (or for 
the office of Delegate or Resident Commissioner in the case of the District of Columbia 
or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico).
(B) For purposes of this paragraph (3), a person is a candidate for presidential nomination 
if he makes (or any other person makes on his behalf) an expenditure for the use of any 
communications medium on behalf of his candidacy for any political party’s nomination 
for election to the office of President. He shall be considered to be such a candidate during 
the period (i) beginning on the date on which he (or such other person) first makes such 
an expenditure (or, if later, January 1 of the year in which the election for the office of 
President is held), and (ii) ending on the date on which such political party nominates 
a candidate for the office of President. For purposes of this title and of section 315 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, a candidate for presidential nomination shall be considered 
a legally qualified candidate for public office.
(C) The Comptroller General shall prescribe regulations under which any expenditure by 
a candidate for presidential nomination for the use in two or more States of a communi-
cations medium shall be attributed to such candidate’s expenditure limitation in each such 
State, based on the number of persons in such State who can reasonably be expected to 
be reached by such communications medium. . .
SEC. 203. Section 608 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
§ 608. Limitations on contributions and expenditures
(a) (1) No candidate may make expenditures from his personal funds, or the personal 
funds of his immediate family, in connection with his campaign for nomination for election, 
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or election, to Federal office in excess of (A) $50,000, in the case of a candidate for the 
office of President or Vice President; (B) $35,000, in the case of a candidate for the office 
of Senator; or (C) $25,000, in the case of a candidate for the office of Representative, or 
Delegate or Resident Commissioner to the Congress.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, ‘immediate family’ means a candidate’s spouse, and 
any child, parent, grandparent, brother, or sister of the candidate, and the spouses of 
such persons. (b) No candidate or political committee shall knowingly accept any contri-
bution or authorize any expenditure in violation of the provisions of this section. (c) Violation 
of the provisions of this section is punishable by a fine not to exceed $1,000, imprisonment 
for not to exceed one year, or both. . .
SEC. 205. Section 610 of title 18, United States Code, relating to contributions or expen-
ditures by national banks, corporations, or labor organizations, is amended by adding at 
the end thereof the following paragraph:
As used in this section, the phrase ‘contribution or expenditure’ shall include any direct 
or indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money, or any services, 
or anything of value (except a loan of money by a national or State bank made in accor-
dance with the applicable banking laws and regulations and in the ordinary course of 
business) to any candidate, campaign commit- tee, or political party or organization, in 
connection with any election to any of the offices referred to in this section; but shall not 
include communications by a corporation to its stockholders and their families or by 
a labor organization to its members and their families on any subject; nonpartisan reg-
istration and get-out-the-vote campaigns by a corporation aimed at its stockholders and 
their families, or by a labor organization aimed at its members and their families; the 
establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated 
fund to be utilized for political purposes by a corporation or labor organization: Provided, 
That it shall be unlawful for such a fund to make a contribution or expenditure by utilizing 
money or any­ thing of value secured by physical force, job discrimination, financial re-
prisals, or the threat of force, job discrimination, or financial reprisal; or by dues, fees, 
or other monies required as a condition of membership in a labor organization or as 
a condition of employment, or by monies obtained in any commercial transaction.
SEC. 206. Section 611 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
§ 611. Contributions by Government contractors: Whoever— (a) entering into any contract 
with the United States or any department or agency thereof either for the rendition of 
personal services or furnishing any material, supplies, or equipment to the United States 
or any department or agency thereof or for selling any land or building to the United 
States or any department or agency thereof, if payment for the performance of such 
contract or payment for such material, supplies, equipment, land, or building is to be 
made in whole or in part from funds appropriated by the Congress, at any time between 
the commencement of negotiations for and the later of (1) the completion of performance 
under, or (2) the termination of negotiations for, such contract or furnishing of material, 
supplies, equipment, land or buildings, directly or indirectly makes any contribution of 
money or other thing of value, or promises expressly or impliedly to make any such 
contribution, to any political party, committee, or candidate for public office or to any 
person for any political purpose or use; or (b) knowingly solicits any such contribution 
from any such person for any such purpose during any such period; shall be fined not 
more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. . .
TITLE III—DISCLOSURE OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FUNDS DEFINITIONS
SEC. 301. When used in this title—
(a) “election” means (1) a general, special, primary, or runoff election, (2) a convention 
or caucus of a political party held to nominate a candidate, (3) a primary election held for 
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the selection of delegates to a national nominating convention of a political party, (4) a pri-
mary election held for the expression of a preference for the nomination of persons for 
election to the office of President, and (5) the election of delegates to a constitutional 
convention for proposing amendments to the Constitution of the United States;
(b) “candidate” means an individual who seeks nomination for election, or election, to 
Federal office, whether or not such individual is elected, and, for purposes of this paragraph, 
an individual shall be deemed to seek nomination for election, or election, if he has 
(1) taken the action necessary under the law of a State to qualify himself for nomination 
for election, or election, to Federal office, or (2) received contributions or made expenditures, 
or has given his consent for any other person to receive contributions or make expenditures, 
with a view to bringing about his nomination for election, or election, to such office;
(c) “Federal office” means the office of President or Vice President of the United States; 
or of Senator or Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress 
of the United States;
(d) “political committee” means any committee, association, or organization which accepts 
contributions or makes expenditures during a calendar year in an aggregate amount 
exceeding $1,000;
(e) “contribution” means— (1) a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or 
anything of value, made for the purpose of influencing the nomination for election, or 
election, of any person to Federal office or as a presidential or vice­presidential elector, 
or for the purpose of influencing the result of a primary held for the selection of delegates 
to a national nominating convention of a political party or for the expression of a prefer-
ence for the nomination of persons for election to the office of President, or for the purpose 
of influencing the election of delegates to a constitutional convention for proposing 
amendments to the Constitution of the United States; (2) a contract, promise, or 
agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, to make a contribution for any such 
purpose; (3) a transfer of funds between political committees; (4) the payment, by any 
person other than a candidate or political committee, of compensation for the personal 
services of another person which are rendered to such candidate or committee without 
charge for any such purpose; and (5) notwithstanding the foregoing meanings of “con-
tribution”, the word shall not be construed to include services provided without compen-
sation by individuals volunteering a portion or all of their time on behalf of a candidate 
or political committee;
(f) “expenditure” means— (1) a purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, depos-
it, or gift of money or anything of value, made for the purpose of influencing the nomi-
nation for election, or election, of any person to Federal office, or as a presidential and 
vice­presidential elector, or for the purpose of influencing the result of a primary held for 
the selection of delegates to a national nominating convention of a political party or for 
the expression of a preference for the nomination of persons for election to the office of 
President, or for the purpose of influencing the election of delegates to a constitutional 
convention for proposing amendments to the Constitution of the United States; (2) a con-
tract, promise, or agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, to make an expenditure, 
and (3) a transfer of funds between political committees;
(g) “supervisory officer” means the Secretary of the Senate with respect to candidates 
for Senator; the Clerk of the House of Representatives with respect to candidates for 
Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress of the United 
States; and the Comptroller General of the United States in any other case;
(h) “person” means an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation, labor 
organization, and any other organization or group of persons; and
(i) “State” means each State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.
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ORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL COMMITTEES
SEC. 302. (a) Every political committee shall have a chairman and a treasurer. No con-
tribution and no expenditure shall be accepted or made by or on behalf of a political 
committee at a time when there is a vacancy in the office of chairman or treasurer 
thereof. No expenditure shall be made for or on behalf of a political committee without 
the authorization of its chairman or treasurer, or their designated agents.
(b) Every person who receives a contribution in excess of $10 for a political committee 
shall, on demand of the treasurer, and in any event within five days after receipt of such 
contribution, render to the treasurer a detailed account thereof, including the amount, 
the name and address (occupation and the principal place of business, if any) of the 
person making such contribution, and the date on which received. All funds of a political 
committee shall be segregated from, and may not be commingled with, any personal 
funds of officers, members, or associates of such committee.
(c) It shall be the duty of the treasurer of a political committee to Recordkeeping. keep 
a detailed and exact account of— (1) all contributions made to or for such committee; 
(2) the full name and mailing address (occupation and the principal place of business, if 
any) of every person making a contribution in excess of $10, and the date and amount 
thereof; (3) all expenditures made by or on behalf of such committee; and (4) the full 
name and mailing address (occupation and the principal place of business, if any) of 
every person to whom any expenditure is made, the date and amount thereof and the 
name and address of, and office sought by, each candidate on whose behalf such expen-
diture was made.
(d) It shall be the duty of the treasurer to obtain and keep a receipted bill, stating the 
particulars, for every expenditure made by or on behalf of a political committee in excess 
of $100 in amount, and for any such expenditure in a lesser amount, if the aggregate 
amount of such expenditures to the same person during a calendar year exceeds $100. 
The treasurer shall preserve all receipted bills and accounts required to be kept by this 
section for periods of time to be determined by the supervisory officer.
(e) Any political committee which solicits or receives contributions or makes expenditures 
on behalf of any candidate that is not authorized in writing by such candidate to do so 
shall include a notice on the face or front page of all literature and advertisements published 
in connection with such candidate’s campaign by such committee or on its behalf stating 
that the committee is not authorized by such candidate and that such candidate is not 
responsible for the activities of such committee. . .
REGISTRATION OF POLITICAL COMMITTEES; STATEMENTS
SEC. 303. (a) Each political committee which anticipates receiving contributions or 
making expenditures during the calendar year in an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000 
shall file with the supervisory officer a statement of organization, within ten days after 
its organization or, if later, ten days after the date on which it has information which 
causes the committee to anticipate it will receive contributions or make expenditures in 
excess of $1,000. Each such committee in existence at the date of enactment of this Act 
shall file a statement of organization with the supervisory officer at such time as he 
prescribes.
(b) The statement of organization shall include— (1) the name and address of the com-
mittee; (2) the names, addresses, and relationships of affiliated or connected organizations; 
(3) the area, scope, or jurisdiction of the committee; (4) the name, address, and position 
of the custodian of books and accounts; (5) the name, address, and position of other 
principal officers, including officers and members of the finance committee, if any; (6) the 
name, address, office sought, and party affiliation of (A) each candidate whom the 
committee is supporting, and (B) any other individual, if any, whom the committee is 
39
supporting for nomination for election, or election, to any public office whatever; or, if 
the committee is supporting the entire ticket of any party, the name of the party; 
(7) a statement whether the committee is a continuing one; (8) the disposition of resid-
ual funds which will be made in the event of dissolution; (9) a listing of all banks, safety 
deposit boxes, or other repositories used; (10) a statement of the reports required to be 
filed by the committee with State or local officers, and, if so, the names, addresses, and 
positions of such persons; and (11) such other information as shall be required by the 
supervisory officer.
(c) Any change in information previously submitted in a statement of organization shall 
be reported to the supervisory officer within a ten­day period following the change.
(d) Any committee which, after having filed one or more statements of organization, 
disbands or determines it will no longer receive contributions or make expenditures during 
the calendar year in an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000 shall so notify the supervi-
sory officer.
REPORTS BY POLITICAL COMMITTEES AND CANDIDATES
SEC. 304. (a) Each treasurer of a political committee supporting a candidate or candidates 
for election to Federal office, and each candidate for election to such office, shall file with 
the appropriate supervisory officer reports of receipts and expenditures on forms to be 
prescribed or approved by him. Such reports shall be filed on the tenth day of March, 
June, and September, in each year, and on the fifteenth and fifth days next preceding the 
date on which an election is held. Completion date, and also by the thirty­first day of 
January. Such reports shall be complete as of such date as the supervisory officer may 
prescribe, which shall not be less than five days before the date of filing, except that any 
contribution of $5,000 or more received after the last report is filed prior to the election 
shall be reported within forty-eight hours after its receipt. . .
REPORTS BY OTHERS THAX POLITICAL COMMITTEES
SEC. 305. Every person (other than a political committee or candidate) who makes 
contributions or expenditures, other than by contribution to a political committee or 
candidate, in an aggregate amount in excess of $100 within a calendar year shall file with 
the supervisory officer a statement containing the information required by section 304. 
Statements required by this section shall be filed on the dates on which reports by polit-
ical committees are filed, but need not be cumulative. . .
The Federal Election Campaign Act 
Amendments of 1974
88 Stat. 1263 (1974)
The limited success of the authors of the FECA, stemming from the ineffectiveness 
of its various provisions, mainly those referring to the public disclosure of financial 
documents from election campaigns, stimulated legislators to search for a quick revision 
of the document and insert necessary amendments. Such an approach was especially 
characteristic after the lack of pre-election disclosure of expenditures by President Richard 
Nixon in the 1972 campaign, when the public found out that the Republican candidate 
collected more than $11 million from various sources. Apart from the disclosure failure, 
even more decisive for congressional action was the outbreak of the Watergate scandal, 
which revealed the illegal activities of the Committee to Re-Elect the President, putting 
the whole problem of money and politics at the center of social concern.
The authors of the amendment opted for strengthening the disclosure system, 
furthering limits to campaign contributions and spending, and creating a comprehensive 
system of public funding for presidential elections, based on the earlier provisions of the 
1971 laws. The most significant aspect of the 1974 legislation, however, was the creation 
of an independent administrative agency, the Federal Election Commission (FEC), which 
would be responsible for administering and enforcing campaign finance laws, including 
oversight of the presidential election public fund. Prior to this the system had lacked 
such an institution; this was one of the major reasons for its ineffectiveness. Therefore, 
the creation of the Commission was aimed at enhancing the disclosure procedures, 
implementing further regulations on campaign finance, and investigating alleged 
violations of the laws concerning campaign finance by both contributors and candidates. 
Another important innovation was a limit on so-called independent expenditures. These 
were all the expenses made on behalf of the candidates by the political parties or the 
outside groups without the coordination with them, their campaign committees or 
political parties. Before the new law took effect, however, it was challenged in court, 
leading to the milestone Supreme Court decision on the scope of campaign finance 
regulations, Buckley v. Valeo.
41
An Act to impose overall limitations on campaign expenditures 
and political contributions; to provide that each candidate for 
Federal office shall designate a principal campaign committee; 
to provide for a single reporting responsibility with respect 
to receipts and expenditures by certain political committees; 
to change the times for the filing of reports regarding campaign 
expenditures and political contributions; to provide for public 
financing of Presidential nominating conventions and Presidential 
primary elections; and for other purposes. . .
SEC. 310 (a) (1) There is established a commission to be known as the Federal Election 
Commission. The Commission is composed of the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk 
of the House of Representatives, ex officio and without the right to vote, and 6 members 
appointed as follows: (A) 2 shall be appointed, with the confirmation of a majority of both 
Houses of the Congress, by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon the recom-
mendations of the majority leader of the Senate and the minority leader of the Senate; 
(B) 2 shall be appointed, with the confirmation of a majority of both Houses of the Congress, 
by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, upon the recommendations of the ma-
jority leader of the House and the minority leader of the House; and (C) 2 shall be ap-
pointed, with the confirmation of a majority of both Houses of the Congress, by the 
President of the United States. A member appointed under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) 
shall not be affiliated with the same political party as the other member appointed under 
such paragraph.
(2) Members of the Commission shall serve for terms of 6 years, except that of the 
members first appointed—(A) one of the members appointed under paragraph (1) (A) 
shall be appointed for a term ending on the April 30 first occur­ ring more than 6 months 
after the date on which he is appointed; (B) one of the members appointed under 
paragraph (1) (B) shall be appointed for a term ending 1 year after the April 30 on which 
the term of the member referred to in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph ends; (C) one 
of the members appointed under paragraph (1) (C) shall be appointed for a term ending 
2 years thereafter; (D) one of the members appointed under paragraph (1) (A) shall be 
appointed for a term ending 3 years thereafter; (E) one of the members appointed under 
paragraph (1) (B) shall be appointed for a term ending 4 years thereafter; and (F) one 
of the members appointed under paragraph (1) (C) shall be appointed for a term ending 
5 years thereafter. An individual appointed to fill a vacancy occurring other than by the 
expiration of a term of office shall be appointed only for the unexpired term of the 
member he succeeds. Any vacancy occurring in the member- ship of the Commission 
shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original appointment.
(3) Members shall be chosen on the basis of their maturity, experience, integrity, impar-
tiality, and good judgment and shall be chosen from among individuals who, at the time 
of their appointment, are not elected or appointed officers or employees in the executive, 
legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States.
(4) Members of the Commission (other than the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk 
of the House of Representatives) shall receive compensation equivalent to the compen-
sation paid at level IV of the Executive Schedule (5 U.S.C. 5315).
(5) The Commission shall elect a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members 
(other than the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives) 
for a term of one year. No member may serve as chairman more often than once during 
any term of office to which he is appointed. The chairman and the vice chairman shall 
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not be affiliated with the same political party. The vice chairman shall act as chairman in 
the absence or disability of the chairman, or in the event of a vacancy in such office.
(b) The Commission shall administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and formulate 
policy with respect to this Act and sections 608, 610, 611, 613, 614, 615, 616, and 617 of 
title 18, United States Code. The Commission has primary jurisdiction with respect to the 
civil enforcement of such provisions.
(c) All decisions of the Commission with respect to the exercise of its duties and powers 
under the provisions of this title shall be made by a majority vote of the members of the 
Commission. A member of the Commission may not delegate to any person his vote or 
any decision-making authority or duty vested in the Commission by the provisions of 
this title.
(d) The Commission shall meet at least once each month and also at the call of any 
member.
(e) The Commission shall prepare written rules for the conduct of its activities, shall have 
an official seal which shall be judicially noticed, and shall have its principal office in or 
near the District of Columbia (but it may meet or exercise any of its powers anywhere in 
the United States). . .
SEC. 311. (a) The Commission has the power— (1) to require, by special or general orders, 
any person to submit in writing such reports and answers to questions as the Commission 
may prescribe; and such submission shall be made within such a reasonable period of 
time and under oath or otherwise as the Commission may determine; (2) to administer 
oaths or affirmations; (3) to require by subpoena, signed by the chairman or the vice 
chairman, the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all documen-
tary evidence relating to the execution of its duties; (4) in any proceeding or investigation, 
to order testimony to be taken by deposition before any person who is designated by the 
Commission and has the power to administer oaths and, in such instances, to compel 
testimony and the production of evidence in the same manner as authorized under 
paragraph (3) of this subsection; (5) to pay witnesses the same fees and mileage as are 
paid in like circumstances in the courts of the United States; (6) to initiate (through 
civil proceedings for injunctive, declaratory, or other appropriate relief), defend, or appeal 
any civil action in the name of the Commission for the purpose of enforcing the provisions 
of this Act, through its general counsel; (7) to render advisory opinions under section 
313; (8) to make, amend, and repeal such rules, pursuant to the provisions of chapter 
5 of title 5, United States Code, as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act; 
(9) to formulate general policy with respect to the administration of this Act and sections 
608, 610, 611, 613, 614, 615, 616,and 617 of title 18, United States Code; (10) to de-
velop prescribed forms under section 311(a)(1); and (11) to conduct investigations and 
hearings expeditiously, to encourage voluntary compliance, and to report apparent vio-
lations to the appropriate law enforcement authorities.
(b) Any United States district court within the jurisdiction of which any inquiry is carried 
on, may, upon petition by the Commission, in case of refusal to obey a subpoena or order 
of the Commission issued under subsection (a) of this section, issue an order requiring 
compliance therewith. Any failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the 
court as contempt thereof.
(c) No person shall be subject to civil liability to any person (other than the Commission 
or the United States) for disclosing information a t the request of the Commission.
(d) (1) Whenever the Commission submits any budget estimate or request to the President 
of the United States or the Office of Management and Budget, it shall concurrently 
transmit a copy of such estimate or request to the Congress. (2) Whenever the Commission 
submits any legislative recommendations, or testimony, or comments on legislation, 
requested by the Congress or by any Member of the Congress, to the President of the 
United States or the Office of Management and Budget, it shall concurrently transmit 
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a copy thereof to the Congress or to the Member requesting the same. No officer or 
agency of the United States shall have any authority to require the Commission to submit 
its legislative recommendations, testimony, or comments on legislation, to any office or 
agency of the United States for approval, comments, or review, prior to the submission 
of such recommendations, testimony, or comments to the Congress.
SEC. 312. The Commission shall transmit reports to the President of the United States 
and to each House of the Congress no later than March 31 of each year. Each such report 
shall contain a detailed statement with respect to the activities of the Commission in 
carrying out its duties under this title, together with recommendations for such legislative 
or other action as the Commission considers appropriate.
SEC. 313. (a) Upon written request to the Commission by any individual holding Federal 
office, any candidate for Federal office, or any political committee, the Commission shall 
render an advisory opinion, in writing, within a reasonable time with respect to whether 
any specific transaction or activity by such individual, candidate, or political committee 
would constitute a violation of this Act, of chapter 95 or chapter 96 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954, or of section 608, 610, 611, 613, 614, 615, 616, or 617 of title 18, United 
States Code.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person with respect to whom an 
advisory opinion is rendered under subsection (a) who acts in good faith in accordance 
with the provisions and findings of such advisory opinion shall be presumed to be in 
compliance with the provision of this Act, of chapter 95 or chapter 96 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954, or of section 608, 610, 611, 613, 614, 615, 616, or 617 of title 
18, United States Code, with respect to which such advisory opinion is rendered.
(c) Any request made under subsection (a) shall be made public by the Commission. The 
Commission shall, before rendering an advisory opinion with respect to such request, 
provide any interested party with an opportunity to transmit written comments to the 
Com- mission with respect to such request.
Buckley v. Valeo
424 U.S. 1 (1976)
Almost no other case has had such a significant impact on the constitutional meaning of 
campaign finance laws as Buckley v. Valeo. Analysts of the issue often divide the history 
of money in the federal electoral process into the pre-Buckley and post-Buckley eras, 
demonstrating that the 1976 Supreme Court decision introduced a new understanding of 
the regulation of campaign finance. Opponents of the FECA and its amendment argued 
that some limits on campaign donations and expenses severely violated the Constitution, 
as they endangered the First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. 
The First Amendment’s clause referring to the right to express oneself, the right to 
decide about the amount of money spent in a campaign by the candidate, and the right 
to information concerning the candidates, led to the very original conclusion reached by 
the majority of Justices that “money talks,” and that, therefore, the process of spending 
money in electoral campaigns is a type of expression called political speech.
The lawsuit was filed by conservative Senator James Buckley against a former 
member of Federal Election Commission, Francis Valeo, who represented the U.S. 
government. When the District Court and Court of Appeals decided against Buckley, he 
appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted review. The main issue in the case referred 
to the constitutionality of the provisions of the 1971 and 1974 legislation, which imposed 
expenditure limits on candidates in federal campaigns, but the Court, in a per curiam 
opinion, determined not only the status of campaign spending but also of individual and 
group contributions to candidates. On the one hand, the Justices upheld contribution limits, 
explaining their important anti-corruption role, but on the other they found expenditure 
limits to be in contradiction to freedom of speech and expression. In other words, the 
American government, having an interest in fighting corruption, had a compelling state 
interest to impose limitations on contributions, but not on campaign spending. Moreover, 
several passages of the Buckley decision seem to contradict each other. For instance, 
if presidential candidates applied to use the public fund, the expenditure limit would 
be constitutional. But if they chose to reject it, they were free to spend as much as 
they wished. Provided they were not coordinated with the candidate or any campaign 
committee, the Court struck down the independent expenditures limits, contributing to the 
growing influence of outside spending. One of the most important provisions introduced 
in Buckley was a test that would distinguish between kinds of advocacy presented in an 
election communication. If the communication – e.g. media advertisement – included 
the words ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote 
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against,’ ‘defeat,’ or ‘reject,’ it would indicate express advocacy for a candidate. Only 
this kind of speech, express advocacy, could be regulated by Congress. In contrast, issue 
advocacy was declared to be a communication not containing the above words and, as it 
was raised in order to discuss public policy problems, was beyond congressional reach 
as provided for in FECA. The Court also determined the constitutionality of the Federal 
Election Commission, advising that a new way of appointing its members be found. The 
rule whereby the Speaker of the House and president pro tempore of the Senate each had 
a right to make two each appointments to the executive branch was ruled as violating the 
constitutional principle of separation of powers.
While several of the above rules were soon either repealed or amended by the new 
legislation or FEC advisory opinions, by linking political contributing with free speech 
rights the Buckley precedent opened the door for the loosening of campaign finance 
regulations in the Roberts’ Court era.
PER CURIAM. . .
The constitutional power of Congress to regulate federal elections is well established and 
is not questioned by any of the parties in this case. Thus, the critical constitutional 
questions presented here go not to the basic power of Congress to legislate in this area, 
but to whether the specific legislation that Congress has enacted interferes with First 
Amendment freedoms or invidiously discriminates against non-incumbent candidates and 
minor parties in contravention of the Fifth Amendment. . .
The Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most 
fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of public issues and debate on the 
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government 
established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection 
to such political expression in order “to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas 
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.” Roth 
v. United States. Although First Amendment protections are not confined to “the expo-
sition of ideas,” Winters v. New York, there is practically universal agreement that 
a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmen-
tal affairs, of course including discussions of candidates, Mills v. Alabama. This no more 
than reflects our “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 
In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed 
choices among candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those who are 
elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation. As the Court observed 
in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee 
has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for 
political office.
The First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression. The 
constitutional right of association explicated in NAACP v. Alabama, stemmed from the 
Court’s recognition that [e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, 
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association. Subsequent 
decisions have made clear that the First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee “freedom 
to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas,” 
a freedom that encompasses “[t]he right to associate with the political party of one’s 
choice.” Kusper v. Pontikes, quoted in Cousins v. Wigoda.
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It is with these principles in mind that we consider the primary contentions of the parties 
with respect to the Act’s limitations upon the giving and spending of money in political 
campaigns. Those conflicting contentions could not more sharply define the basic issues 
before us. Appellees contend that what the Act regulates is conduct, and that its effect 
on speech and association is incidental, at most. Appellants respond that contributions 
and expenditures are at the very core of political speech, and that the Act’s limitations 
thus constitute restraints on First Amendment liberty that are both gross and direct. . .
In upholding the constitutional validity of the Act’s contribution and expenditure provisions 
on the ground that those provisions should be viewed as regulating conduct, not speech, 
the Court of Appeals relied upon United States v. O’Brien. The O’Brien case involved 
a defendant’s claim that the First Amendment prohibited his prosecution for burning his 
draft card because his act was “symbolic speech” engaged in as a “demonstration against 
the war and against the draft.” On the assumption that “the alleged communicative element 
in O’Brien’s conduct [was] sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment,” the Court 
sustained the conviction because it found “a sufficiently important governmental interest 
in regulating the non-speech element” that was “unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression” and that had an “incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment free-
doms. . . no greater than [was] essential to the furtherance of that interest.” The Court 
expressly emphasized that O’Brien was not a case where the alleged governmental inter-
est in regulating conduct arises in some measure because the communication allegedly 
integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful.
We cannot share the view that the present Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations 
are comparable to the restrictions on conduct upheld in O’Brien. The expenditure of 
money simply cannot be equated with such conduct as destruction of a draft card. Some 
forms of communication made possible by the giving and spending of money involve 
speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some involve a combination of the 
two. Yet this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on 
the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a non-speech element or to reduce the 
exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment. See Bigelow v. Virginia, New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan. For example, in Cox v. Louisiana, the Court contrasted picketing 
and parading with a newspaper comment and a telegram by a citizen to a public official. 
The parading and picketing activities were said to constitute conduct “intertwined with 
expression and association,” whereas the newspaper comment and the telegram were 
described as a “pure form of expression” involving “free speech alone,” rather than “expres-
sion mixed with particular conduct.”
Even if the categorization of the expenditure of money as conduct were accepted, the 
limitations challenged here would not meet the O’Brien test because the governmental 
interests advanced in support of the Act involve “suppressing communication.” The inter-
ests served by the Act include restricting the voices of people and interest groups who 
have money to spend and reducing the over-all scope of federal election campaigns. 
Although the Act does not focus on the ideas expressed by persons or groups subject to 
its regulations, it is aimed, in part, at equalizing the relative ability of all voters to affect 
electoral outcomes by placing a ceiling on expenditures for political expression by citizens 
and groups. Unlike O’Brien, where the Selective Service System’s administrative interest 
in the preservation of draft cards was wholly unrelated to their use as a means of com-
munication, it is beyond dispute that the interest in regulating the alleged “conduct” of 
giving or spending money “arises in some measure because the communication alleg-
edly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful”. . .
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political commu-
nication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting 
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audi-
ence reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s 
mass society requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest 
handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies 
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generally necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the event. The electorate’s increasing 
dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and information has 
made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective 
political speech. . .
Given the important role of contributions in financing political campaigns, contribution 
restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations prevented 
candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective 
advocacy. There is no indication, however, that the contribution limitations imposed by 
the Act would have any dramatic adverse effect on the funding of campaigns and political 
associations. The over-all effect of the Act’s contribution ceilings is merely to require 
candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons and 
to compel people who would otherwise contribute amounts greater than the statutory 
limits to expend such funds on direct political expression, rather than to reduce the total 
amount of money potentially available to promote political expression.
The Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations also impinge on protected associa-
tional freedoms. Making a contribution, like joining a political party, serves to affiliate 
a person with a candidate. In addition, it enables like­minded persons to pool their 
resources in furtherance of common political goals. The Act’s contribution ceilings thus 
limit one important means of associating with a candidate or committee, but leave the 
contributor free to become a member of any political association and to assist person-
ally in the association’s efforts on behalf of candidates. And the Act’s contribution 
limitations permit associations and candidates to aggregate large sums of money to 
promote effective advocacy. By contrast, the Act’s $1,000 limitation on independent 
expenditures “relative to a clearly identified candidate” precludes most associations 
from effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents, the original basis for the 
recognition of First Amendment protection of the freedom of association. See NAACP 
v. Alabama. . .
In sum, although the Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations both implicate fun-
damental First Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose significantly more 
severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than do 
its limitations on financial contributions. . .
It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act’s primary purpose – to limit the actuality and 
appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions – in order 
to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation. 
Under a system of private financing of elections, a candidate lacking immense personal 
or family wealth must depend on financial contributions from others to provide the re-
sources necessary to conduct a successful campaign. The increasing importance of the 
communications media and sophisticated mass-mailing and polling operations to effective 
campaigning make the raising of large sums of money an ever more essential ingredient 
of an effective candidacy. To the extent that large contributions are given to secure 
a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our 
system of representative democracy is undermined. Although the scope of such pernicious 
practices can never be reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples surfacing 
after the 1972 election demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory one. . .
The Act’s $1,000 contribution limitation focuses precisely on the problem of large campaign 
contributions – the narrow aspect of political association where the actuality and potential 
for corruption have been identified – while leaving persons free to engage in independent 
political expression, to associate actively through volunteering their services, and to 
assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and 
committees with financial resources. Significantly, the Act’s contribution limitations in 
themselves do not undermine to any material degree the potential for robust and effective 
discussion of candidates and campaign issues by individual citizens, associations, the 
institutional press, candidates, and political parties.
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We find that, under the rigorous standard of review established by our prior decisions, 
the weighty interests served by restricting the size of financial contributions to political 
candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms 
caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling. . .
There is no such evidence to support the claim that the contribution limitations in 
themselves discriminate against major party challengers to incumbents. Challengers can 
and often do defeat incumbents in federal elections. Major party challengers in federal 
elections are usually men and women who are well known and influential in their com-
munity or State. Often such challengers are themselves incumbents in important local, 
state, or federal offices. Statistics in the record indicate that major party challengers as 
well as incumbents are capable of raising large sums for campaigning. Indeed, a small 
but nonetheless significant number of challengers have in recent elections outspent their 
incumbent rivals. And, to the extent that incumbents generally are more likely than 
challengers to attract very large contributions, the Act’s $1,000 ceiling has the practical 
effect of benefiting challengers as a class. Contrary to the broad generalization drawn by 
the appellants, the practical impact of the contribution ceilings in any given election will 
clearly depend upon the amounts in excess of the ceilings that, for various reasons, the 
candidates in that election would otherwise have received and the utility of these addi-
tional amounts to the candidates. To be sure, the limitations may have a significant effect 
on particular challengers or incumbents, but the record provides no basis for predicting 
that such adventitious factors will invariably and invidiously benefit incumbents as a class. 
Since the danger of corruption and the appearance of corruption apply with equal force 
to challengers and to incumbents, Congress had ample justification for imposing the same 
fundraising constraints upon both.
The charge of discrimination against minor party and independent candidates is more 
troubling, but the record provides no basis for concluding that the Act invidiously disad-
vantages such candidates. As noted above, the Act, on its face treats, all candidates 
equally with regard to contribution limitations. And the restriction would appear to ben-
efit minor party and independent candidates relative to their major party opponents, 
because major party candidates receive far more money in large contributions. Although 
there is some force tax appellants’ response that minor party candidates are primarily 
concerned with their ability to amass the resources necessary to reach the electorate, 
rather than with their funding position relative to their major party opponents, the record 
is virtually devoid of support for the claim that the $1,000 contribution limitation will have 
a serious effect on the initiation and scope of minor party and independent candidacies. 
Moreover, any attempt to exclude minor parties and independents en masse from the 
Act’s contribution limitations overlooks the fact that minor party candidates may win 
elective office or have a substantial impact on the outcome of an election.
In view of these considerations, we conclude that the impact of the Act’s $1,000 contri-
bution limitation on major party challengers and on minor party candidates does not 
render the provision unconstitutional on its face. . .
The Act’s expenditure ceilings impose direct and substantial restraints on the quantity of 
political speech. The most drastic of the limitations restricts individuals and groups, includ-
ing political parties that fail to place a candidate on the ballot, to an expenditure of $1,000 
“relative to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar year.” § 608(e)(1). Other 
expenditure ceilings limit spending by candidates, § 608(a), their campaigns, § 608(c), 
and political parties in connection with election campaigns, § 608(f). It is clear that 
a primary effect of these expenditure limitations is to restrict the quantity of campaign 
speech by individuals, groups, and candidates. The restrictions, while neutral as to the 
ideas expressed, limit political expression “at the core of our electoral process and of the 
First Amendment freedoms.” Williams v. Rhodes.
The constitutional deficiencies described in Thomas v. Collins can be avoided only by 
reading § 608(e)(1) as limited to communications that include explicit words of advo-
cacy of election or defeat of a candidate, much as the definition of “clearly identified” in 
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§ 608(e)(2) requires that an explicit and unambiguous reference to the candidate appear 
as part of the communication. This is the reading of the provision suggested by the 
nongovernmental appellees in arguing that “[f]unds spent to propagate one’s views on 
issues without expressly calling for a candidate’s election or defeat are thus not covered.” 
We agree that, in order to preserve the provision against invalidation on vagueness 
grounds, § 608(e)(1) must be construed to apply only to expenditures for communications 
that, in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for 
federal office. [in the footnote: This construction would restrict the application of § 608(e)
(1) to communications containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such 
as “vote for,” “elect,” “support,” “cast your ballot for,” “Smith for Congress,” “vote against,” 
“defeat,” “reject.”
We turn then to the basic First Amendment question – whether § 608(e)(1), even as thus 
narrowly and explicitly construed, impermissibly burdens the constitutional right of free 
expression. The Court of Appeals summarily held the provision constitutionally valid on 
the ground that “section 608(e) is a loophole-closing provision only” that is necessary to 
prevent circumvention of the contribution limitations. We cannot agree. . .
We find that the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of 
corruption is inadequate to justify § 608(e)(1)’s ceiling on independent expenditures. 
First, assuming, arguendo, that large independent expenditures pose the same dangers 
of actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements as do large contributions, § 608(e)(1) 
does not provide an answer that sufficiently relates to the elimination of those dangers. 
Unlike the contribution limitations’ total ban on the giving of large amounts of money to 
candidates, § 608(e)(1) prevents only some large expenditures. So long as persons and 
groups eschew expenditures that, in express terms advocate the election or defeat of 
a clearly identified candidate, they are free to spend as much as they want to promote 
the candidate and his views. The exacting interpretation of the statutory language neces-
sary to avoid unconstitutional vagueness thus undermines the limitation’s effectiveness 
as a loophole-closing provision by facilitating circumvention by those seeking to exert 
improper influence upon a candidate or officeholder. It would naively underestimate the 
ingenuity and resourcefulness of persons and groups desiring to buy influence to believe 
that they would have much difficulty devising expenditures that skirted the restriction on 
express advocacy of election or defeat, but nevertheless benefited the candidate’s 
campaign. Yet no substantial societal interest would be served by a loophole­closing 
provision designed to check corruption that permitted unscrupulous persons and organi-
zations to expend unlimited sums of money in order to obtain improper influence over 
candidates for elective office. Cf. Mills v. Alabama.
Second, quite apart from the shortcomings of § 608(e)(1) in preventing any abuses 
generated by large independent expenditures, the independent advocacy restricted by 
the provision does not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption 
comparable to those identified with large campaign contributions. The parties defending 
§ 608(e)(1) contend that it is necessary to prevent would-be contributors from avoiding 
the contribution limitations by the simple expedient of paying directly for media advertise-
ments or for other portions of the candidate’s campaign activities. They argue that ex-
penditures controlled by or coordinated with the candidate and his campaign might well 
have virtually the same value to the candidate as a contribution and would pose similar 
dangers of abuse. Yet such controlled or coordinated expenditures are treated as con-
tributions, rather than expenditures under the Act. Section 608(b)’s contribution ceilings, 
rather than § 608(e)(1)’s independent expenditure limitation, prevent attempts to cir-
cumvent the Act through prearranged or coordinated expenditures amounting to disguised 
contributions. By contrast, 608(e)(1) limits expenditures for express advocacy of candi-
dates made totally independently of the candidate and his campaign. Unlike contributions, 
such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate’s 
campaign, and indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement 
and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines 
the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expen-
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ditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate. 
Rather than preventing circumvention of the contribution limitations, § 608(e)(1) se-
verely restricts all independent advocacy despite its substantially diminished potential 
for abuse.
While the independent expenditure ceiling thus fails to serve any substantial governmen-
tal interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process, 
it heavily burdens core First Amendment expression. For the First Amendment right to 
“speak one’s mind. . . on all public institutions” includes the right to engage in “‘vigorous 
advocacy’ no less than ‘abstract discussion.’” New York Times Co. v Sullivan. Advocacy 
of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no less entitled to protection 
under the First Amendment than the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy 
of the passage or defeat of legislation. It is argued, however, that the ancillary govern-
mental interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the 
outcome of elections serves to justify the limitation on express advocacy of the election 
or defeat of candidates imposed by § 608(e)(1)’s expenditure ceiling. But the concept 
that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to 
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was 
designed “to secure ‘the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources,’” and “to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing 
about of political and social changes desired by the people.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 
The First Amendment’s protection against governmental abridgment of free expression 
cannot properly be made to depend on a person’s financial ability to engage in public 
discussion. Cf. Eastern R. Conf. v. Noerr Motors. . .
For the reasons stated, we conclude that § 608(e)(1)’s independent expenditure limitation 
is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. . .
Section 608(c) places limitations on over-all campaign expenditures by candidates 
seeking nomination for election and election to federal office. Presidential candidates may 
spend $10,000,000 in seeking nomination for office, and an additional $20,000,000 in 
the general election campaign. The ceiling on senatorial campaigns is pegged to the size 
of the voting-age population of the State, with minimum dollar amounts applicable to 
campaigns in States with small populations. In senatorial primary elections, the limit is 
the greater of eight cents multiplied by the voting-age population or $100,000, and, in 
the general election, the limit is increased to 12 cents multiplied by the voting-age 
population, or $150,000. The Act imposes blanket $70,000 limitations on both primary 
campaigns and general election campaigns for the House of Representatives, with the 
exception that the senatorial ceiling applies to campaigns in States entitled to only one 
Representative. These ceilings are to be adjusted upwards at the beginning of each cal-
endar year by the average percentage rise in the consumer price index for the 12 preced-
ing months.
No governmental interest that has been suggested is sufficient to justify the restriction 
on the quantity of political expression imposed by § 608(c)’s campaign expenditure 
limitations. The major evil associated with rapidly increasing campaign expenditures is 
the danger of candidate dependence on large contributions. The interest in alleviating the 
corrupting influence of large contributions is served by the Act’s contribution limitations 
and disclosure provisions, rather than by § 608(c)’s campaign expenditure ceilings. The 
Court of Appeals’ assertion that the expenditure restrictions are necessary to reduce the 
incentive to circumvent direct contribution limits is not persuasive. There is no indication 
that the substantial criminal penalties for violating the contribution ceilings, combined 
with the political repercussion of such violations, will be insufficient to police the contribu-
tion provisions. Extensive reporting, auditing, and disclosure requirements applicable to 
both contributions and expenditures by political campaigns are designed to facilitate the 
detection of illegal contributions. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals noted, the Act permits 
an officeholder or successful candidate to retain contributions in excess of the expenditure 
ceiling, and to use these funds for “any other lawful purpose.” This provision undercuts 
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whatever marginal role the expenditure limitations might otherwise play in enforcing the 
contribution ceilings.
The interest in equalizing the financial resources of candidates competing for federal 
office is no more convincing a justification for restricting the scope of federal election 
campaigns. Given the limitation on the size of outside contributions, the financial re-
sources available to a candidate’s campaign, like the number of volunteers recruited, will 
normally vary with the size and intensity of the candidate’s support. There is nothing 
invidious, improper, or unhealthy in permitting such funds to be spent to carry the can-
didate’s message to the electorate. Moreover, the equalization of permissible campaign 
expenditures might serve not to equalize the opportunities of all candidates, but to 
handicap a candidate who lacked substantial name recognition or exposure of his views 
before the start of the campaign.
The campaign expenditure ceilings appear to be designed primarily to serve the govern-
mental interests in reducing the allegedly skyrocketing costs of political campaigns. 
Appellees and the Court of Appeals stressed statistics indicating that spending for fed-
eral election campaigns increased almost 300% between 1952 and 1972 in comparison 
with a 57.6% rise in the consumer price index during the same period. Appellants respond 
that, during these years, the rise in campaign spending lagged behind the percentage 
increase in total expenditures for commercial advertising and the size of the gross na-
tional product. In any event, the mere growth in the cost of federal election campaigns, 
in and of itself, provides no basis for governmental restrictions on the quantity of campaign 
spending and the resulting limitation on the scope of federal campaigns. The First 
Amendment denies government the power to determine that spending to promote one’s 
political views is wasteful, excessive, or unwise. In the free society ordained by our 
Constitution, it is not the government, but the people – individually, as citizens and 
candidates, and collectively, as associations and political committees – who must retain 
control over the quantity and range of debate on public issues in a political campaign.
For these reasons, we hold that § 608(c) is constitutionally invalid. . .
The 1974 amendments to the Act create an eight-member Federal Election Commission 
(Commission) and vest in it primary and substantial responsibility for administering and 
enforcing the Act. The question that we address in this portion of the opinion is whether, 
in view of the manner in which a majority of its members are appointed, the Commission 
may, under the Constitution, exercise the powers conferred upon it. . .
The body in which this authority is reposed consists of eight members. The Secretary of 
the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives are ex officio members of the 
Commission without the right to vote. Two members are appointed by the President pro 
tempore of the Senate “upon the recommendations of the majority leader of the Senate 
and the minority leader of the Senate.” Two more are to be appointed by the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives, likewise upon the recommendations of its respective major-
ity and minority leaders. The remaining two members are appointed by the President. 
Each of the six voting members of the Commission must be confirmed by the majority of 
both Houses of Congress, and each of the three appointing authorities is forbidden to 
choose both of their appointees from the same political party. . .
Our inquiry, of necessity, touches upon the fundamental principles of the Government 
established by the Framers of the Constitution, and all litigants and all of the courts which 
have addressed themselves to the matter start on common ground in the recognition of 
the intent of the Framers that the powers of the three great branches of the National 
Government be largely separate from one another.
James Madison, writing in the Federalist No. 47, defended the work of the Framers against 
the charge that these three governmental powers were not entirely separate from one 
another in the proposed Constitution. He asserted that, while there was some admixture, 
the Constitution was nonetheless true to Montesquieu’s well-known maxim that the 
legislative, executive, and judicial departments ought to be separate and distinct:
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The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of 
his meaning. “When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person 
or body,” says he, there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the 
same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical 
manner. . .
Some of these reasons are more fully explained in other passages; but, briefly stated as 
they are here, they sufficiently establish the meaning which we have put on this celebrat-
ed maxim of this celebrated author.
Yet it is also clear from the provisions of the Constitution itself, and from the Federalist 
Papers, that the Constitution by no means contemplates total separation of each of these 
three essential branches of Government. The President is a participant in the lawmaking 
process by virtue of his authority to veto bills enacted by Congress. The Senate is 
a participant in the appointive process by virtue of its authority to refuse to confirm 
persons nominated to office by the President. The men who met in Philadelphia in the 
summer of 1787 were practical statesmen, experienced in politics, who viewed the 
principle of separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny. But they likewise saw 
that a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another would 
preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively. . .
The Constitution, for purposes of appointment, very clearly divides all its officers into two 
classes. The primary class requires a nomination by the President and confirmation by 
the Senate. But foreseeing that, when offices became numerous, and sudden removals 
necessary, this mode might be inconvenient, it was provided that, in regard to officers 
inferior to those specially mentioned, Congress might, by law, vest their appointment in 
the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. That all persons 
who can be said to hold an office under the government about to be established under 
the Constitution were intended to be included within one or the other of these modes of 
appointment there can be but little doubt. (Emphasis supplied.)
We think that the term “Officers of the United States,” as used in Art. II, defined to include 
“all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government” in United States 
v. Germaine, supra, is a term intended to have substantive meaning. We think its fair 
import is that any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the 
United States is an “Officer of the United States,” and must, therefore, be appointed in 
the manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of that Article.
If “all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government about to be es-
tablished under the Constitution were intended to be included within one or the other of 
these modes of appointment,” United States v. Germaine, it is difficult to see how the 
members of the Commission may escape inclusion. If a postmaster first class, Myers 
v. United States, and the clerk of a district court, Ex parte Hennen, are inferior officers 
of the United States within the meaning of the Appointments Clause, as they are, surely 
the Commissioners before us are, at the very least, such “inferior Officers” within the 
meaning of that Clause.
Although two members of the Commission are initially selected by the President, his 
nominations are subject to confirmation not merely by the Senate, but by the House of 
Representatives as well. The remaining four voting members of the Commission are 
appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate and by the Speaker of the House. 
While the second part of the Clause authorizes Congress to vest the appointment of the 
officers described in that part in “the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments,” 
neither the Speaker of the House nor the President pro tempore of the Senate comes 
within this language.
The phrase “Heads of Departments,” used as it is in conjunction with the phrase “Courts 
of Law,” suggests that the Departments referred to are themselves in the Executive Branch 
or at least have some connection with that branch. While the Clause expressly author-
izes Congress to vest the appointment of certain officers in the “Courts of Law,” the absence 
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of similar language to include Congress must mean that neither Congress nor its officers 
were included within the language “Heads of Departments” in this part of cl. 2.
Thus, with respect to four of the six voting members of the Commission, neither the 
President, the head of any department, nor the Judiciary has any voice in their selection.
The Appointments Clause specifies the method of appointment only for “Officers of the 
United States” whose appointment is not “otherwise provided for” in the Constitution. But 
there is no provision of the Constitution remotely providing any alternative means for the 
selection of the members of the Commission or for anybody like them. Appellee Commission 
has argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the Appointments Clause of Art. II 
should not be read to exclude the “inherent power of Congress” to appoint its own offic-
ers to perform functions necessary to that body as an institution. But there is no need to 
read the Appointments Clause contrary to its plain language in order to reach the result 
sought by the Court of Appeals. Article I, § 3, cl. 5, expressly authorizes the selection of 
the President pro tempore of the Senate, and § 2, cl. 5, of that Article provides for the 
selection of the Speaker of the House. Ranking nonmembers, such as the Clerk of the 
House of Representatives, are elected under the internal rules of each House, and are 
designated by statute as “officers of the Congress.” There is no occasion for us to decide 
whether any of these member officers are “Officers of the United States” whose “appoint-
ment” is otherwise provided for within the meaning of the Appointments Clause, since, 
even if they were such officers, their appointees would not be. Contrary to the fears 
expressed by the majority of the Court of Appeals, nothing in our holding with respect to 
Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, will deny to Congress “all power to appoint its own inferior officers to 
carry out appropriate legislative functions”. . .
Our conclusion on the merits, sustained by the arguments before stated, is that Article 
II grants to the President the executive power of the Government, i.e., the general ad-
ministrative control of those executing the laws, including the power of appointment and 
removal of executive officers – a conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take care that 
the laws be faithfully executed. . .
In summary, we sustain the individual contribution limits, the disclosure and reporting 
provisions, and the public financing scheme. We conclude, however, that the limitations 
on campaign expenditures, on independent expenditures by individuals and groups, and 
on expenditures by a candidate from his personal funds are constitutionally infirm. Finally, 
we hold that most of the powers conferred by the Act upon the Federal Election Commission 
can be exercised only by “Officers of the United States,” appointed in conformity with 
Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution, and therefore cannot be exercised by the Commission 
as presently constituted.
The Federal Election Campaign Act 
Amendments of 1976
90 Stat. 475 (1976)
Usually, the reaction of Congress to a Supreme Court decision finding its legislation 
in part or in whole unconstitutional is immediate, if the majority of representatives and/or 
Senators believe that the legislative department, as being superior to the judicial branch, 
should directly or indirectly overrule the Court’s precedent. In 1976, however, one could 
observe a quick, but positive reaction of House of Representatives and Senate to the 
Buckley holding, resulting in the implementation of new provisions, which amended the 
1971 and 1974 laws. Congress was in a hurry, as its members wanted the reform to come 
into force before the 1976 elections.
Importantly, the legislation referred not only to the regulations on expenditure 
limits, and the appointment of the Federal Election Commission’s employees (granted 
to the president, who acted with the advice and consent of the Senate), but also to the 
operation of political action committees (restricting the financing of PACs by labor 
unions and corporations), and to the public financing program for presidential elections. 
Furthermore, Congress decided to equip the Commission with broader powers, such as 
the power to prosecute civil violations of campaign finance regulations.
An Act to amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to 
provide that members of the Federal Election Commission shall be 
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, and for other purposes. . .
SEC. 101. (a) (1) The second sentence of section 309(a)(1) of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971, as redesignated by section 105 (hereinafter in this Act referred 
to as the “Act”), is amended to read as follows: “The Commission is composed of the 
Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives, ex officio and 
without the right to vote, and 6 members appointed by the President of the United States, 
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” (2) The last sentence of section 
309(a)(1) of the Act, as redesignated by section 105, is amended to read as follows: “No 
more than 3 members of the Commission appointed under this paragraph may be affili-
ated with the same political party.”
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(b) Section 309(a) (2) of the Act, as redesignated by section 105, is amended to read as 
follows: (2) (A) Members of the Commission shall serve for terms of 6 years, except that 
of the members first appointed—(i) two of the members, not affiliated with the same 
political party, shall be appointed for terms ending on April 30, 1977; (ii) two of the 
members, not affiliated with the same political party, shall be appointed for terms ending 
on April 30, 1979; and (iii) two of the members, not affiliated with the same political 
party, shall be appointed for terms ending on April 30, 1981. (B) A member of the 
Commission may serve on the Commission after the expiration of his term until his 
successor has taken office as a member of the Commission. (C) An individual appointed 
to fill a vacancy occurring other than by the expiration of a term of office shall be appoint-
ed only for the unexpired term of the member he succeeds. (D) Any vacancy occurring 
in the membership of the Commission shall be filled in the same manner as in the case 
of the original appointment.
(c) (l) Section 309 (a) (3) of the Act, as redesignated by section 105, is amended by 
adding at the end thereof he following new sentences: “Members of the Commission shall 
not engage in any other business, vocation, or employment. Any individual who is en-
gaging in any other business, vocation, or employment at the time such individual begins 
to serve as a member of the Commission shall terminate or liquidate such activity no 
later than 1 year after beginning to serve as such a member.” (2) Section 309(b) of the 
Act, as redesignated by section 105, is amended to read as follows: (b) (1) The Commission 
shall administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and formulate policy with respect to, 
this Act and chapter 95 and chapter 96 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The 
Commission shall have exclusive primary jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement 
of such provisions.
(2) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit, restrict, or diminish any investigatory, 
informational, oversight, supervisory, or disciplinary authority or function of the Congress 
or any committee of the Congress with respect to elections for Federal office.
(3) The first sentence of section 309(c) of the Act, as redesignated by section 105, is 
amended by inserting immediately before the period at the end thereof the following: 
except that the affirmative vote of 4 members of the Commission shall be required in 
order for the Commission to establish guidelines for compliance with the provisions of 
this Act or with chapter 95 or chapter 96 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, or for 
the Commission to take any action in accordance with paragraph (6), (7), (8), or (10) of 
section 310(a). . .
(e) (1) The President shall appoint members of the Federal Election Commission under 
section 309(a) of the Act, as redesignated by section 105 and as amended by this section, 
as soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) The first appointments made by the President under section 309(a) of the Act, as 
redesignated by section 105 and as amended by this section, shall not be considered to 
be appointments to fill the unexpired terms of members serving on the Federal Election 
Commission on the date of the enactment of this Act.
(3) Members serving on the Federal Election Commission on the date of the enactment 
of this Act may continue to serve as such members until new members are appointed and 
qualified under section 309(a) of the Act, as redesignated by section 105 and as 
amended by this section, except that until appointed and qualified under this Act, 
members serving on such Commission on such date of enactment may, beginning on 
March 23, 1976, exercise only such powers and functions as may be consistent with the 
determinations of the Supreme Court of the United States in Buckley et al. against Valeo, 
Secretary of the United States Senate, et al., January 30,1976.
(f) The provisions of section 309(a) (3) of the Act, as redesignated by section 105, which 
prohibit any individual from being appointed as a member of the Federal Election Commission 
who is, at the time of his appointment, an elected or appointed officer or employee of the 
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Federal Government, shall not apply in the 
56
case of any individual serving as a member of such Commission on the date of the en-
actment of this Act. . .
SEC. 320. (a) (1) No person shall make contributions— (A) to any candidate and his 
authorized political committees with respect to any election for Federal office which, in 
the aggregate, exceed $1,000; (B) to the political committees established and maintained 
by a national political party, which are not the authorized political committees of any can-
didate, in any calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed $20,000; or (C) to any 
other political committee in any calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed $5,000.
(2) No multicandidate political committee shall make contributions— (A) to any candi-
date and his authorized political committees with respect to any election for Federal 
office which, in the aggregate, exceed $5,000; (B) to the political committees established 
and maintained by a national political party, which are not the authorized political 
committees of any candidate, in any calendar year, which, in the aggregate, exceed 
$15,000; or (C) to any other political committee in any calendar year which, in the 
aggregate, exceed $5,000.
(3) No individual shall make contributions aggregating more than $25,000 in any calen-
dar year. For purposes of this paragraph, any contribution made to a candidate in a year 
other than the calendar year in which the election is held with respect to which such con-
tribution is made, is considered to be made during the calendar year in which such 
election is held.
(4) The limitations on contributions contained in paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to 
transfers between and among political committees which are national. State, district, or 
local committees (including any subordinate committee thereof) of the same political 
party. For purposes of paragraph (2), the term ‘multicandidate political committee’ means 
a political committee which has been registered under section 303 for a period of not less 
than 6 months, which has received contributions from more than 50 persons, and, except 
for any State political party organization, has made contributions to 5 or more candidates 
for Federal office.
(5) For purposes of the limitations provided by paragraph (1) and paragraph (2), all 
contributions made by political committees established or financed or maintained or 
controlled by any corporation, labor organization, or any other person, including any 
parent, subsidiary, branch, division, department, or local unit of such corporation, 
labor organization, or any other person, or by any group of such persons, shall be 
considered to have been made by a single political committee, except that (A) nothing 
in this sentence shall limit transfers between political committees of funds raised 
through joint fund raising efforts; (B) for purposes of the limitations provided by 
paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) all contributions made by a single political commit-
tee established or financed or maintained or controlled by a national committee of 
a political party and by a single political committee established or financed or maintained 
or controlled by the State committee of a political party shall not be considered to 
have been made by a single political committee; and (C) nothing in this section shall 
limit the transfer of funds between the principal campaign committee of a candidate 
seeking nomination or election to a Federal office and the principal campaign commit-
tee of that candidate for nomination or election to another Federal office if (i) such 
transfer is not made when the candidate is actively seeking nomination or election to 
both such offices; (ii) the limitations contained in this Act on contributions by persons 
are not exceeded by such transfer; and (iii) the candidate has not elected to receive 
any funds under chapter 95 or chapter 96 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. In 
any case in which a corporation and any of its subsidiaries, branches, divisions, de-
partments, or local units, or a labor organization and any of its subsidiaries, branches, 
divisions, departments, or local units establish or finance or maintain or control more 
than one separate segregated fund, all such separate segregated funds shall be 
treated as a single separate segregated fund for purposes of the limitations provided 
by paragraph (1) and paragraph (2).
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(6) The limitations on contributions to a candidate imposed by paragraphs (1) and (2) of 
this subsection shall apply separately with respect to each election, except that all elections 
held in any calendar year for the office of President of the United States (except a gen-
eral election for such office) shall be considered to be one election.
(7) For purposes of this subsection— (A) contributions to a named candidate made to 
any political committee authorized by such candidate to accept contributions on his 
behalf shall be considered to be contributions made to such candidate; (B) (i) expen-
ditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the 
request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their 
agents, shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate; (ii) the financing 
by any person of the dissemination, distribution, or republication, in whole or in part, 
of any broadcast or any written, graphic, or other form of campaign materials prepared 
by the candidate, his campaign committees, or their authorized agents shall be con-
sidered to be an expenditure for purposes of this paragraph; and (C) contributions 
made to or for the benefit of any candidate nominated by a political party for election 
to the office of Vice President of the United States shall be considered to be contributions 
made to or for the benefit of the candidate of such party for election to the office of 
President of the United States.
(8) For purposes of the limitations imposed by this section, all contributions made by 
a person, either directly or indirectly, on behalf of a particular candidate, including con-
tributions, which are in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermedi-
ary or conduit to such candidate, shall be treated as contributions from such person to 
such candidate. The intermediary or conduit shall report the original source and the in-
tended recipient of such contribution to the Commission and to the intended recipient.
(b)(1) No candidate for the office of President of the United States who is eligible under 
section 9003 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to condition for eligibility for 
payments) or under section 9033 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to eli-
gibility for payments) to receive payments from the Secretary of the Treasury may make 
expenditures in excess of— (A) $10,000,000, in the case of a campaign for nomination 
for election to such office, except the aggregate of expenditures under this subparagraph 
in any one State shall not exceed the greater of 16 cents multiplied by the voting age 
population of the State (as certified under subsection (e)), or $200,000; or (B) $20,000,000 
in the case of a campaign for election to such office.
(2) For purposes of this subsection— (A) expenditures made by or on behalf of any 
candidate nominated by a political party for election to the office of Vice President of the 
United States shall be considered to be expenditures made by or on behalf of the candi-
date of such party for election to the office of President of the United States; and (B) an 
expenditure is made on behalf of a candidate, including a vice presidential candidate, if 
it is made by— (i) an authorized committee or any other agent of the candidate for 
purposes of making any expenditure; or (ii) any person authorized or requested by the 
candidate, an authorized committee of the candidate, or an agent of the candidate, to 
make the expenditure.
(c) (1) At the beginning of each calendar year (commencing in 1976), as there become 
available necessary data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor, 
the Secretary of Labor shall certify to the Commission and publish in the Federal Register 
the percent difference between the price index for the 12 months preceding the beginning 
of such calendar year and the price index for the base period. Each limitation established 
by subsection (b) and subsection (d) shall be increased by such percent difference. Each 
amount so increased shall be the amount in effect for such calendar year.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1) — (A) the term ‘price index’ means the average over 
a calendar year of the Consumer Price Index (all items—United States city average) 
published monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics; and (B) the term ‘base period’ means 
the calendar year 1974.
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(d) (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law with respect to limitations on expen-
ditures or limitations on contributions, the national committee of a political party and 
a State committee of a political party, including any subordinate committee of a State 
committee, may make expenditures in connection with the general election campaign of 
candidates for Federal office, subject to the limitations contained in paragraphs (2) and 
(3) of this subsection.
(2) The national committee of a political party may not make any expenditure in connec-
tion with the general election campaign of any candidate for President of the United States 
who is affiliated with such party which exceeds an amount equal to 2 cents multiplied by 
the voting age population of the United States (as certified under sub­ section (e)). Any 
expenditure under this paragraph shall be in addition to any expenditure by a national 
committee of a political party serving as the principal campaign committee of a candidate 
for the office of President of the United States.
(3) The national committee of a political party, or a State committee of a political party, 
including any subordinate committee of a State committee, may not make any expendi-
ture in connection with the general election campaign of a candidate for Federal office in 
a State who is affiliated with such party which exceeds— (A) in the case of a candidate 
for election to the office of Senator, or of Representative from a State which is entitled to 
only one Representative, the greater of— (i) 2 cents multiplied by the voting age popu-
lation of the State (as certified under subsection (e); or (ii) $20,000; and (B) in the case 
of a candidate for election to the office of Representative, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner 
in any other State, $10,000. . .
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, amounts totaling not more than 
$17,500 may be contributed to a candidate for nomination for election, or for election, 
to the United States Senate during the year in which an election is held in which he is 
such a candidate, by the Republican or Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, or 
the national committee of a political party, or any combination of such committees.
SEC. 321. (a) It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by au-
thority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with 
any election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election or political 
convention or caucus held to select candidates for any political office, or for any corpo-
ration whatever, or any labor organization, to make a contribution or expenditure in 
connection with any election at which presidential and vice presidential electors or a Senator 
or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, Congress are to be 
voted for, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held 
to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political com-
mittee, or other person knowingly to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this 
section, or any officer or any director of any corporation or any national bank or any of-
ficer of any labor organization to consent to any contribution or expenditure by the cor-
poration, national bank, or labor organization, as the case may be, prohibited by this 
section.
(b) (1) For the purposes of this section the term ‘labor organization’ means any organi-
zation of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which 
employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole of in part, of dealing 
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of 
employment, or conditions of work.
(2) For purposes of this section and section 12(h) of the Public Utility Holding Company 
Act, the term ‘contribution or expenditure’ shall include any direct or indirect payment, 
distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money, or any services, or anything of 
value (except a loan of money by a national or State bank made in accordance with the 
applicable banking laws and regulations and in the ordinary course of business) to 
any candidate, campaign committee, or political party or organization, in connection 
with any election to any of the offices referred to in this section, but shall not include 
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(A) communications by a corporation to its stockholders and executive or administrative 
personnel and their families or by a labor organization to its members and their families 
on any subject; (B) nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns by a cor-
poration aimed at its stockholders and executive or administrative personnel and their 
families, or by a labor organization aimed at its members and their families; and (C) the 
establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated 
fund to be utilized for political purposes by a corporation, labor organization, membership 
organization, cooperative, or corporation without capital stock.
(3) It shall be unlawful— (A) for such a fund to make a contribution or expenditure by 
utilizing money or anything of value secured by physical force, job discrimination, finan-
cial reprisals, or the threat of force, job discrimination, or financial reprisal; or by dues, 
fees, or other moneys required as a condition of membership in a labor organization or 
as a condition of employment, or by moneys obtained in any commercial transaction; 
(B) for any person soliciting an employee for a contribution to such a fund to fail to inform 
such employee of the political purposes of such fund at the time of such solicitation; and 
(C) for any person soliciting an employee for a contribution to such a fund to fail to inform 
such employee, at the time of such solicitation, of his right to refuse to so contribute 
with- out any reprisal.
(4) (A) Except as provided in subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D), it shall be unlawful— (i) for 
a corporation, or a separate segregated fund established by a corporation, to solicit 
contributions to such a fund from any person other than its stockholders and their fam-
ilies and its executive or administrative personnel and their families, and (ii) for a labor 
organization, or a separate segregated fund established by a labor organization, to solic-
it contributions to such a fund from any person other than its members and their families.
(B) it shall not be unlawful under this section for a corporation, a labor organization, or 
a separate segregated fund established by such corporation or such labor organization, 
to make 2 written solicitations for contributions during the calendar year from any 
stockholder, executive or administrative personnel, or employee of a corporation or the 
families of such persons. A solicitation under this subparagraph may be made only by 
mail addressed to stockholders, executive or administrative personnel, or employees at 
their residence and shall be designed that the corporation, labor organization, or separate 
segregated fund conducting such solicitation cannot determine who makes a contribution 
of $50 or less as a result of such solicitation and who does not make such a contribution.
(C) This paragraph shall not prevent a membership organization, cooperative, or corpo-
ration without capital stock, or a separate segregated fund established by a membership 
organization, cooperative, or corporation without capital stock, from soliciting contributions 
to such a fund from members of such organization, cooperative, or corporation without 
capital stock.
(D) This paragraph shall not prevent a trade association or a separate segregated fund 
established by a trade association from soliciting contributions from the stockholders and 
executive or administrative personnel of the member corporations of such trade associ-
ation and the families of such stockholders or personnel to the extent that such solicita-
tion of such stockholders and personnel, and their families, has been separately and 
specifically approved by the member corporation involved, and such member corporation 
does not approve any such solicitation by more than one such trade association in any 
calendar year.
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti
 435 U.S. 675 (1978)
Among the various arguments raised by critics of the growing impact of money in the 
electoral process, one of the most frequently made concerns the dangerous influence 
of corporations on the system, sometimes to the extent of their being described as the 
main source of corruption and bribery. Such an approach resulted in the passage of 
different laws and regulations by many states, aimed at restricting the financial activities 
undertaken by corporations before and during election campaigns. An example of such 
measures could be found in 1970s in Massachusetts, where the legislature established 
an act banning corporations from funding ballot initiatives if they had no direct interest 
in such a contribution. The controversy over the scope of the restrictions led to a lawsuit 
which ended in the Supreme Court in 1978, known as First National Bank of Boston 
v. Bellotti.
The First National Bank of Boston was subject to the restrictions provided by The 
Bay State law, and it could not freely participate in a campaign before a state referendum 
on taxation issues, so the bank’s representatives challenged the state restrictions in court. 
On appeal, the issue was brought to the Supreme Court, which, in a 5–4 ruling, declared 
Massachusetts’ regulation unconstitutional as it violated the right of corporations to 
participate in various stages of the non-candidate election campaign. The majority 
opinion stated that corporations were protected by the free speech clause of the First 
Amendment, which was similar to the argumentation used by the Justices in the Buckley 
opinion. Despite the fact that the Bellotti decision referred mainly to state law, the 
argumentation used by the Justices became crucial for most of the 21st century cases 
concerning campaign finance, which cite Bellotti’s reasoning almost as often as Buckley’s.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court
The statute at issue, Mass.Gen.Laws Ann., ch. 55, § 8 prohibits appellants, two national 
banking associations and three business corporations, from making contributions or ex-
penditures “for the purpose of. . . influencing or affecting the vote on any question sub-
mitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or 
assets of the corporation.” The statute further specifics that “[n]o question submitted to 
the voters solely concerning the taxation of the income, property or transactions of indi-
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viduals shall be deemed materially to affect the property, business or assets of the cor-
poration”. . .
The speech proposed by appellants is at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection. 
“The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the 
least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without 
previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment . . . Freedom of discussion, if it would 
fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information 
is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies 
of their period.” Thornhill v. Alabama. The referendum issue that appellants wish to address 
falls squarely within this description. In appellants’ view, the enactment of a graduated 
personal income tax, as proposed to be authorized by constitutional amendment, would 
have a seriously adverse effect on the economy of the State. The importance of the 
referendum issue to the people and government of Massachusetts is not disputed. Its 
merits, however, are the subject of sharp disagreement.
As the Court said in Mills v. Alabama, “there is practically universal agreement that 
a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of govern-
mental affairs.”
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could 
silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensable to decision­making 
in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation, 
rather than an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for 
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, 
association, union, or individual.
The court below nevertheless held that corporate speech is protected by the First Amendment 
only when it pertains directly to the corporation’s business interests. In deciding whether 
this novel and restrictive gloss on the First Amendment comports with the Constitution 
and the precedents of this Court, we need not survey the outer boundaries of the Amendment’s 
protection of corporate speech, or address the abstract question whether corporations 
have the full measure of rights that individuals enjoy under the First Amendment.
The question in this case, simply put, is whether the corporate identity of the speaker 
deprives this proposed speech of what otherwise would be its clear entitlement to pro-
tection. We turn now to that question. . .
We find no support in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in the decisions of this Court, 
for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the First 
Amendment loses that protection simply because its source is a corporation that cannot 
prove, to the satisfaction of a court, a material effect on its business or property. The 
“materially affecting” requirement is not an identification of the boundaries of corporate 
speech etched by the Constitution itself. Rather, it amounts to an impermissible legislative 
prohibition of speech based on the identity of the interests that spokesmen may represent 
in public debate over controversial issues and a requirement that the speaker have 
a sufficiently great interest in the subject to justify communication.
Section 8 permits a corporation to communicate to the public its views on certain refer-
endum subjects – those materially affecting its business – but not others. It also singles 
out one kind of ballot question – individual taxation – as a subject about which corpora-
tions may never make their ideas public. The legislature has drawn the line between 
permissible and impermissible speech according to whether there is a sufficient nexus, 
as defined by the legislature, between the issue presented to the voters and the business 
interests of the speaker.
In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from 
dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers who may address 
a public issue. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley. If a legislature may direct business 
corporations to “stick to business,” it also may limit other corporations – religious, 
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charitable, or civic – to their respective “business” when addressing the public. Such 
power in government to channel the expression of views is unacceptable under the First 
Amendment. Especially where, as here, the legislature’s suppression of speech suggests 
an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing 
its views to the people, the First Amendment is plainly offended. Yet the State contends 
that its action is necessitated by governmental interests of the highest order. . .
[A]ppellee argues that § 8 protects corporate shareholders, an interest that is both legit-
imate and traditionally within the province of state law. The statute is said to serve this 
interest by preventing the use of corporate resources in furtherance of views with which 
some shareholders may disagree. This purpose is belied, however, by the provisions of 
the statute, which are both underinclusive and overinclusive.
The underinclusiveness of the statute is self-evident. Corporate expenditures with respect 
to a referendum are prohibited, while corporate activity with respect to the passage or 
defeat of legislation is permitted, even though corporations may engage in lobbying more 
often than they take positions on ballot questions submitted to the voters. Nor does 
§ 8 prohibit a corporation from expressing its views, by the expenditure of corporate 
funds, on any public issue until it becomes the subject of a referendum, though the 
displeasure of disapproving shareholders is unlikely to be any less.
The fact that a particular kind of ballot question has been singled out for special treatment 
undermines the likelihood of a genuine state interest in protecting shareholders. It suggests 
instead that the legislature may have been concerned with silencing corporations on 
a particular subject. Indeed, appellee has conceded that
“the legislative and judicial history of the statute indicates. . . that the second crime was 
‘tailor-made’ to prohibit corporate campaign contributions to oppose a graduated income 
tax amendment.”
Nor is the fact that § 8 is limited to banks and business corporations without relevance. 
Excluded from its provisions and criminal sanctions are entities or organized groups in 
which numbers of persons may hold an interest or membership, and which often have 
resources comparable to those of large corporations. Minorities in such groups or entities 
may have interests with respect to institutional speech quite comparable to those of 
minority shareholders in a corporation. Thus, the exclusion of Massachusetts business 
trusts, real estate investment trusts, labor unions, and other associations undermines the 
plausibility of the State’s purported concern for the persons who happen to be sharehold-
ers in the banks and corporations covered by § 8.
The overinclusiveness of the statute is demonstrated by the fact that § 8 would prohibit 
a corporation from supporting or opposing a referendum proposal even if its shareholders 
unanimously authorized the contribution or expenditure. Ultimately shareholders may 
decide, through the procedures of corporate democracy, whether their corporation should 
engage in debate on public issues. Acting through their power to elect the board of di-
rectors or to insist upon protective provisions in the corporation’s charter, shareholders 
normally are presumed competent to protect their own interests. In addition to intracor-
porate remedies, minority shareholders generally have access to the judicial remedy of 
a derivative suit to challenge corporate disbursements alleged to have been made for 
improper corporate purposes or merely to further the personal interests of management.
Assuming, arguendo, that protection of shareholders is a “compelling” interest under the 
circumstances of this case, we find “no substantially relevant correlation between the 
governmental interest asserted and the State’s effort” to prohibit appellants from 
speaking. Shelton v. Tucker. . .
Because that portion of § 8 challenged by appellants prohibits protected speech in 
a manner unjustified by a compelling state interest, it must be invalidated.
The Federal Election Campaign Act 
Amendments of 1979
90 Stat. 339 (1979)
In the late 1970s, Congress initiated a third revision of the Federal Election Campaign 
Act, voting for amendments to the legislation in 1979, which were enacted in early 
1980. Contrarily to the reasons for earlier amendments, which were imposed after 
political scandals (1974) and a Supreme Court decision (1976), this time the legislators 
decided to make changes in the regulations analyzing the conduct of the federal 
elections of 1976 and 1978. One of the main purposes of the revision of campaign 
finance law was a simplification of the procedures referring to the disclosure of 
campaign reports, which was achieved by diminishing the amount of reports, as well 
as reducing the number of subjects responsible for the disclosure of documentation. 
The other significant input of the 1979 amendments was the enhancement of the public 
financing program, through an increase in the amount of funds used in that program. 
Generally, the law was intended to make the procedures simpler, which was the main 
notion of election campaign participants, as well as the critics of FECA. Finally, the 
amendment sought to promote raising turnout and party-building activities. It raised 
the allowable expenditures of state and local parties, as long as they were coordinated 
with federal office candidates, particularly in presidential races. Yet while it aimed 
at voting registration drives and get-out-the-vote activities, it soon became a major 
source of soft money proliferation.
Despite the fact that Congress implemented small changes to the FECA in the 1980s, 
there was no further major legislation concerning campaign finance until the beginning 
of the 21st century, when the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act was adopted.
An Act to amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to 
make certain changes in the reporting and disclosure 
requirements of such Act, and for other purposes. . .
SEC. 304. (a)(1) Each treasurer of a political committee shall file reports of receipts and 
disbursements in accordance with the provisions of this subsection. The treasurer shall 
sign each such report.
64
(2) If the political Committee is the principal campaign committee of a candidate for the 
House of Representatives or for the Senate— (A) in any calendar year during which there 
is regularly scheduled election for which such candidate is seeking election, or nomination 
for election, the treasurer shall file the following reports: (i) a pre­election report, which 
shall be filed no later than the 12th day before (or posted by registered or certified mail 
no later than the 15th day before) any election in which such candidate is seeking election, 
or nomination for election, and which shall be complete as of the 20th day before such 
election; (ii) a post­general election report, which shall be filed no later than the 30th day 
after any general election in which such candidate has sought election, and which shall 
be complete as of the 20th day after such general election; and (iii) additional quarterly 
reports, which shall be filed no later than the 15th day after the last day of each calendar 
quarter, and which shall be complete as of the last day of each calendar quarter: except 
that the report for the quarter ending December 31 shall be filed no later than January 31 
of the following calendar year; and (B) in any other calendar year the following reports 
shall be filed: (i) a report covering the period beginning January 1 and ending June 30, 
which shall be filed no later than July 31; and (ii) a report covering the period beginning 
July 1 and ending December 31, which shall be filed no later than January 31 of the 
following calendar year.
(3) If the committee is the principal campaign committee of a candidate for the office of 
President—
(A) in any calendar year during which a general election is held to fill such office— (i) the 
treasurer shall file monthly reports if such committee has on January 1 of such year, 
received contributions aggregating $100,000 or made expenditures aggregating $100,000 
or anticipates receiving contributions aggregating $100,000 or more or making expen-
ditures aggregating $100,000 or more during such year: such monthly reports shall be 
filed no later than the 20th day after the last day of each month and shall be complete 
as of the last day of the month, except that, in lieu of filing the report otherwise due in 
November and December, a pre­general election report shall be filed in accordance with 
paragraph (2)(A)(i), a post­ general election report shall be filed in accordance with para-
graph (2)(A)(ii), and a year end report shall be filed no later than January 31 of the 
following calendar year; (ii) the treasurer of the other principal campaign commit- tees 
of a candidate for the office of President shall file a pre­ election report or reports in 
accordance with paragraph (2)(A)(i), a post-general election report in accordance with 
paragraph (2)(A)(ii), and quarterly reports in accordance with paragraph (2)(A)(iii); and 
(iii) if at any time during the election year a committee filing under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) 
receives contributions in excess of $100,000 or makes expenditures in excess of $100,000, 
the treasurer shall begin filing monthly reports­ under paragraph (3)(A)(i) at the next 
reporting period; and (B) in any other calendar year, the treasurer shall file either— 
(i) monthly reports, which shall be filed no later than the 20th day after the last day of 
each month and shall be complete as of the last day of the month; or (ii) quarterly reports, 
which shall be filed no later than the 15th day after the last day of each calendar quarter 
and which shall be complete as of the last day of each calendar quarter.
(4) All political committees other than authorized committees of a candidate shall file 
either— (A)(i) quarterly reports, in a calendar year in which a regularly scheduled gen-
eral election is held, which shall be filed no later than the 15th day after the last day of 
each calendar quarter: except that the report for the quarter ending on December 31 
of such calendar year shall be filed no later than January 31 of the following calendar 
year; (ii) a pre­election report, which shall be filed no later than the 12th day before (or 
posted by registered or certified mail no later than the 15th day before) any election 
in which the committee makes a contribution to or expenditure on behalf of a candidate in 
such election, and which shall be complete as of the 20th day before the election; (iii) 
a post­general election report, which shall be filed no later than the 30th day after the 
general election and which shall be complete as of the 20th day after such general 
election; and (iv) in any other calendar year, a report covering the period beginning 
January 1 and ending June 30, which shall be filed no later than July 31 and a report 
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covering the period beginning July 1 and ending December 31, which shall be filed no 
later than January 31 of the following calendar year; or (B) monthly reports in all calen-
dar years which shall be filed no later than the 20th day after the last day of the month 
and shall be complete as of the last day of the month, except that, in lieu of filing the 
reports otherwise due in November and December of any year in which a regularly 
scheduled general election is held, a pre­general election report shall be filed in accordance 
with paragraph (2)(A)(i), a post­general election report shall be filed in accordance with 
paragraph (2)(A)(ii), and a year end report shall be filed no later than January 31 of the 
following calendar year.
(5) If a designation, report, or statement filed pursuant to this Act (other than under 
paragraph (2)(A)(i) or (4)(A)(ii)) is sent by registered or certified mail, the United States 
postmark shall be considered the date of filing of the designation, report, or statement.
(6)(A) The principal campaign committee of a candidate shall notify the Clerk, the Secretary, 
or the Commission, and the Secretary of State, as appropriate, in writing, of any contri-
bution of $1,000 or more received by any authorized committee of such candidate after 
the 20th day, but more than 48 hours before, any election. This notification shall be made 
within 48 hours after the receipt of such contribution and shall include the name of the 
candidate and the office sought by the candidate, the identification of the contributor, and 
the date of receipt and amount of the contribution. (B) The notification required under 
this paragraph shall be in addition to all other reporting requirements under this Act.
(7) The reports required to be filed by this subsection shall be cumulative during the 
calendar year to which they relate, but where there has been no change in an item re-
ported in a previous report during such year, only the amount need be carried forward.
(8) The requirement for a political committee to file a quarterly report under paragraph 
(2)(A)(iii) or paragraph (4)(A)(i) shall be waived if such committee is required to file 
a pre-election report under paragraph (2)(A)(i), or paragraph (4)(A)(ii) during the period 
beginning on the 5th day after the close of the calendar quarter and ending on the 15th 
day after the close of the calendar quarter.
(9) The Commission shall set filing dates for reports to be filed by principal campaign 
committees of candidates seeking election, or nomination for election, in special elections 
and political committees filing under paragraph (4)(A) which make contributions to or 
expenditures on behalf of a candidate or candidates in special elections. The Commission 
shall require no more than one pre-election report for each election and one post-election 
report for the election, which fills the vacancy. The Commission may waive any reporting 
obligation of committees required to file for special elections if any report required by 
paragraph (2) or (4) is required to be filed within 10 days of a report required under this 
subsection. The Commission shall establish the reporting dates within 5 days of the 
setting of such election and shall publish such dates and notify the principal campaign 
committees of all candidates in such election of the reporting dates.
(10) The treasurer of a committee supporting a candidate for the office of Vice President 
(other than the nominee of a political party) shall file reports in accordance with paragraph (3).
(b) Each report under this section shall disclose—
(1) the amount of cash on hand at the beginning of the reporting period;
(2) for the reporting period and the calendar year, the total amount of all receipts, and 
the total amount of all receipts in the following categories: (A) contributions from persons 
other than political committees; (B) for an authorized committee, contributions from the 
candidate; (C) contributions from political party committees; (D) contributions from 
other political committees; (E) for an authorized committee, transfers from other autho-
rized committees of the same candidate; (F) transfers from affiliated committees and, 
where the reporting committee is a political party committee, transfers from other polit-
ical party committees, regardless of whether such committees are affiliated; (G) for an 
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authorized committee, loans made by or guar- anteed by the candidate; (H) all other 
loans; (I) rebates, refunds, and other offsets to operating expenditures; (J) dividends, 
interest, and other forms of receipts; and (K) for an authorized committee of a candidate 
for the office of President, Federal funds received under chapter 95 and chapter 96 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954;
(3) the identification of each— (A) person (other than a political committee) who makes 
a contribution to the reporting committee during the reporting period, whose contribution 
or contributions have an aggregate amount or value in excess of $200 within the calendar 
year, or in any lesser amount if the reporting committee should so elect, together with the 
date and amount of any such contribution; (B) political committee which makes a contri-
bution to the reporting committee during the reporting period, together with the date and 
amount of any such contribution; (C) authorized committee which makes a transfer to the 
reporting committee; (D) affiliated committee which makes a transfer to the reporting 
committee during the reporting period and, where the reporting committee is a political 
party committee, each transfer of funds to the reporting committee from another political 
party committee, regardless of whether such committees are affiliated, together with the 
date and amount of such transfer; (E) person who makes a loan to the reporting commit-
tee during the reporting period, together with the identification of any endorser or guar-
antor of such loan, and the date and amount or value of such loan; (F) person who provides 
a rebate, refund, or other offset to operating expenditures to the reporting committee in 
an aggregate amount or value in excess of $200 within the calendar year, together with 
the date and amount of such receipt; and (G) person who provides any dividend, interest, 
or other receipt to the reporting committee in an aggregate value or amount in excess of 
$200 within the calendar year, together with the date and amount of any such receipt;
(4) for the reporting period and the calendar year, the total amount of all disbursements, 
and all disbursements in the following categories: (A) expenditures made to meet candi-
date or committee operating expenses; (B) for authorized committees, transfers to 
other commit­ tees authorized by the same candidate; (C) transfers to affiliated commit-
tees and, where the reporting committee is a political party committee, transfers to 
other political party committees, regardless of whether they are affiliated; (D) for an 
authorized committee, repayment of loans made by or guaranteed by the candidate; 
(E) repayment of all other loans; (F) contribution refunds and other offsets to contributions; 
(G) for an authorized committee, any other disbursements; (H) for any political commit-
tee other than an authorized committee— (i) contributions made to other political com-
mittees; (ii) loans made by the reporting committees; (iii) independent expenditures; 
(iv) expenditures made under section 315(d) of this Act; and (v) any other disbursements; 
and (I) for an authorized committee of a candidate for the office of President, disbursements 
not subject to the limitation of section 315(b);
(5) the name and address of each— (A) person to whom an expenditure in an aggregate 
amount or value in excess of $200 within the calendar year is made by the reporting 
committee to meet a candidate or committee operating expense, together with the date, 
amount, and purpose of such operating expenditure; (B) authorized committee to which 
a transfer is made by the reporting committee; (C) affiliated committee to which a trans-
fer is made by the reporting committee during the reporting period and, where the re-
porting committee is a political party commit- tee, each transfer of funds by the reporting 
committee to another political party committee, regardless of whether such committees 
are affiliated, together with the date and amount of such transfers; (D) person who receives 
a loan repayment from the reporting committee during the reporting period, together 
with the date and amount of such loan repayment; and (E) person who receives a con-
tribution refund or other offset to contributions from the reporting committee where such 
contribution was reported under paragraph (3)(A) of this subsection, together with the 
date and amount of such disbursement;
(6)(A) for an authorized committee, the name and address of each person who has received 
any disbursement not disclosed under paragraph (5) in an aggregate amount or value in 
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excess of $200 within the calendar year, together with the date and amount of any such 
disbursement; (B) for any other political committee, the name and address of each— (i) po-
litical committee which has received a contribution from the reporting committee during 
the reporting period, together with the date and amount of any such contribution; 
(ii) person who has received a loan from the reporting committee during the reporting 
period, together with the date and amount of such loan; (iii) person who receives any 
disbursement during the reporting period in an aggregate amount or value in excess of 
$200 within the calendar year in connection with an independent expenditure by the 
reporting committee, together with the date, amount, and purpose of any such indepen-
dent expenditure and a statement which indicates whether such independent expenditure 
is in support of, or in opposition to, a candidate, as well as the name and office sought 
by such candidate, and a certification, under penalty of perjury, whether such independent 
expenditure is made in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or 
suggestion of, any candidate or any authorized committee or agent of such committee; 
(iv) person who receives any expenditure from the reporting committee during the re-
porting period in connection with an expenditure under section 315(d) in the Act, togeth-
er with the date, amount, and purpose of any such expenditure as well as the name of, 
and office sought by, the candidate on whose behalf the expenditure is made; and 
(v) person who has received any disbursement not other- wise disclosed in this paragraph 
or paragraph (5) in an aggregate amount or value in excess of $200 within the calendar 
year from the reporting committee within the reporting period, together with the date, 
amount, and purpose of any such disbursement;
(7) the total sum of all contributions to such political commit- tee, together with the total 
contributions less offsets to contributions and the total sum of all operating expenditures 
made by such political committee, together with total operating expenditures less offsets 
to operating expenditures, for both the reporting period and the calendar year; and
(8) the amount and nature of outstanding debts and obligations owed by or to such po-
litical committee; and where such debts and obligations are settled for less than their 
reported amount or value, a statement as to the circumstances and conditions under 
which such debts or obligations were extinguished and the consideration therefor.
California Medical Association 
v. F.E.C.
453 U.S. 182 (1981)
It seemed that after major changes in the original version of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act, which, among other reasons, resulted from a judicial review of the law 
by the Supreme Court, there would be no serious challenge to the constitutionality of 
campaign finance law. The analysis of the political and legal history of the 1980s and 
1990s, however, reveals quite an opposite situation. In these two decades there were 
several suits in the federal courts, which raised various problems on the scope of the 
legislation, both from the procedural as well as substantive perspectives. One of the 
first important cases regarding the constitutionality of FECA was California Medical 
Association, et al. v. F.E.C., decided by the Supreme Court in 1981.
The petitioners, a non-profit medical organization, had created in the mid 1970s 
a political action committee (the California Medical Political Action Committee), the 
goal of which was to support candidates in legislative elections. As a formal committee, 
it was subject to the limitations imposed on similar organizations, stemming from the 
provisions of Federal Election Campaign Act. When the Federal Election Commission, 
responsible for overseeing the enforcement of federal campaign finance laws, found out 
that the committee had exceeded the acceptable contribution limits, it filed a lawsuit 
against the California Medical Association. After winning in the District Court, 
and losing in the Court of Appeals, the association brought the case to the Supreme 
Court. The issue was similar to the earlier challenges of the campaign finance laws, 
as it referred to the accordance of the Federal Election Campaign Act with the First 
Amendment’s freedom of speech guarantees. The Court found that free speech was 
not violated by the contribution limits set by FECA, arguing that such limits served 
a compelling state interest: the protection of the integrity of the electoral process. The 
precedent was reached by a 5–4 margin, proving that the Justices were divided over 
the meaning of campaign finance restrictions, and the scope of the First Amendment’s 
protection of candidates and other participants of the process.
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MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court
In this case, we consider whether provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 
as amended, limiting the amount an unincorporated association may contribute to 
a multicandidate political committee violate the First Amendment or the equal protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment. Concluding that these contribution limits are consti-
tutional, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. . .
Appellants’ First Amendment claim is based largely on this Court’s decision in Buckley 
v. Valeo. That case involved a broad challenge to the constitutionality of the 1974 
Amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act. We held, inter alia, that the limitations 
placed by the Act on campaign expenditures violated the First Amendment in that they 
directly restrained the rights of citizens, candidates, and associations to engage in pro-
tected political speech. Nonetheless, we upheld the various ceilings the Act placed on the 
contributions individuals and multicandidate political committees could make to candidates 
and their political committees, and the maximum aggregate amount any individual could 
contribute in any calendar year. We reasoned that such contribution restrictions did not 
directly infringe on the ability of contributors to express their own political views, and 
that such limitations served the important governmental interests in preventing the 
corruption or appearance of corruption of the political process that might result if such 
contributions were not restrained.
Although the $5,000 annual limit imposed by § 441a(a)(1)(C) on the amount that indi-
viduals and unincorporated associations may contribute to political committees is, 
strictly speaking, a contribution limitation, appellants seek to bring their challenge to this 
provision within the reasoning of Buckley. First, they contend that § 441a(a)(1)(C) is akin 
to an unconstitutional expenditure limitation because it restricts the ability of CMA to 
engage in political speech through a political committee, CALPAC. Appellants further 
contend that even if the challenged provision is viewed as a contribution limitation, it is 
qualitatively different from the contribution restrictions we upheld in Buckley. Specifically, 
appellants assert that, because the contributions here flow to a political committee, 
rather than to a candidate, the danger of actual or apparent corruption of the political 
process recognized by this Court in Buckley as a sufficient justification for contribution 
restrictions is not present in this case.
While these contentions have some surface appeal, they are, in the end, unpersuasive. 
The type of expenditures that this Court in Buckley considered constitutionally protected 
were those made independently by a candidate, individual, or group in order to engage 
directly in political speech. Nothing in § 441a(a)(1)(C) limits the amount CMA or any of 
its members may independently expend in order to advocate political views; rather, the 
statute restrains only the amount that CMA may contribute to CALPAC. Appellants 
nonetheless insist that CMA’s contributions to CALPAC should receive the same constitu-
tional protection as independent expenditures because, according to appellants, this is 
the manner in which CMA has chosen to engage in political speech.
We would naturally be hesitant to conclude that CMA’s determination to fund CALPAC 
rather than to engage directly in political advocacy is entirely unprotected by the First 
Amendment. Nonetheless, the “speech by proxy” that CMA seeks to achieve through 
its contributions to CALPAC is not the sort of political advocacy that this Court in 
Buckley found entitled to full First Amendment protection. CALPAC, as a multicandidate 
political committee, receives contributions from more than 50 persons during a cal-
endar year. Thus, appellants’ claim that CALPAC is merely the mouthpiece of CMA is 
untenable. CALPAC, instead, is a separate legal entity that receives funds from mul-
tiple sources and that engages in independent political advocacy. Of course, CMA 
would probably not contribute to CALPAC unless it agreed with the views espoused 
by CALPAC, but this sympathy of interests alone does not convert CALPAC’s speech 
into that of CMA.
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Our decision in Buckley precludes any argument to the contrary. In that case, the limita-
tions on the amount individuals could contribute to candidates and campaign organizations 
were challenged on the ground that they limited the ability of the contributor to express 
his political views, albeit through the speech of another. The Court, in dismissing the 
claim, noted: “While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate 
or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into 
political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor.”
This analysis controls the instant case. If the First Amendment rights of a contributor are 
not infringed by limitations on the amount he may contribute to a campaign organization 
which advocates the views and candidacy of a particular candidate, the rights of a con-
tributor are similarly not impaired by limits on the amount he may give to a multicandidate 
political committee, such as CALPAC, which advocates the views and candidacies of 
a number of candidates.
We also disagree with appellants’ claim that the contribution restriction challenged here 
does not further the governmental interest in preventing the actual or apparent corruption 
of the political process. Congress enacted § 441a(a)(1)(C) in part to prevent circumven-
tion of the very limitations on contributions that this Court upheld in Buckley. Under the 
Act, individuals and unincorporated associations such as CMA may not contribute more 
than $1,000 to any single candidate in any calendar year. Moreover, individuals may not 
make more than $25,000 in aggregate annual political contributions. If appellants’ posi-
tion – that Congress cannot prohibit individuals and unincorporated associations from 
making unlimited contributions to multicandidate political committees – is accepted, then 
both these contribution limitations could be easily evaded. Since multicandidate political 
committees may contribute up to $5,000 per year to any candidate, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)
(2)(A), an individual or association seeking to evade the $1,000 limit on contributions to 
candidates could do so by channeling funds through a multicandidate political committee. 
Similarly, individuals could evade the $25,000 limit on aggregate annual contributions to 
candidates if they were allowed to give unlimited sums to multicandidate political com-
mittees, since such committees are not limited in the aggregate amount they may con-
tribute in any year. These concerns prompted Congress to enact § 441a(a)(1)(C), and it 
is clear that this provision is an appropriate means by which Congress could seek to 
protect the integrity of the contribution restrictions upheld by this Court in Buckley.
Appellants also challenge the restrictions on contributions to political committees on the 
ground that they violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Under 
the statute, corporations and labor unions may pay for the establishment, administration, 
and solicitation expenses of a “separate segregated fund to be utilized for political 
purposes.” Contributions by these groups to such funds are not limited by the statute. 
Appellants assert that a corporation’s or a union’s contribution to its segregated political 
fund is directly analogous to an unincorporated association’s contributions to a multican-
didate political committee. Thus, they conclude that, because contributions are unlimit-
ed in the former situation, they cannot be limited in the latter without violating equal 
protection.
We have already concluded that § 441a(a)(1)(C) does not offend the First Amendment. 
In order to conclude that it nonetheless violates the equal protection component of the 
Fifth Amendment, we would have to find that, because of this provision the Act burdens 
the First Amendment rights of persons subject to § 441a(a)(1)(C) to a greater extent 
than it burdens the same rights of corporations and unions, and that such differential 
treatment is not justified. We need not consider this second question – whether the 
discrimination alleged by appellants is justified – because we find no such discrimination. 
Appellants’ claim of unfair treatment ignores the plain fact that the statute as a whole 
imposes far fewer restrictions on individuals and unincorporated associations than it does 
on corporations and unions. Persons subject to the restrictions of § 441a(a)(1)(C) may 
make unlimited expenditures on political speech; corporations and unions, however, 
may make only the limited contributions authorized by § 441b(b)(2). Furthermore, indi-
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viduals and unincorporated associations may contribute to candidates, to candidates’ 
committees, to national party committees and to all other political committees, while 
corporations and unions are absolutely barred from making any such contributions. In 
addition, multicandidate political committees are generally unrestricted in the manner 
and scope of their solicitations; the segregated funds that unions and corporations may 
establish pursuant to § 441b(b)(2)(C) are carefully limited in this regard. The differing 
restrictions placed on individuals and unincorporated associations, on the one hand, and 
on unions and corporations, on the other, reflect a judgment by Congress that these 
entities have differing structures and purposes, and that they therefore may require 
different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process. 
Appellants do not challenge any of the restrictions on the corporate and union political 
activity, yet these restrictions entirely undermine appellants’ claim that, because of 
§441a(a)(1)(C), the Act discriminates against individuals and unincorporated associations 
in the exercise of their First Amendment rights.
Accordingly, we conclude that the $5,000 limitation on the amount that persons may 
contribute to multicandidate political committees violates neither the First nor the Fifth 
Amendment.
F.E.C. v. National Conservative 
Political Action Committee
470 U.S. 480 (1985)
The issues raised in the California Medical Association decision, on the proper conduct 
of political action committees in election campaigns, were the subjects of many other 
cases decided by federal courts in the 1980s. One of the most important disputes was 
F.E.C. v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, argued and decided in 
the Supreme Court’s 1984–1985 term. The National Conservative Political Action 
Committee (NCPAC), founded in 1975, became a major contributor to Republican Party 
candidates in their campaigns for Congress and the White House in the early 1980s. 
Recognized as a very influential political organization of the right side of the ideological 
sphere in the United States at that time, the committee supported conservative candidates 
by collecting funds for their campaigns, as well as preparing media advertisements 
attacking their political opponents.
The Federal Election Commission filed a suit against the conservative political 
action committee when it was revealed that the organization had spent more than $1,000 
on the campaign supporting a candidate for the presidency, which was a violation of 
one of the provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act. After a long battle in the 
lower courts, the highest judicial tribunal in the U.S. took the case in order to define 
the constitutionality of expenditure limits. In a 7–2 decision, announced by William 
Rehnquist, the Court used the freedom of speech argument to declare that parts of the 
Federal Election Commission Act violated the First Amendment, as such issues were 
beyond the power of the government. The decision underlined the important role of 
political action committees in the electoral process, defending their status as independent 
organizations which could openly participate in election campaigns.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. . .
NCPAC is a nonprofit, non­membership corporation formed under the District of Columbia 
Nonprofit Corporation Act in August, 1975, and registered with the FEC as a political 
committee. Its primary purpose is to attempt to influence directly or indirectly the election 
or defeat of candidates for federal, state, and local offices by making contributions and 
by making its own expenditures. It is governed by a three­member board of directors, 
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which is elected annually by the existing board. The board’s chairman and the other two 
members make all decisions concerning which candidates to support or oppose, the 
strategy and methods to employ, and the amounts of money to spend. Its contributors 
have no role in these decisions. It raises money by general and specific direct mail solic-
itations. It does not maintain separate accounts for the receipts from its general and 
specific solicitations, nor is it required by law to do so.
FCM is incorporated under the laws of Virginia, and is registered with the FEC as 
a multi­candidate political committee. In all material respects it is identical to NCPAC.
Both NCPAC and FCM are self-described ideological organizations with a conservative 
political philosophy. They solicited funds in support of President Reagan’s 1980 campaign, 
and they spent money on such means as radio and television advertisements to encour-
age voters to elect him President. On the record before us, these expenditures were 
“independent” in that they were not made at the request of or in coordination with the 
official Reagan election campaign committee or any of its agents. Indeed, there are indi-
cations that the efforts of these organizations were at times viewed with disfavor by the 
official campaign as counterproductive to its chosen strategy. NCPAC and FCM expressed 
their intention to conduct similar activities in support of President Reagan’s reelection in 
1984, and we may assume that they did so.
As noted above, both the Fund Act and FECA play a part in regulating Presidential campaigns. 
The Fund Act comes into play only if a candidate chooses to accept public funding of his 
general election campaign, and it covers only the period between the nominating con-
vention and 30 days after the general election. In contrast, FECA applies to all Presidential 
campaigns, as well as other federal elections, regardless of whether publicly or privately 
funded. Important provisions of these Acts have already been reviewed by this Court in 
Buckley v. Valeo. Generally, in that case we upheld as constitutional the limitations on 
contributions to candidates, and struck down as unconstitutional limitations on indepen-
dent expenditures.
In these cases, we consider provisions of the Fund Act that make it a criminal offense for 
political committees such as NCPAC and FCM to make independent expenditures in 
support of a candidate who has elected to accept public financing. Specifically, § 9012(f) 
provides: “(1) . . . it shall be unlawful for any political committee which is not an autho-
rized committee with respect to the eligible candidates of a political party for President 
and Vice President in a presidential election knowingly and willfully to incur expenditures 
to further the election of such candidates, which would constitute qualified campaign 
expenses if incurred by an authorized committee of such candidates, in an aggregate 
amount exceeding $1,000.”
The term “political committee” is defined to mean “any committee, association, or orga-
nization (whether or not incorporated) which accepts contributions or makes expenditures 
for the purpose of influencing, or attempting to influence, the nomination or election of 
one or more individuals to Federal, State, or local elective public office.”
The term “qualified campaign expense” simply means an otherwise lawful expense by 
a candidate or his authorized committee “to further his election” incurred during the 
period between the candidate’s nomination and 30 days after election. The term “eligi-
ble candidates” means those Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates who are 
qualified under the Act to receive public funding and have chosen to do so. Two of the 
more important qualifications are that a candidate and his authorized committees not 
incur campaign expenses in excess of his public funding and not accept contributions 
to defray campaign expenses.
There is no question that NCPAC and FCM are political committees and that President 
Reagan was a qualified candidate, and it seems plain enough that the PACs’ expenditures 
fall within the term “qualified campaign expense.” The PACs have argued in this Court, 
though apparently not below, that § 9012(f) was not intended to cover truly independent 
expenditures such as theirs, but only coordinated expenditures. But “expenditures in 
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cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, 
his authorized political committees, or their agents,” are considered “contributions” 
under the FECA, and as such are already subject to FECA’s $1,000 and $5,000 limitations 
in §§ 441a(a)(1), (2). Also, as noted above, one of the requirements for public funding 
is the candidate’s agreement not to accept such contributions. Under the PACs’ construction, 
§ 9012(f) would be wholly superfluous, and we find no support for that construction in 
the legislative history. We conclude that the PACs’ independent expenditures at issue 
in this case are squarely prohibited by § 9012(f), and we proceed to consider whether 
that prohibition violates the First Amendment.
There can be no doubt that the expenditures at issue in this case produce speech at the 
core of the First Amendment. . .
The PACs in this case, of course, are not lone pamphleteers or street corner orators in 
the Tom Paine mold; they spend substantial amounts of money in order to communicate 
their political ideas through sophisticated media advertisements. And of course the 
criminal sanction in question is applied to the expenditure of money to propagate politi-
cal views, rather than to the propagation of those views unaccompanied by the expendi-
ture of money. But for purposes of presenting political views in connection with a nation-
wide Presidential election, allowing the presentation of views while forbidding the 
expenditure of more than $1,000 to present them is much like allowing a speaker in 
a public hall to express his views while denying him the use of an amplifying system. . .
We also reject the notion that the PACs’ form of organization or method of solicitation 
diminishes their entitlement to First Amendment protection. The First Amendment freedom 
of association is squarely implicated in these cases. NCPAC and FCM are mechanisms by 
which large numbers of individuals of modest means can join together in organizations 
which serve to “amplif[y] the voice of their adherents.” Buckley v. Valeo, NAACP v. Alabama; 
Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley. It is significant that, in 1979–1980, approxi-
mately 101,000 people contributed an average of $75 each to NCPAC, and in 1980, ap-
proximately 100,000 people contributed an average of $25 each to FCM. . .
Having concluded that the PACs’ expenditures are entitled to full First Amendment pro-
tection, we now look to see if there is a sufficiently strong governmental interest served 
by § 9012(f)’s restriction on them, and whether the section is narrowly tailored to the 
evil that may legitimately be regulated. The restriction involved here is not merely an 
effort by the Government to regulate the use of its own property, such as was involved 
in United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns, or the dismissal of a speaker 
from Government employment, such as was involved in Connick v. Myers. It is a flat, 
across-the-board criminal sanction applicable to any “committee, association, or organi-
zation” which spends more than $1,000 on this particular type of political speech.
We held in Buckley and reaffirmed in Citizens Against Rent Control that preventing cor-
ruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government 
interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances. In Buckley, we struck down 
the FECA’s limitation on individuals’ independent expenditures because we found no 
tendency in such expenditures, uncoordinated with the candidate or his campaign, to 
corrupt or to give the appearance of corruption. For similar reasons, we also find § 9012(f)’s 
limitation on independent expenditures by political committees to be constitutionally 
infirm.
Corruption is a subversion of the political process. Elected officials are influenced to act 
contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or 
infusions of money into their campaigns. The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid 
pro quo: dollars for political favors. But here the conduct proscribed is not contributions 
to the candidate, but independent expenditures in support of the candidate. The amounts 
given to the PACs are overwhelmingly small contributions, well under the $1,000 limit on 
contributions upheld in Buckley; and the contributions are, by definition, not coordinated 
with the campaign of the candidate. The Court concluded in Buckley that there was 
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a fundamental constitutional difference between money spent to advertise one’s views 
independently of the candidate’s campaign and money contributed to the candidate to be 
spent on his campaign. We said there: “Unlike contributions, such independent expendi-
tures may well provide little assistance to the candidate’s campaign, and indeed may 
prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expen-
diture with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure 
to the candidate but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid 
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”
We think the same conclusion must follow here. It is contended that, because the PACs 
may, by the breadth of their organizations, spend larger amounts than the individuals in 
Buckley, the potential for corruption is greater. But precisely what the “corruption” may 
consist of we are never told with assurance. The fact that candidates and elected officials 
may alter or reaffirm their own positions on issues in response to political messages paid 
for by the PACs can hardly be called corruption, for one of the essential features of de-
mocracy is the presentation to the electorate of varying points of view. It is of course 
hypothetically possible here, as in the case of the independent expenditures forbidden in 
Buckley, that candidates may take notice of and reward those responsible for PAC expen-
ditures by giving official favors to the latter in exchange for the supporting messages. 
But here, as in Buckley, the absence of prearrangement and coordination undermines the 
value of the expenditure to the candidate, and thereby alleviates the danger that expen-
ditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate. On 
this record, such an exchange of political favors for uncoordinated expenditures remains 
a hypothetical possibility, and nothing more. . .
F.E.C. v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life
479 U.S. 238 (1986)
Just one year after the victory of a Republican-leaning political action committee 
in the Supreme Court, another campaign finance case, which raised the problem of 
contributions made by an ideological organization as decided. A non-profit corporation, 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCL) produced and distributed a newsletter 
entitled Everything You Need to Know to Vote Pro-Life. As this was issued before the 
primary elections to Congress in 1978, it agitated for those candidates who supported 
a conservative pro-life ideology. According to the Federal Election Commission, such 
a contribution to an election campaign by a corporation violated the Federal Election 
Campaign Act, which prohibited the use of general corporate funds for federal election 
expenditures. The case against MCL was brought to the court, and on appeal was 
decided by the Supreme Court in 1986.
In a unanimous opinion (with two Justices concurring), the Court found that the 
newsletter prepared by the non-profit corporation before the primary elections was 
protected by the First Amendment, and, therefore, that the provision of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act banning various forms of corporate contributions to the 
electoral process was unconstitutional. Although the Court found that MCL’s actions 
directly endorsed certain pro-life candidates, it argued that the idea of expenditure itself 
constitutes elements of express advocacy, thus being consistent with the elements of 
the Buckley ruling. The decision did not mean that any kind of contribution made by 
corporations or political action committees was acceptable, but that expenditures made 
by a non-profit organization, even if they constituted express advocacy communication, 
were within the scope of freedom of speech.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN announced the judgment of the Court. . .
The questions for decision here arise under § 316 of the Federal Election Campaign Act 
(FECA or Act), as renumbered and amended, 2 U.S.C. § 441b. The first question is 
whether appellee Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), a nonprofit, non­stock 
corporation, by financing certain activity with its treasury funds, has violated the restric-
tion on independent spending contained in § 441b. That section prohibits corporations 
from using treasury funds to make an expenditure “in connection with” any federal 
election, and requires that any expenditure for such purpose be financed by voluntary 
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contributions to a separate segregated fund. If appellee has violated § 441b, the next 
question is whether application of that section to MCFL’s conduct is constitutional. We 
hold that the appellee’s use of its treasury funds is prohibited by § 441b, but that § 441b 
is unconstitutional as applied to the activity of which the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC or Commission) complains. . .
In September, 1978, MCFL prepared and distributed a “Special Edition” prior to the 
September, 1978, primary elections. While the May, 1978, newsletter had been mailed 
to 2,109 people, and the October, 1978, newsletter to 3,119 people, more than 100,000 
copies of the “Special Edition” were printed for distribution. The front page of the publica-
tion was headlined “EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW TO VOTE PRO­LIFE,” and readers 
were admonished that “[n]o pro-life candidate can win in November without your vote in 
September.” “VOTE PRO­LIFE” was printed in large bold­faced letters on the back page, 
and a coupon was provided to be clipped and taken to the polls to remind voters of the 
name of the “pro-life” candidates. Next to the exhortation to vote “pro-life” was a dis-
claimer: “This special election edition does not represent an endorsement of any particu-
lar candidate”. . .
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the “Special Edition” is not outside the reach of 
§ 441b. First, we find no merit in appellee’s contention that preparation and distribution 
of the “Special Edition” does not fall within that section’s definition of “expenditure.” 
Section 441b(b)(2) defines “contribution or expenditure” as the provision of various things 
of value “to any candidate, campaign committee, or political party or organization, in 
connection with any election”. . . (emphasis added). MCFL contends that, since it supplied 
nothing to any candidate or organization, the publication is not within § 441b. However, 
the general definitions section of the Act contains a broader definition of “expenditure,” 
including within that term the provision of anything of value made “for the purpose of 
influencing any election for Federal office”. . .
Th[e] history clearly confirms that § 441b was meant to proscribe expenditures in con-
nection with an election. . . This history makes clear that Congress has long regarded it 
as insufficient merely to restrict payments made directly to candidates or campaign or-
ganizations. The first explicit expression of this came in 1947, when Congress passed the 
Taft-Hartley Act, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970 ed.), the criminal statute prohibit-
ing corporate contributions and expenditures to candidates. The statute, as amended, 
forbade any corporation or labor organization to make a “contribution or expenditure in 
connection with any election”. . . for federal office. . .
The Federal Election Campaign Act enacted the prohibition now found in § 441b. This 
portion of the Act simply ratified the existing understanding of the scope of § 610.
Representative Hansen, the sponsor of the provision, declared: “The effect of this language 
is to carry out the basic intent of section 610, which is to prohibit the use of union or 
corporate funds for active electioneering directed at the general public on behalf of 
a candidate in a Federal election”. . .
Appellee next argues that the definition of an expenditure under § 441b necessarily 
incorporates the requirement that a communication “expressly advocate” the election 
of candidates, and that its “Special Edition” does not constitute express advocacy. The 
argument relies on the portion of Buckley v. Valeo that upheld the disclosure requirement 
for expenditures by individuals other than candidates and by groups other than political 
committees. There, in order to avoid problems of overbreadth, the Court held that the 
term “expenditure” encompassed “only funds used for communications that expressly 
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” The rationale for this 
holding was: “[T]he distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advo-
cacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application. 
Candidates, especially incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues involving legisla-
tive proposals and governmental actions. Not only do candidates campaign on the basis 
of their positions on various issues, but campaigns themselves generate issues of 
public interest.”
78
We agree with appellee that this rationale requires a similar construction of the more 
intrusive provision that directly regulates independent spending. We therefore hold that 
an expenditure must constitute “express advocacy” in order to be subject to the prohibi-
tion of § 441b. We also hold, however, that the publication of the “Special Edition” con-
stitutes “express advocacy”. . .
In sum, we hold that MCFL’s publication and distribution of the “Special Edition” is in vio-
lation of § 441b. We therefore turn to the constitutionality of that provision as applied to 
appellee. . .
The FEC minimizes the impact of the legislation upon MCFL’s First Amendment rights by 
emphasizing that the corporation remains free to establish a separate segregated fund, 
composed of contributions earmarked for that purpose by the donors that may be used 
for unlimited campaign spending. However, the corporation is not free to use its general 
funds for campaign advocacy purposes. While that is not an absolute restriction on speech, 
it is a substantial one. Moreover, even to speak through a segregated fund, MCFL must 
make very significant efforts. . .
Because it is incorporated, MCFL must establish a “separate segregated fund” if it wishes 
to engage in any independent spending whatsoever. Since such a fund is considered 
a “political committee” under the Act, § 431(4)(B), all MCFL independent expenditure 
activity is, as a result, regulated as though the organization’s major purpose is to further 
the election of candidates. This means that MCFL must comply with several requirements 
in addition to those mentioned. . . Under § 434, MCFL must file either monthly reports 
with the FEC or reports on the following schedule: quarterly reports during election years, 
a pre-election report no later than the 12th day before an election, a post-election report 
within 30 days after an election, and reports every 6 months during nonelection years. . .
It is evident from this survey that MCFL is subject to more extensive requirements and 
more stringent restrictions than it would be if it were not incorporated. These additional 
regulations may create a disincentive for such organizations to engage in political speech. 
Detailed recordkeeping and disclosure obligations, along with the duty to appoint 
a treasurer and custodian of the records, impose administrative costs that many small 
entities may be unable to bear. . .
When a statutory provision burdens First Amendment rights, it must be justified by 
a compelling state interest. Williams v. Rhodes; NAACP v. Button. The FEC first insists 
that justification for § 441b’s expenditure restriction is provided by this Court’s acknowl-
edgment that “the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly 
careful regulation.” National Right to Work Committee. The Commission thus relies on 
the long history of regulation of corporate political activity as support for the application 
of § 441b to MCFL. . .
Direct corporate spending on political activity raises the prospect that resources amassed 
in the economic marketplace may be used to provide an unfair advantage in the political 
marketplace. Political “free trade” does not necessarily require that all who participate in 
the political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources. See NCPAC (invalidating 
limits on independent spending by political committees); Buckley (striking down expendi-
ture limits in 1971 Campaign Act). Relative availability of funds is, after all, a rough ba-
rometer of public support. The resources in the treasury of a business corporation, how-
ever, are not an indication of popular support for the corporation’s political ideas. They 
reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of investors and customers. The 
availability of these resources may make a corporation a formidable political presence, even 
though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas.
By requiring that corporate independent expenditures be financed through a political 
committee expressly established to engage in campaign spending, § 441b seeks to 
prevent this threat to the political marketplace. The resources available to this fund, as 
opposed to the corporate treasury, in fact reflect popular support for the political positions 
of the committee. . .
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Regulation of corporate political activity thus has reflected concern not about use of the 
corporate form per se, but about the potential for unfair deployment of wealth for polit-
ical purposes. Groups such as MCFL, however, do not pose that danger of corruption. 
MCFL was formed to disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital. The resources it 
has available are not a function of its success in the economic marketplace, but its pop-
ularity in the political marketplace. While MCFL may derive some advantages from its 
corporate form, those are advantages that redound to its benefit as a political organiza-
tion, not as a profit­making enterprise. In short, MCFL is not the type of “traditional 
corporatio[n] organized for economic gain,” NCPAC, that has been the focus of regulation 
of corporate political activity. . .
The Commission next argues in support of § 441b that it prevents an organization from 
using an individual’s money for purposes that the individual may not support. We acknowl-
edged the legitimacy of this concern as to the dissenting stockholder and union member 
in National Right to Work Committee, and in Pipefitters. But such persons, as noted, 
contribute investment funds or union dues for economic gain, and do not necessarily 
authorize the use of their money for political ends. Furthermore, because such individuals 
depend on the organization for income or for a job, it is not enough to tell them that any 
unhappiness with the use of their money can be redressed simply by leaving the corpora-
tion or the union. It was thus wholly reasonable for Congress to require the establishment 
of a separate political fund to which persons can make voluntary contributions.
This rationale for regulation is not compelling with respect to independent expenditures by 
appellee. Individuals who contribute to appellee are fully aware of its political purposes, 
and in fact contribute precisely because they support those purposes. It is true that 
a contributor may not be aware of the exact use to which his or her money ultimately may 
be put, or the specific candidate that it may be used to support. However, individuals 
contribute to a political organization in part because they regard such a contribution as 
a more effective means of advocacy than spending the money under their own personal 
direction. Any contribution therefore necessarily involves at least some degree of delegation 
of authority to use such funds in a manner that best serves the shared political purposes 
of the organization and contributor. In addition, an individual desiring more direct control 
over the use of his or her money can simply earmark the contribution for a specific purpose, 
an option whose availability does not depend on the applicability of § 441b. Finally, 
a contributor dissatisfied with how funds are used can simply stop contributing.
The Commission maintains that, even if contributors may be aware that a contribution to 
appellee will be used for political purposes in general, they may not wish such money to 
be used for electoral campaigns in particular. That is, persons may desire that an organi-
zation use their contributions to further a certain cause, but may not want the organization 
to use their money to urge support for or opposition to political candidates solely on the 
basis of that cause. This concern can be met, however, by means far more narrowly tailored 
and less burdensome than § 441b’s restriction on direct expenditures: simply requiring 
that contributors be informed that their money may be used for such a purpose. . .
Finally, the FEC maintains that the inapplicability of § 441b to MCFL would open the door 
to massive undisclosed political spending by similar entities, and to their use as conduits 
for undisclosed spending by business corporations and unions. We see no such danger. 
Even if § 441b is inapplicable, an independent expenditure of as little as $250 by MCFL 
will trigger the disclosure provisions of § 434(c). As a result, MCFL will be required to 
identify all contributors who annually provide in the aggregate $200 in funds intended 
to influence elections, will have to specify all recipients of independent spending amount-
ing to more than $200, and will be bound to identify all persons making contributions 
over $200 who request that the money be used for independent expenditures. These 
reporting obligations provide precisely the information necessary to monitor MCFL’s in-
dependent spending activity and its receipt of contributions. The state interest in disclo-
sure therefore can be met in a manner less restrictive than imposing the full panoply of 
regulations that accompany status as a political committee under the Act. . .
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Furthermore, should MCFL’s independent spending become so extensive that the organi-
zation’s major purpose may be regarded as campaign activity, the corporation would be 
classified as a political committee, Buckley. As such, it would automatically be subject 
to the obligations and restrictions applicable to those groups whose primary objective 
is to influence political campaigns. In sum, there is no need for the sake of disclosure to 
treat MCFL any differently than other organizations that only occasionally engage in in-
dependent spending on behalf of candidates.
Thus, the concerns underlying the regulation of corporate political activity are simply absent 
with regard to MCFL. The dissent is surely correct in maintaining that we should not sec-
ond-guess a decision to sweep within a broad prohibition activities that differ in degree, 
but not kind. It is not the case, however, that MCFL merely poses less of a threat of the 
danger that has prompted regulation. Rather, it does not pose such a threat at all. Voluntary 
political associations do not suddenly present the specter of corruption merely by assuming 
the corporate form. Given this fact, the rationale for restricting core political speech in this 
case is simply the desire for a bright-line rule. This hardly constitutes the compelling state 
interest necessary to justify any infringement on First Amendment freedom. While the 
burden on MCFL’s speech is not insurmountable, we cannot permit it to be imposed without 
a constitutionally adequate justification. In so holding, we do not assume a legislative role, 
but fulfill our judicial duty – to enforce the demands of the Constitution.
Our conclusion is that § 441b’s restriction of independent spending is unconstitutional as 
applied to MCFL, for it infringes protected speech without a compelling justification for 
such infringement. We acknowledge the legitimacy of Congress’ concern that organizations 
that amass great wealth in the economic marketplace not gain unfair advantage in the 
political marketplace. . .
In particular, MCFL has three features essential to our holding that it may not constitu-
tionally be bound by § 441b’s restriction on independent spending. First, it was formed 
for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business ac-
tivities. If political fundraising events are expressly denominated as requests for contri-
butions that will be used for political purposes, including direct expenditures, these events 
cannot be considered business activities. This ensures that political resources reflect 
political support. Second, it has no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have 
a claim on its assets or earnings. This ensures that persons connected with the organi-
zation will have no economic disincentive for disassociating with it if they disagree with 
its political activity. Third, MCFL was not established by a business corporation or a labor 
union, and it is its policy not to accept contributions from such entities. This prevents 
such corporations from serving as conduits for the type of direct spending that creates 
a threat to the political marketplace.
It may be that the class of organizations affected by our holding today will be small. That 
prospect, however, does not diminish the significance of the rights at stake. Freedom of 
speech plays a fundamental role in a democracy; as this Court has said, freedom of thought 
and speech “is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of 
freedom.” Palko v. Connecticut. Our pursuit of other governmental ends, however, may 
tempt us to accept in small increments a loss that would be unthinkable if inflicted all at 
once. For this reason, we must be as vigilant against the modest diminution of speech as 
we are against its sweeping restriction. Where at all possible, government must curtail 
speech only to the degree necessary to meet the particular problem at hand, and must 
avoid infringing on speech that does not pose the danger that has prompted regulation. 
In enacting the provision at issue in this case, Congress has chosen too blunt an instrument 
for such a delicate task.
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce
494 U.S. 652 (1990)
Despite the fact that most Supreme Court cases referred to the scope of federal cam-
paign finance laws, there were also important disputes over the scope of state campaign 
regulations, which raised the problem of money as a form of expression, as well as 
donations made by corporations. Both of these issues occurred in Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce, which was decided by the Supreme Court in 1990. From the 
analysis of judicial reasoning in such decisions, one can derive important arguments 
regarding the discussion over First Amendment guarantees with regard to financial 
participation in the electoral process.
The controversy concerned the actions of the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 
which intended to publish – even though its ad discussed the issues – materials promoting 
a candidate to the state legislature. Classified as independent expenditure, it was also 
prohibited by state law (Michigan Campaign Finance Act of 1976). The law allowed 
corporate expenditures only if they were made from independent sources, known as 
‘segregated funds,’ but the Michigan Chamber of Commerce used its general funds 
instead. In a 6–3 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the Michigan regulations, arguing 
that there was a compelling interest of the state to control the financial participation of 
corporations in a campaign election. The Justices stated that despite First Amendment 
protection, the government should manage the process whereby political candidates 
were controlled by corporate entities. According to the majority, the fact that the 
Michigan law provided for independent expenditures by corporations reduced the threat 
of corruption in the system. In a dissenting opinion Justice Antonin Scalia pointed out 
that the Court should have interpreted the First Amendment free speech guarantees from 
an originalist perspective and acknowledged a right to political speech by corporations. 
In 2010, the Supreme Court overruled the Austin decision permitting corporate funding 
in Citizens United v. F.E.C.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court
In this appeal, we must determine whether § 54(1) of the Michigan Campaign Finance 
Act violates either the First or the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Section 
54(1) prohibits corporations from using corporate treasury funds for independent expen-
ditures in support of or in opposition to any candidate in elections for state office. Mich.
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Comp. Laws § 169.254(1) (1979). Corporations are allowed, however, to make such 
expenditures from segregated funds used solely for political purposes. § 169.255(1). In 
response to a challenge brought by the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, the Sixth 
Circuit held that § 54(1) could not be applied to the Chamber, a Michigan nonprofit cor-
poration, without violating the First Amendment. Although we agree that expressive rights 
are implicated in this case, we hold that application of § 54(1) to the Chamber is consti-
tutional because the provision is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
To determine whether Michigan’s restrictions on corporate political expenditures may 
constitutionally be applied to the Chamber, we must ascertain whether they burden the 
exercise of political speech and, if they do, whether they are narrowly tailored to serve 
a compelling state interest. Buckley v. Valeo. Certainly, the use of funds to support 
a political candidate is “speech” independent campaign expenditures constitute “political 
expression at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms’.” 
The mere fact that the Chamber is a corporation does not remove its speech from the 
ambit of the First Amendment. See, e.g., First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.
This Court concluded in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), that a fed-
eral statute requiring corporations to make independent political expenditures only through 
special segregated funds, 2 U.S.C. § 441b, burdens corporate freedom of expression. 
MCFL. The Court reasoned that the small nonprofit corporation in that case would face 
certain organizational and financial hurdles in establishing and administering a segregat-
ed political fund. For example, the statute required the corporation to appoint a treasur-
er for its segregated fund, keep records of all contributions, file a statement of organiza-
tion containing information about the fund, and update that statement periodically. In 
addition, the corporation was permitted to solicit contributions to its segregated fund only 
from “members,” which did not include persons who merely contributed to or indicated 
support for the organization. These hurdles “impose[d] administrative costs that many 
small entities [might] be unable to bear” and “create[d] a disincentive for such organi-
zations to engage in political speech.”
Despite the Chamber’s success in administering its separate political fund, Michigan’s 
segregated fund requirement still burdens the Chamber’s exercise of expression because 
“the corporation is not free to use its general funds for campaign advocacy purposes.” 
MCFL. The Act imposes requirements similar to those in the federal statute involved in 
MCFL: a segregated fund must have a treasurer, § 169.221, and its administrators must 
keep detailed accounts of contributions, § 169.224, and file with state officials a statement 
of organization, ibid. In addition, a nonprofit corporation like the Chamber may solicit 
contributions to its political fund only from members, stockholders of members, officers 
or directors of members, and the spouses of any of these persons. § 169.255. Although 
these requirements do not stifle corporate speech entirely, they do burden expressive 
activity. See MCFL. Thus, they must be justified by a compelling state interest.
The State contends that the unique legal and economic characteristics of corporations 
necessitate some regulation of their political expenditures to avoid corruption or the 
appearance of corruption. See FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm. (NCPAC). 
State law grants corporations special advantages – such as limited liability, perpetual life, 
and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets – that enhance 
their ability to attract capital and to deploy their resources in ways that maximize the 
return on their shareholders’ investments. These state-created advantages not only allow 
corporations to play a dominant role in the nation’s economy, but also permit them to use 
“resources amassed in the economic marketplace” to obtain “an unfair advantage in the 
political marketplace.” MCFL. As the Court explained in MCFL, the political advantage of 
corporations is unfair because “[t]he resources in the treasury of a business corporation 
are not an indication of popular support for the corporation’s political ideas. They reject 
instead the economically motivated decisions of investors and customers. The availabil-
ity of these resources may make a corporation a formidable political presence, even though 
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the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas.” We therefore 
have recognized that “the compelling governmental interest in preventing corruption 
support[s] the restriction of the influence of political war chests funneled through the 
corporate form.” NCPAC. . .
The Chamber argues that this concern about corporate domination of the political process 
is insufficient to justify restrictions on independent expenditures. Although this Court has 
distinguished these expenditures from direct contributions in the context of federal laws 
regulating individual donors, Buckley, it has also recognized that a legislature might 
demonstrate a danger of real or apparent corruption posed by such expenditures when 
made by corporations to influence candidate elections, Bellotti. Regardless of whether this 
danger of “financial quid pro quo” corruption, see NCPAC, may be sufficient to justify 
a restriction on independent expenditures, Michigan’s regulation aims at a different type 
of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense ag-
gregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that 
have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas, 
rather, it ensures that expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas 
espoused by corporations. We emphasize that the mere fact that corporations may accu-
mulate large amounts of wealth is not the justification for § 54; rather, the unique 
state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries 
warrants the limit on independent expenditures. Corporate wealth can unfairly influence 
elections when it is deployed in the form of independent expenditures, just as it can when 
it assumes the guise of political contributions. We therefore hold that the State has artic-
ulated a sufficiently compelling rationale to support its restriction on independent expen-
ditures by corporations. . .
The Chamber contends that even if the Campaign Finance Act is constitutional with respect 
to for­profit corporations, it nonetheless cannot be applied to a nonprofit ideological 
corporation like a chamber of commerce. In MCFL, we held that the nonprofit organization 
there had “features more akin to voluntary political associations than business firms, and 
therefore should not have to bear burdens on independent spending solely because of 
[its] incorporated status.”
In reaching that conclusion, we enumerated three characteristics of the corporation that 
were “essential” to our holding. Because the Chamber does not share these crucial features, 
the Constitution does not require that it be exempted from the generally applicable 
provisions of § 54(1).
The first characteristic of Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., that distinguished it from 
ordinary business corporations was that the organization “was formed for the express 
purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business activities.” Its articles 
of incorporation indicated that its purpose was “[t]o foster respect for human life and to 
defend the right to life of all human beings, born and unborn, through educational, po-
litical and other forms of activities,” and all of the organization’s activities were “designed 
to further its agenda,” MCFL’s narrow political focus thus “ensure[d] that [its] political 
resources reflect[ed] political support.”
In contrast, the Chamber’s bylaws set forth more varied purposes, several of which are 
not inherently political. For instance, the Chamber compiles and disseminates information 
relating to social, civic, and economic conditions, trains and educates its members, and 
promotes ethical business practices. Unlike MCFL’s, the Chamber’s educational activities 
are not expressly tied to political goals; many of its seminars, conventions, and publications 
are politically neutral and focus on business and economic issues. The Chamber’s President 
and Chief Executive Officer stated that one of the corporation’s main purposes is to provide 
“service to [its] membership that includes everything from group insurance to education-
al seminars, and. . . litigation activities on behalf of the business community”. . .
We described the second feature of MCFL as the absence of “shareholders or other persons 
affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or earnings. This ensures that persons con-
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nected with the organization will have no economic disincentive for disassociating with it 
if they disagree with its political activity.” Although the Chamber also lacks shareholders, 
many of its members may be similarly reluctant to withdraw as members even if they 
disagree with the Chamber’s political expression, because they wish to benefit from the 
Chamber’s nonpolitical programs and to establish contacts with other members of the 
business community. The Chamber’s political agenda is sufficiently distinct from its edu-
cational and outreach programs that members who disagree with the former may contin-
ue to pay dues to participate in the latter. Justice KENNEDY ignores these disincentives for 
withdrawing as a member of the Chamber, stating only that “[o]ne need not become 
a member. . . to earn a living.” Certainly, members would be disinclined to terminate their 
involvement with the organization on the basis of less extreme disincentives than the loss 
of employment. Thus, we are persuaded that the Chamber’s members are more similar to 
shareholders of a business corporation than to the members of MCFL in this respect.
The final characteristic upon which we relied in MCFL was the organization’s independence 
from the influence of business corporations. On this score, the Chamber differs most 
greatly from the Massachusetts organization. MCFL was not established by, and had 
a policy of not accepting contributions from, business corporations. Thus it could not 
“serv[e] as [a] condui[t] for the type of direct spending that creates a threat to the polit-
ical marketplace.” In striking contrast, more than three­quarters of the Chamber’s 
members are business corporations, whose political contributions and expenditures can 
constitutionally be regulated by the State. See Buckley v. Valeo. As we read the Act, 
a corporation’s payments into the Chamber’s general treasury would not be considered 
payments to influence an election, so they would not be “contributions” or “expenditures,” 
see §§ 169.204(1), 169.206, and would not be subject to the Act’s limitations. Business 
corporations therefore could circumvent the Act’s restrictions by funneling money through 
the Chamber’s general treasury. Because the Chamber accepts money from for­profit 
corporations, it could, absent application of § 54(1), serve as a conduit for corporate 
political spending. In sum, the Chamber does not possess the features that would compel 
the State to exempt it from restrictions on independent political expenditures. . .
Michigan identified as a serious danger the significant possibility that corporate political 
expenditures will undermine the integrity of the political process, and it has implemented 
a narrowly tailored solution to that problem. By requiring corporations to make all inde-
pendent political expenditures through a separate fund made up of money solicited ex-
pressly for political purposes, the Michigan Campaign Finance Act reduces the threat that 
huge corporate treasuries amassed with the aid of favorable state laws will be used to 
influence unfairly the outcome of elections. The Michigan Chamber of Commerce does 
not exhibit the characteristics identified in MCFL that would require the State to exempt 
it from generally applicable restrictions on independent corporate expenditures. We 
therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Colorado Republican Federal 
Campaign Committee v. F.E.C.
518 U.S. 604 (1996)
The last vital Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of certain regulations of 
the Federal Election Campaign Act made in the 20th century came in 1996 in Colorado 
Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. F.E.C. The issue referred to the actions 
undertaken by the Republican Committee in Colorado during the 1986 elections to the 
state Senate, when it prepared a series of radio advertisements criticizing prospective 
candidates of the rival Democratic Party. According to FECA provisions, such 
contributions were prohibited, because the expenditures of political parties during 
federal election campaigns to Congress were limited. As a result, the Federal Election 
Commission filed a suit against the operations of the Republican Committee, which, in 
a countersuit, claimed that federal campaign finance legislation was inconsistent with 
the constitutional right to free speech. Although the District Court decided to dismiss 
the case on the grounds of its mootness, the Court of Appeals adjudicated in the dispute, 
finding no violation of the constitution in FECA’s restrictions. Finally, the case was 
brought to the Supreme Court, which posed a general question on the constitutionality of 
the FECA provisions regarding campaign contributions by political parties in elections 
to Congress.
Seven Justices signed the plurality opinion written by Justice Stephen Breyer, in 
which they declared the constitutionality of the expenditures of political parties which 
were not made in the name of any candidates and not coordinated with them – thus 
making them independent expenditures. The Court established that any prohibition of 
such an expenditure contradicts the principles of free speech and free expression. As 
a result, the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee won the case, but the 
Court’s holding did not directly overrule any larger piece of campaign finance legislation, 
as only Justice Clarence Thomas, who wrote a dissent, opted for an argument on the 
unconstitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act’s restrictions on political 
party contributions. Although the Republican Committee also challenged the limits on 
coordinated expenditures in support of candidates to the House of Representatives and 
Senate, the Court decided not to consider that issue in the case.
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MR. JUSTICE BREYER announced the judgment of the Court. . .
Most of the provisions this Court found unconstitutional imposed expenditure limits. Those 
provisions limited candidates’ rights to spend their own money, Buckley, limited a candi-
date’s campaign expenditures, limited the right of individuals to make “independent” 
expenditures (not coordinated with the candidate or candidate’s campaign), and similar-
ly limited the right of political committees to make “independent” expenditures, NCPAC. 
The provisions that the Court found constitutional mostly imposed contribution limits–
limits that apply both when an individual or political committee contributes money direct-
ly to a candidate and also when they indirectly contribute by making expenditures that 
they coordinate with the candidate. See Buckley, California Medical Assn. Consequently, 
for present purposes, the Act now prohibits individuals and political committees from 
making direct, or indirect, contributions that exceed the following limits:
(a) For any “person”: $1,000 to a candidate “with respect to any election”; $5,000 to any 
political committee in any year; $20,000 to the national committees of a political party 
in any year; but all within an overall limit (for any individual in any year) of $25,000.
(b) For any “multicandidate political committee”: $5,000 to a candidate “with respect to 
any election”; $5,000 to any political committee in any year; and $15,000 to the nation-
al committees of a political party in any year.
FECA also has a special provision, directly at issue in this case, that governs contributions 
and expenditures by political parties. §441a(d). This special provision creates, in part, an 
exception to the above contribution limits. That is, without special treatment, political 
parties ordinarily would be subject to the general limitation on contributions by a “mul-
ticandidate political committee” just described. That provision, as we said in (b) above, 
limits annual contributions by a “multicandidate political committee” to no more than 
$5,000 to any candidate. And as also mentioned above, this contribution limit governs 
not only direct contributions but also indirect contributions that take the form of coordi-
nated expenditures, defined as “expenditures made. . . in cooperation, consultation, or 
concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political 
committees, or their agents.” §441a(a)(7)(B)(i). Thus, ordinarily, a party’s coordinated 
expenditures would be subject to the $5,000 limitation.
However, FECA’s special provision, which we shall call the “Party Expenditure Provision,” 
creates a general exception from this contribution limitation, and from any other limitation 
on expenditures. It says:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law with respect to limitations on expenditures 
or limitations on contributions, . . . political party [committees]. . . may make expenditures 
in connection with the general election campaign of candidates for Federal office”. . . 
§441a(d)(1) (emphasis added).
The summary judgment record indicates that the expenditure in question is what this 
Court in Buckley called an “independent” expenditure, not a “coordinated” expenditure 
that other provisions of FECA treat as a kind of campaign “contribution.” See Buckley, 
NCPAC. The record describes how the expenditure was made. In a deposition, the Colorado 
Party’s Chairman, Howard Callaway, pointed out that, at the time of the expenditure, the 
Party had not yet selected a senatorial nominee from among the three individuals vying 
for the nomination. He added that he arranged for the development of the script at his 
own initiative, that he, and no one else, approved it, that the only other politically relevant 
individuals who might have read it were the party’s executive director and political direc-
tor, and that all relevant discussions took place at meetings attended only by party staff. . .
So treated, the expenditure falls within the scope of the Court’s precedents that extend 
First Amendment protection to independent expenditures. Beginning with Buckley, the 
Court’s cases have found a “fundamental constitutional difference between money spent 
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to advertise one’s views independently of the candidate’s campaign and money contrib-
uted to the candidate to be spent on his campaign.” NCPAC. This difference has been 
grounded in the observation that restrictions on contributions impose “only a marginal 
restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication,” Buckley, because 
the symbolic communicative value of a contribution bears little relation to its size, and 
because such limits leave “persons free to engage in independent political expression, to 
associate actively through volunteering their services, and to assist to a limited but 
nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees with financial 
resources.” At the same time, reasonable contribution limits directly and materially advance 
the Government’s interest in preventing exchanges of large financial contributions for 
political favors.
In contrast, the Court has said that restrictions on independent expenditures significantly 
impair the ability of individuals and groups to engage in direct political advocacy and 
“represent substantial. . . restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech.” And 
at the same time, the Court has concluded that limitations on independent expenditures 
are less directly related to preventing corruption, since “[t]he absence of prearrangement 
and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate. . . not only undermines the value 
of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will 
be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”
Given these established principles, we do not see how a provision that limits a political 
party’s independent expenditures can escape their controlling effect. A political party’s 
independent expression not only reflects its members’ views about the philosophical and 
governmental matters that bind them together, it also seeks to convince others to join 
those members in a practical democratic task, the task of creating a government that 
voters can instruct and hold responsible for subsequent success or failure. The independ-
ent expression of a political party’s views is “core” First Amendment activity no less than 
is the independent expression of individuals, candidates, or other political committees. 
See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm.
We are not aware of any special dangers of corruption associated with political parties 
that tip the constitutional balance in a different direction. When this Court considered, 
and held unconstitutional, limits that FECA had set on certain independent expenditures 
by political action committees, it reiterated Buckley’s observation that “the absence of 
prearrangement and coordination” does not eliminate, but it does help to “alleviate,” any 
“danger” that a candidate will understand the expenditure as an effort to obtain a “quid 
pro quo.” See NCPAC. The same is true of independent party expenditures. . .
We. . . believe that this Court’s prior case law controls the outcome here. We do not see 
how a Constitution that grants to individuals, candidates, and ordinary political commit-
tees the right to make unlimited independent expenditures could deny the same right to 
political parties. Having concluded this, we need not consider the Party’s further claim 
that the statute’s “in connection with” language, and the FEC’s interpretation of that 
language, are unconstitutionally vague. Cf. Buckley.
The Government does not deny the force of the precedent we have discussed. Rather, it 
argued below, and the lower courts accepted, that the expenditure in this case should be 
treated under those precedents, not as an “independent expenditure,” but rather as 
a “coordinated expenditure,” which those cases have treated as “contributions,” and which 
those cases have held Congress may constitutionally regulate. See Buckley.
While the District Court found that the expenditure in this case was “coordinated,” it did 
not do so based on any factual finding that the Party had consulted with any candidate 
in the making or planning of the advertising campaign in question. Instead, the District 
Court accepted the Government’s argument that all party expenditures should be treated 
as if they had been coordinated as a matter of law, “[b]ased on Supreme Court precedent 
and the Commission’s interpretation of the statute.” The Court of Appeals agreed with 
this legal conclusion. Thus, the lower courts’ “finding” of coordination does not conflict 
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with our conclusion, that the summary judgment record shows no actual coordination as 
a matter of fact. The question, instead, is whether the Court of Appeals erred as a legal 
matter in accepting the Government’s conclusive presumption that all party expenditures 
are “coordinated.” We believe it did. . .
We recognize that the Party filed a counterclaim in which it sought to raise a facial 
challenge to the Party Expenditure Provision as a whole. But that counterclaim did not 
focus specifically upon coordinated expenditures. Nor did its summary judgment affidavits 
specifically allege that the Party intended to make coordinated expenditures exceeding 
the statute’s limits. While this lack of focus does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to 
consider a facial challenge to the Party Expenditure Provision as overbroad or as uncon-
stitutional in all applications, it does provide a prudential reason for this Court not to 
decide the broader question, especially since it may not be necessary to resolve the 
entire current dispute. If, in fact, the Party wants to make only independent expenditures 
like those before us, its counterclaim is mooted by our resolution of its “as applied” 
challenge. Cf. Renne v. Geary Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.
More importantly, the opinions of the lower courts, and the parties’ briefs in this case, did 
not squarely isolate, and address, party expenditures that in fact are coordinated, nor 
did they examine, in that context, relevant similarities or differences with similar expen-
ditures made by individuals or other political groups. Indeed, to our knowledge, this is 
the first case in the 20­year history of the Party Expenditure Provision to suggest that in 
fact coordinated expenditures by political parties are protected from congressional regu-
lation by the First Amendment, even though this Court’s prior cases have permitted 
regulation of similarly coordinated expenditures by individuals and other political groups. 
See Buckley. This issue is complex. As Justice Kennedy points out, party coordinated 
expenditures do share some of the constitutionally relevant features of independent 
expenditures. But many such expenditures are also virtually indistinguishable from 
simple contributions. Moreover, political parties also share relevant features with many 
PAC’s, both having an interest in, and devoting resources to, the goal of electing candidates 
who will “work to further” a particular “political agenda,” which activity would benefit from 
coordination with those candidates. See, e.g., NCPAC. Thus, a holding on in fact coordi-
nated party expenditures necessarily implicates a broader range of issues than may first 
appear, including the constitutionality of party contribution limits.
Amendment to the Internal 
Revenue Code
114 Stat. 477 (2000)
Buckley v. Valeo, decided by the Supreme Court in 1976, had a significant impact not 
only on defining campaign contributions as a form of political speech, but also on the 
creation of so-called 527 organizations. The name comes from Section 527 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, which refers to income tax-exempt organizations attempting to influence 
the election or appointment of candidates to offices at all administrative levels in the 
United States. As a result, the exemption covered all federal and state political action 
committees, as well as political party committees involved in the electoral process in 
American states and on the federal level, which were registered by the Federal Election 
Commission. Conversely, the law did not require the disclosure of political activities of 
Section 527 organizations, which were not under the control of the federal agency. In 
2000, Congress implemented amendments to the Tax Code, establishing the rule that 
unregistered organizations would also have to report on their contributions to federal 
election campaigns.
An Act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to require 
527 organizations to disclose their political activities
SECTION 1. REQUIRED NOTIFICATION OF SECTION 527 STATUS
(a) In General – Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding 
at the end the following new subsection: (i) Organizations Must Notify Secretary That 
They Are Section 527 Organizations – (1) In general – Except as provided in paragraph 
(5), an organization shall not be treated as an organization described in this section – (A) un-
less it has given notice to the Secretary, electronically and in writing, that it is to be so 
treated, or (B) if the notice is given after the time required under paragraph (2), the 
organization shall not be so treated for any period before such notice is given. (2) Time 
to give notice – The notice required under paragraph (1) shall be transmitted not later 
than 24 hours after the date on which the organization is established. . . (5) Exceptions – This 
subsection shall not apply to any organization – (A) to which this section applies solely 
by reason of subsection (f)(1), or (B) which reasonably anticipates that it will not have 
gross receipts of $25,000 or more for any taxable year. (6) Coordination with other re-
quirements – This subsection shall not apply to any person required (without regard to 
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this subsection) to report under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as a political 
committee.
(b) Disclosure Requirements – (A) In general – The Secretary shall make publicly available, 
on the Internet and at the offices of the Internal Revenue Service – (i) a list of all politi-
cal organizations which file a notice with the Secretary under section 527(i), and (ii) the 
name, address, electronic mailing address, custodian of records, and contact person for 
such organization. (B) Time to make information available – T he Secretary shall make 
available the information required under subparagraph (A) not later than 5 business days 
after the Secretary receives a notice from a political organization under section 527(i). . .
SEC. 2. DISCLOSURES BY POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
(a) Required Disclosure of 527 Organizations – Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986 (relating to political organizations), as amended by section 1(a), is amended by 
adding at the end the following new section: Required Disclosure of Expenditures and 
Contributions –
(1) Penalty for failure – In the case of – (A) a failure to make the required disclosures 
under paragraph (2) at the time and in the manner prescribed therefor, or (B) a failure 
to include any of the information required to be shown by such disclosures or to show the 
correct information there shall be paid by the organization an amount equal to the rate 
of tax specified in subsection (b)(1) multiplied by the amount to which the failure relates.
(2) Required reports Effective dates – A political organization which accepts a contribu-
tion, or makes an expenditure, for an exempt function during any calendar year shall 
file with the Secretary either – (A)(i) in the case of a calendar year in which a regularly 
scheduled election is held – (I) quarterly reports, beginning with the first quarter of the 
calendar year in which a contribution is accepted or expenditure is made, which shall be 
filed not later than the fifteenth day after the last day of each calendar quarter, except 
that the report for the quarter ending on December 31 of such calendar year shall be 
filed not later than January 31 of the following calendar year, (II) a pre­election report, 
which shall be filed not later than the twelfth day before (or posted by registered or 
certified mail not later than the fifteenth day before) any election with respect to which 
the organization makes a contribution or expenditure, and which shall be complete as 
of the twentieth day before the election, and (III) a post­general election report, which 
shall be filed not later than the thirtieth day after the general election and which shall 
be complete as of the twentieth day after such general election, and (ii) in the case of 
any other calendar year, a report covering the period beginning January 1 and ending 
June 30, which shall be filed no later than July 31 and a report covering the period begin-
ning July 1 and ending December 31, which shall be filed no later than January 31 of the 
following calendar year, or (B) monthly reports for the calendar year, beginning with the 
first month of the calendar year in which a contribution is accepted or expenditure is 
made, which shall be filed not later than the twentieth day after the last day of the month 
and shall be complete as if the last day of the month, except that, in lieu of filing the 
reports otherwise due in November and December of any year in which a regularly 
scheduled general election is held, a pre­general election report shall be filed in accord-
ance with subparagraph (A)(i)(II), a post­general election report shall be filed in 
accor dance with subparagraph (A)(i)(III), and a year end report shall be filed not later 
than January 31 of the following calendar year.
(3) Contents of report – A report required under paragraph (2) shall contain the following 
information: (A) The amount of each expenditure made to a person if the aggregate 
amount of expenditures to such person during the calendar year equals or exceeds $500 
and the name and address of the person (in the case of an individual, including the oc-
cupation and name of employer of such individual). (B) The name and address (in the 
case of an individual including the occupation and name of employer of such individual) 
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of all contributors which contributed an aggregate amount of $200 or more to the orga-
nization during the calendar year and the amount of the contribution. Any expenditure 
or contribution disclosed in a previous reporting period is not required to be included in 
the current reporting period. . .
(6) Election – For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘election’ means – (A) a general, 
special, primary, or runoff election for a Federal office, (B) a convention or caucus of 
a political party which has authority to nominate a candidate for Federal office, (C) a pri-
mary election held for the selection of delegates to a national nominating convention of 
a political party, or (D) a primary election held for the expression of a preference for the 
nomination of individuals for election to the office of President.
F.E.C. v. Colorado Republican 
Federal Campaign Committee
533 U.S. 431 (2001)
In 1996 the Supreme Court adjudicated in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign 
Committee v. F.E.C., in which the Justices held that the provisions of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act were not applicable to political party expenditures which were 
not directly related to any candidate. The Republican Committee challenged in that case 
the coordinated expenditures restrictions, but the Court did not answer that question. The 
same issue was repeated by the Committee a few years later, leading to another lawsuit 
which again ended up in the Supreme Court. As a result, the same Justices answered the 
same legal question on the scope of the expenditure limits of political parties as imposed 
by the Federal Election Campaign Act.
The Court declared that restrictions on coordinated expenditures were constitutional 
as they served an important state interest, and did not violate political parties’ right 
to freely participate in election campaigns for federal offices. This time, however, 
the distribution of votes was 5–4, producing not only a narrow-margin decision, but 
also revealing a strong division among liberal and conservative Justices. Sandra Day 
O’Connor was the only conservative who supported the majority opinion, whereas 
such Justices as Anthony Kennedy, William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence 
Thomas wrote dissenting opinions, in which they undermined the compelling state 
interest arguments, arguing for broader protection of the freedom of speech of political 
parties.
MR. JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court
In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n (Colorado I), 
we held that spending limits set by the Federal Election Campaign Act were unconstitu-
tional as applied to the Colorado Republican Party’s independent expenditures in con-
nection with a senatorial campaign. We remanded for consideration of the party’s claim 
that all limits on expenditures by a political party in connection with congressional 
campaigns are facially unconstitutional and thus unenforceable even as to spending 
coordinated with a candidate. Today we reject that facial challenge to the limits on 
parties’ coordinated expenditures. . .
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Spending for political ends and contributing to political candidates both fall within the 
First Amendment’s protection of speech and political association. Buckley. But ever since 
we first reviewed the 1971 Act, we have understood that limits on political expenditures 
deserve closer scrutiny than restrictions on political contributions. . . Restraints on ex-
penditures generally curb more expressive and associational activity than limits on 
contributions do. Shrink Missouri; Colorado I; Buckley. A further reason for the distinc-
tion is that limits on contributions are more clearly justified by a link to political corrup-
tion than limits on other kinds of unlimited political spending are (corruption being un-
derstood not only as quid pro quo agreements, but also as undue influence on an 
officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence, Shrink Missouri. At least 
this is so where the spending is not coordinated with a candidate or his campaign. 
Colorado I, Buckley. . .
The First Amendment line between spending and donating is easy to draw when it falls 
between independent expenditures by individuals or political action committees (PACs) 
without any candidate’s approval (or wink or nod), and contributions in the form of cash 
gifts to candidates. See, Shrink Missouri, Buckley. . .
The current contribution limits appear in 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a). They provide that “persons” 
(still broadly defined) may contribute no more than $1,000 to a candidate “with respect 
to any election for Federal office,” $5,000 to any political committee in any year, and 
$20,000 to the national committees of a political party in any year. Individuals are limit-
ed to a yearly contribution total of $25,000. “[M]ulticandidate political committees” are 
limited to a $5,000 contribution to a candidate “with respect to any election,” $5,000 to 
any political committee in any year, and $15,000 to the national committees of a political 
party in any year. Unlike the party expenditure limits, these contribution limits are not 
adjusted for inflation. . .
[Colorado I] still left the question whether the First Amendment allows coordinated 
election expenditures by parties to be treated functionally as contributions, the way co-
ordinated expenditures by other entities are treated. Colorado I found no justification for 
placing parties at a disadvantage when spending independently; but was there a case for 
leaving them entirely free to coordinate unlimited spending with candidates when others 
could not? The principal opinion in Colorado I noted that coordinated expenditures “share 
some of the constitutionally relevant features of independent expenditures.” But it also 
observed that “many [party coordinated expenditures] are. . . virtually indistinguishable 
from simple contributions.” Coordinated spending by a party, in other words, covers 
a spectrum of activity, as does coordinated spending by other political actors. The issue 
in this case is, accordingly, whether a party is otherwise in a different position from 
other political speakers, giving it a claim to demand a generally higher standard of 
scrutiny before its coordinated spending can be limited. The issue is posed by two 
questions: does limiting coordinated spending impose a unique burden on parties, and is 
there reason to think that coordinated spending by a party would raise the risk of cor-
ruption posed when others spend in coordination with a candidate? The issue is best 
viewed through the positions developed by the Party and the Government in this case.
The Party’s argument that its coordinated spending, like its independent spending, should 
be left free from restriction under the Buckley line of cases boils down to this: because 
a party’s most important speech is aimed at electing candidates and is itself expressed 
through those candidates, any limit on party support for a candidate imposes a unique 
First Amendment burden. The point of organizing a party, the argument goes, is to run 
a successful candidate who shares the party’s policy goals. Therefore, while a campaign 
contribution is only one of several ways that individuals and nonparty groups speak and 
associate politically, see Shrink Missouri; Buckley, financial support of candidates is es-
sential to the nature of political parties as we know them. And coordination with a can-
didate is a party’s natural way of operating, not merely an option that can easily be 
avoided. Limitation of any party expenditure coordinated with a candidate, the Party 
contends, is therefore a serious, rather than incidental, imposition on the party’s speech 
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and associative purpose, and that justifies a stricter level of scrutiny than we have applied 
to analogous limits on individuals and nonparty groups. But whatever level of scrutiny is 
applied, the Party goes on to argue, the burden on a party reflects a fatal mismatch 
between the effects of limiting coordinated party expenditures and the prevention of 
corruption or the appearance of it.
The Government’s argument for treating coordinated spending like contributions goes 
back to Buckley. There, the rationale for endorsing Congress’s equation of coordinated 
expenditures and contributions was that the equation “prevent[s] attempts to circumvent 
the Act through prearranged or coordinated expenditures amounting to disguised contri-
butions.” The idea was that coordinated expenditures are as useful to the candidate as 
cash, and that such “disguised contributions” might be given “as a quid pro quo for im-
proper commitments from the candidate” (in contrast to independent expenditures, which 
are poor sources of leverage for a spender because they might be duplicative or counter-
productive from a candidate’s point of view). In effect, therefore, Buckley subjected 
limits on coordinated expenditures by individuals and nonparty groups to the same 
scrutiny it applied to limits on their cash contributions. The standard of scrutiny requires 
the limit to be “‘closely drawn’ to match a ‘sufficiently important interest,’ though the 
dollar amount of the limit need not be ‘fine tun[ed],’” Shrink Missouri.
The Government develops this rationale a step further in applying it here. Coordinated 
spending by a party should be limited not only because it is like a party contribution, but 
for a further reason. A party’s right to make unlimited expenditures coordinated with 
a candidate would induce individual and other nonparty contributors to give to the party 
in order to finance coordinated spending for a favored candidate beyond the contribution 
limits binding on them. The Government points out that a degree of circumvention is 
occurring under present law (which allows unlimited independent spending and some 
coordinated spending). Individuals and nonparty groups who have reached the limit of 
direct contributions to a candidate give to a party with the understanding that the con-
tribution to the party will produce increased party spending for the candidate’s benefit. 
The Government argues that if coordinated spending were unlimited, circumvention would 
increase: because coordinated spending is as effective as direct contributions in support-
ing a candidate, an increased opportunity for coordinated spending would aggravate the 
use of a party to funnel money to a candidate from individuals and nonparty groups, who 
would thus bypass the contribution limits that Buckley upheld.
Each of the competing positions is plausible at first blush. Our evaluation of the arguments, 
however, leads us to reject the Party’s claim to suffer a burden unique in any way that 
should make a categorical difference under the First Amendment. On the other side, 
the Government’s contentions are ultimately borne out by evidence, entitling it to 
prevail in its characterization of party coordinated spending as the functional equivalent 
of contributions.
. . .There are two basic arguments here. The first turns on the relationship of a party to 
a candidate: a coordinated relationship between them so defines a party that it cannot 
function as such without coordinated spending, the object of which is a candidate’s 
election. We think political history and political reality belie this argument. The second 
argument turns on the nature of a party as uniquely able to spend in ways that promote 
candidate success. We think that this argument is a double-edged sword, and one 
hardly limited to political parties. . .
Parties perform functions more complex than simply electing candidates; whether they 
like it or not, they act as agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to produce 
obligated officeholders. It is this party role, which functionally unites parties with other 
self-interested political actors that the Party Expenditure Provision targets. This party 
role, accordingly, provides good reason to view limits on coordinated spending by parties 
through the same lens applied to such spending by donors, like PACs, that can use parties 
as conduits for contributions meant to place candidates under obligation. . .
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Insofar as the Party suggests that its strong working relationship with candidates and its 
unique ability to speak in coordination with them should be taken into account in the First 
Amendment analysis, we agree. It is the accepted understanding that a party combines 
its members’ power to speak by aggregating contributions and broadcasting messages 
more widely than individual contributors generally could afford to do, and the party 
marshals this power with greater sophistication than individuals generally could, using 
such mechanisms as speech coordinated with a candidate. In other words, the party is 
efficient in generating large sums to spend and in pinpointing effective ways to spend 
them. Cf. Colorado I.
It does not, however, follow from a party’s efficiency in getting large sums and spending 
intelligently that limits on a party’s coordinated spending should be scrutinized under an 
unusually high standard, and in fact any argument from sophistication and power would 
cut both ways. On the one hand, one can seek the benefit of stricter scrutiny of a law 
capping party coordinated spending by emphasizing the heavy burden imposed by limit-
ing the most effective mechanism of sophisticated spending. And yet it is exactly this 
efficiency culminating in coordinated spending that (on the Government’s view) places 
a party in a position to be used to circumvent contribution limits that apply to individuals 
and PACs, and thereby to exacerbate the threat of corruption and apparent corruption 
that those contribution limits are aimed at reducing. As a consequence, what the Party 
calls an unusual burden imposed by regulating its spending is not a simple premise for 
arguing for tighter scrutiny of limits on a party; it is the premise for a question pointing 
in the opposite direction. If the coordinated spending of other, less efficient and perhaps 
less practiced political actors can be limited consistently with the Constitution, why would 
the Constitution forbid regulation aimed at a party whose very efficiency in channeling 
benefits to candidates threatens to undermine the contribution (and hence coordinated 
spending) limits to which those others are unquestionably subject. . .
The Party’s arguments for being treated differently from other political actors subject to 
limitation on political spending under the Act do not pan out. Despite decades of limitation 
on coordinated spending, parties have not been rendered useless. In reality, parties 
continue to organize to elect candidates, and also function for the benefit of donors whose 
object is to place candidates under obligation, a fact that parties cannot escape. Indeed, 
parties’ capacity to concentrate power to elect is the very capacity that apparently opens 
them to exploitation as channels for circumventing contribution and coordinated spending 
limits binding on other political players. And some of these players could marshal the 
same power and sophistication for the same electoral objectives as political parties 
themselves. . .
Finally, the Party falls back to claiming that, even if there is a threat of circumvention, 
the First Amendment demands a response better tailored to that threat than a limitation 
on spending, even coordinated spending. The Party has two suggestions. First, it says 
that better crafted safeguards are in place already, in particular the earmarking rule of 
§ 441a(a)(8), which provides that contributions that “are in any way earmarked or oth-
erwise directed through an intermediary or conduit to [a] candidate” are treated as 
contributions to the candidate. The Party says that this provision either suffices to address 
any risk of circumvention or would suffice if clarified to cover practices like tallying. This 
position, however, ignores the practical difficulty of identifying and directly combating 
circumvention under actual political conditions. Donations are made to a party by con-
tributors who favor the party’s candidates in races that affect them; donors are (of course) 
permitted to express their views and preferences to party officials; and the party is 
permitted (as we have held it must be) to spend money in its own right. When this is the 
environment for contributions going into a general party treasury, and candidate-fund-
raisers are rewarded with something less obvious than dollar-for-dollar pass-throughs 
(distributed through contributions and party spending), circumvention is obviously very 
hard to trace. The earmarking provision, even if it dealt directly with tallying, would reach 
only the most clumsy attempts to pass contributions through to candidates. To treat the 
earmarking provision as the outer limit of acceptable tailoring would disarm any serious 
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effort to limit the corrosive effects of what Chief Judge Seymour called “‘understandings’ 
regarding what donors give what amounts to the party, which candidates are to receive 
what funds from the party, and what interests particular donors are seeking to promote,” 
(dissenting opinion). . .
The Party’s second preferred prescription for the threat of an end run calls for replacing 
limits on coordinated expenditures by parties with limits on contributions to parties, the 
latter supposedly imposing a lesser First Amendment burden. The Party thus invokes the 
general rule that contribution limits take a lesser First Amendment toll, expenditure 
limits a greater one. That was one strand of the reasoning in Buckley itself, which reject-
ed the argument that limitations on independent expenditures by individuals, groups, and 
candidates were justifiable in order to avoid circumvention of contribution limitations. It 
was also one strand of the logic of the Colorado I principal opinion in rejecting the Party 
Expenditure Provision’s application to independent party expenditures.
In each of those cases, however, the Court’s reasoning contained another strand. The 
analysis ultimately turned on the understanding that the expenditures at issue were not 
potential alter egos for contributions, but were independent and therefore functionally 
true expenditures, qualifying for the most demanding First Amendment scrutiny employed 
in Buckley. Colorado I; Buckley. Thus, in Colorado I we could not assume, “absent con-
vincing evidence to the contrary,” that the Party’s independent expenditures formed a link 
in a chain of corruption by-conduit. “The absence of prearrangement and coordination of 
an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the 
expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be 
given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate,” Buckley; 
therefore, “the constitutionally significant fact” in Colorado I was “the lack of coordination 
between the candidate and the source of the expenditure.”
Here, however, just the opposite is true. There is no significant functional difference 
between a party’s coordinated expenditure and a direct party contribution to the candidate, 
and there is good reason to expect that a party’s right of unlimited coordinated spending 
would attract increased contributions to parties to finance exactly that kind of spending. 
Coordinated expenditures of money donated to a party are tailor-made to undermine 
contribution limits. Therefore the choice here is not, as in Buckley and Colorado I, between 
a limit on pure contributions and pure expenditures. The choice is between limiting 
contributions and limiting expenditures whose special value as expenditures is also the 
source of their power to corrupt. Congress is entitled to its choice.
We hold that a party’s coordinated expenditures, unlike expenditures truly independent, 
may be restricted to minimize circumvention of contribution limits.
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
116 Stat. 81 (2002)
After congressional legislative activity in the 1970s, which resulted in the establishment 
of a set of rules governing federal campaign finance, the pace of reform of the electoral 
process slowed down, and it was the Supreme Court which took the initiative in 
reshaping the meaning of certain regulations referring to campaign contributions and 
spending, as well as disclosure procedures. It would be a mistake, however, to consider 
that politicians did not try to argue in congressional debates on amending the Federal 
Elections Campaign Act, which was criticized especially during and after those electoral 
cycles which revealed the growing impact of money on the electoral process. The 
1980s and 1990s saw an intensified operation of political action committees, both from 
the perspective of their number and the amount of funds they contributed to federal 
campaigns. Besides PACs’ and national political committees’ contributions, one of 
the major problems occurred with the increased role of so-called soft money, defined 
as funds which were not under the control of federal campaign finance, but served 
indirectly as an important source of candidates’ organization of election campaigns. 
Soft money was collected by numerous entities, such as corporations and labor unions, 
to cover administrative costs, voter turnout programs, grassroots activities or media 
advertisements, aimed at preparing and conducting political campaigns on the federal 
level. As more than $700 million was spent this way in the 1990s, soft money became 
a major target of the campaign finance reformers.
Proposals were prepared by Republicans and Democrats working together over and 
above political divisions, and aimed at limiting the role of soft money and restricting 
issue advertising, as well as enhancing the enforcement provisions of campaign finance 
regulations. After tensions in the House of Representatives and Senate, Congress 
finally adopted the new law in 2002, known as the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(BCRA). Among its many provisions, the Act banned political party committees from 
collecting and spending funds in connection with federal elections, if they were not 
subject to campaign finance regulations and limitations. It restricted the functioning 
of national party committees and political action committees, and the form and 
character of candidates’ expenditures. Importantly, BCRA created a new category of 
“electioneering communications”, referring to various types of communications made 
in support of candidates to federal offices in a fixed period of time. The Act also raised 
the limits on what individuals were able to contribute to a candidate, national party 
committee and PAC as well as the overall limits (aggregate limits) that could be donated 
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to these entities. All these limits were now to be updated by the FEC in every electoral 
cycle. Despite its bipartisan character, the law was quickly challenged in the courts by 
politicians who felt that it imposed too-broad restrictions on subjects participating in 
federal election campaigns.
An Act to amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
to provide bipartisan campaign reform. . .
SEC. 101. SOFT MONEY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. . .
(a) National Committees. (1) In general – A national committee of a political party (in-
cluding a national congressional campaign committee of a political party) may not solic-
it, receive, or direct to another person a contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or 
any other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the limitations, 
prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act. (2) Applicability – The prohibition 
established by paragraph (1) applies to any such national committee, any officer or agent 
acting on behalf of such a national committee, and any entity that is directly or indirect-
ly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by such a national committee.
(b) State, District, and Local Committees – (1) In general – Except as provided in paragraph 
(2), an amount that is expended or disbursed for Federal election activity by a State, 
district, or local committee of a political party (including an entity that is directly or indi-
rectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by a State, district, or local com-
mittee of a political party and an officer or agent acting on behalf of such committee or 
entity), or by an association or similar group of candidates for State or local office 
or of individuals holding State or local office, shall be made from funds subject to the 
limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act. . .
(c) Fundraising Costs – An amount spent by a person described in subsection (a) or (b) to 
raise funds that are used, in whole or in part, for expenditures and disbursements for 
a Federal election activity shall be made from funds subject to the limitations, prohibitions, 
and reporting requirements of this Act.
(d) Tax-Exempt Organizations – A national, State, district, or local committee of a polit-
ical party (including a national congressional campaign committee of a political party), 
an entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by 
any such national, State, district, or local committee or its agent, and an officer or agent 
acting on behalf of any such party committee or entity, shall not solicit any funds for, or 
make or direct any donations to – (1) an organization that is described in section 501(c) 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation under section 501(a) 
of such Code (or has submitted an application for determination of tax exempt status 
under such section) and that makes expenditures or disbursements in connection with 
an election for Federal office (including expenditures or disbursements for Federal election 
activity); or (2) an organization described in section 527 of such Code (other than 
a political committee, a State, district, or local committee of a political party, or the au-
thorized campaign committee of a candidate for State or local office).
(e) Federal Candidates – (1) In general – A candidate, individual holding Federal office, 
agent of a candidate or an individual holding Federal office, or an entity directly or indi-
rectly established, financed, maintained or controlled by or acting on behalf of 1 or more 
candidates or individuals holding Federal office, shall not – (A) solicit, receive, direct, 
transfer, or spend funds in connection with an election for Federal office, including funds 
for any Federal election activity, unless the funds are subject to the limitations, prohibitions, 
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and reporting requirements of this Act; or (B) solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend 
funds in connection with any election other than an election for Federal office or disburse 
funds in connection with such an election unless the funds – (i) are not in excess of the 
amounts permitted with respect to contributions to candidates and political committees 
under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of section 315(a); and (ii) are not from sources pro-
hibited by this Act from making contributions in connection with an election for Federal 
office. (2) State law – Paragraph (1) does not apply to the solicitation, receipt, or 
spending of funds by an individual described in such paragraph who is or was also 
a candidate for a State or local office solely in connection with such election for State or 
local office if the solicitation, receipt, or spending of funds is permitted under State law 
and refers only to such State or local candidate, or to any other candidate for the State 
or local office sought by such candidate, or both. (3) Fundraising events – Notwithstanding 
paragraph (1) or subsection (b)(2)(C), a candidate or an individual holding Federal office 
may attend, speak, or be a featured guest at a fundraising event for a State, district, or 
local committee of a political party. . .
SEC. 103. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
(a) Reporting Requirements – Section 304 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
is amended by adding at the end the following: (e) Political Committees – (1) National 
and congressional political committees – The national committee of a political party, any 
national congressional campaign committee of a political party, and any subordinate 
committee of either, shall report all receipts and disbursements during the reporting 
period. (2) Other political committees to which section 323 applies – (A) In general – In 
addition to any other reporting requirements applicable under this Act, a political com-
mittee (not described in paragraph (1)) to which section 323(b)(1) applies shall report 
all receipts and disbursements made for activities described in section 301(20)(A), unless 
the aggregate amount of such receipts and disbursements during the calendar year is 
less than $5,000. (B) Specific disclosure by state and local parties of certain non­federal 
amounts permitted to be spent on federal election activity. – Each report by a political 
committee under subparagraph (A) of receipts and disbursements made for activities 
described in section 301(20)(A) shall include a disclosure of all receipts and disbursements 
described in section 323(b)(2)(A) and (B). (3) Itemization – If a political committee has 
receipts or disbursements to which this subsection applies from or to any person aggre-
gating in excess of $200 for any calendar year, the political committee shall separately 
itemize its reporting for such person in the same manner as required in paragraphs (3)(A), 
(5), and (6) of subsection (b). . .
SEC. 201. DISCLOSURE OF ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS
(a) In General – Section 304 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended 
by section 103, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: (f) Disclosure 
of Electioneering Communications –
(1) Statement required. – Every person who makes a disbursement for the direct costs of 
producing and airing electioneering communications in an aggregate amount in excess of 
$10,000 during any calendar year shall, within 24 hours of each disclosure date, file with 
the Commission a statement containing the information described in paragraph (2).
(2) Contents of statement. – Each statement required to be filed under this subsection 
shall be made under penalty of perjury and shall contain the following information: (A) The 
identification of the person making the disbursement, of any person sharing or exercis-
ing direction or control over the activities of such person, and of the custodian of the 
books and accounts of the person making the disbursement. (B) The principal place of 
business of the person making the disbursement, if not an individual. (C) The amount 
of each disbursement of more than $200 during the period covered by the statement 
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and the identification of the person to whom the disbursement was made. (D) The 
elections to which the electioneering communications pertain and the names (if known) 
of the candidates identified or to be identified. (E) If the disbursements were paid out 
of a segregated bank account which consists of funds contributed solely by individuals 
who are United States citizens or nationals or lawfully admitted for permanent residence 
(as defined in section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act directly to this 
account for electioneering communications, the names and addresses of all contributors 
who contributed an aggregate amount of $1,000 or more to that account during the 
period beginning on the first day of the preceding calendar year and ending on 
the disclosure date. Nothing in this subparagraph is to be construed as a prohibition 
on the use of funds in such a segregated account for a purpose other than electioneer-
ing communications. (F) If the disbursements were paid out of funds not described in 
subparagraph (E), the names and addresses of all contributors who contributed an 
aggregate amount of $1,000 or more to the person making the disbursement during 
the period beginning on the first day of the preceding calendar year and ending on the 
disclosure date.
(3) Electioneering communication – For purposes of this subsection – (A) In general – (i) The 
term ‘electioneering communication’ means any broadcast, cable, or satellite communi-
cation which – (I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; (II) is made 
within – (aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office sought 
by the candidate; or (bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a conven-
tion or caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the 
office sought by the candidate; and(III) in the case of a communication which refers to 
a candidate for an office other than President or Vice President, is targeted to the relevant 
electorate. (ii) If clause (i) is held to be constitutionally insufficient by final judicial de-
cision to support the regulation provided herein, then the term ‘electioneering commu-
nication’ means any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which promotes or 
supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office 
(regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or against 
a candidate) and which also is suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an exhor-
tation to vote for or against a specific candidate. Nothing in this subparagraph shall be 
construed to affect the interpretation or application of section 100.22(b) of title 11, Code 
of Federal Regulations. . .
SEC. 203. PROHIBITION OF CORPORATE AND LABOR DISBURSEMENTS FOR 
ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS. . .
(c) Rules Relating to Electioneering Communications – (1) Applicable electioneering 
communication – For purposes of this section, the term ‘applicable electioneering 
communication’ means an electioneering communication which is made by any entity 
described in subsection (a) of this section or by any other person using funds donated 
by an entity described in subsection (a) of this section. (2) Exception. – Notwithstanding 
paragraph (1), the term ‘applicable electioneering communication’ does not include 
a communication by a section 501(c)(4) organization or a political organization (as 
defined in section 527(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) made under section 
304(f)(2)(E) or (F) of this Act if the communication is paid for exclusively by funds 
provided directly by individuals who are United States citizens or nationals or lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence of the Immigration and Nationality Act. For purposes 
of the preceding sentence, the term ‘provided directly by individuals’ does not include 
funds the source of which is an entity described in subsection (a) of this section. 
(3) Special operating rules – (A) Definition under paragraph (1) – An electioneering 
communication shall be treated as made by an entity described in subsection (a) if an 
entity described in subsection (a) directly or indirectly disburses any amount for any of 
the costs of the communication. (B) Exception under paragraph (2) – A section 501(c)
(4) organization that derives amounts from business activities or receives funds from 
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any entity described in subsection (a) shall be considered to have paid for any commu-
nication out of such amounts unless such organization paid for the communication out 
of a segregated account to which only individuals can contribute, as described in section 
304(f)(2)(E). . .
SEC. 211. DEFINITION OF INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE
Section 301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act is amended by striking paragraph (17) 
and inserting the following: (17) Independent expenditure – The term ‘independent ex-
penditure’ means an expenditure by a person – (A) expressly advocating the election or 
defeat of a clearly identified candidate; and (B) that is not made in concert or cooperation 
with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate’s authorized polit-
ical committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents. . .
SEC. 213. INDEPENDENT VERSUS COORDINATED EXPENDITURES BY PARTY. . .
(A) In general – On or after the date on which a political party nominates a candidate, 
no committee of the political party may make – (i) any coordinated expenditure under 
this subsection with respect to the candidate during the election cycle at any time after 
it makes any independent expenditure with respect to the candidate during the election 
cycle; or (ii) any independent expenditure (as defined in section 301(17)) with respect 
to the candidate during the election cycle at any time after it makes any coordinated 
expenditure under this subsection with respect to the candidate during the election 
cycle. (B) Application – For purposes of this paragraph, all political committees established 
and maintained by a national political party (including all congressional campaign 
committees) and all political committees established and maintained by a State political 
party (including any subordinate committee of a State committee) shall be considered 
to be a single political committee. (C) Transfers – A committee of a political party that 
makes coordinated expenditures under this subsection with respect to a candidate shall 
not, during an election cycle, transfer any funds to, assign authority to make coordi-
nated expenditures under this subsection to, or receive a transfer of funds from, 
a committee of the political party that has made or intends to make an independent 
expenditure with respect to the candidate.
SEC. 214. COORDINATION WITH CANDIDATES OR POLITICAL PARTIES
(a) In General – Section 315(a)(7)(B) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 is 
amended – (1) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iii); and (2) by inserting after clause 
(i) the following new clause: (ii) expenditures made by any person (other than a candidate 
or candidate’s authorized committee) in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at 
the request or suggestion of, a national, State, or local committee of a political party, 
shall be considered to be contributions made to such party committee. . .
(c) Regulations by the Federal Election Commission. – The Federal Election Commission 
shall promulgate new regulations on coordinated communications paid for by persons 
other than candidates, authorized committees of candidates, and party committees. The 
regulations shall not require agreement or formal collaboration to establish coordination. 
In addition to any subject determined by the Commission, the regulations shall ad-
dress – (1) payments for the republication of campaign materials; (2) payments for the 
use of a common vendor; (3) payments for communications directed or made by persons 
who previously served as an employee of a candidate or a political party; and (4) payments 
for communications made by a person after substantial discussion about the communi-
cation with a candidate or a political party. . .
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SEC. 313. USE OF CONTRIBUTED AMOUNTS FOR CERTAIN PURPOSES
(a) Permitted Uses. – A contribution accepted by a candidate, and any other donation 
received by an individual as support for activities of the individual as a holder of Federal 
office, may be used by the candidate or individual – (1) for otherwise authorized expen-
ditures in connection with the campaign for Federal office of the candidate or individual; 
(2) for ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in connection with duties of the indi-
vidual as a holder of Federal office; (3) for contributions to an organization described in 
section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or (4) for transfers, without lim-
itation, to a national, State, or local committee of a political party.
(b) Prohibited Use – (1) In general. – A contribution or donation described in subsection 
(a) shall not be converted by any person to personal use. (2) Conversion – For the pur-
poses of paragraph (1), a contribution or donation shall be considered to be converted to 
personal use if the contribution or amount is used to fulfill any commitment, obligation, 
or expense of a person that would exist irrespective of the candidate’s election campaign or 
individual’s duties as a holder of Federal office, including – (A) a home mortgage, rent, 
or utility payment; (B) a clothing purchase; (C) a non-campaign-related automobile expense; 
(D) a country club membership; (E) a vacation or other non-campaign-related trip; 
(F) a household food item; (G) a tuition payment; (H) admission to a sporting event, 
concert, theater, or other form of entertainment not associated with an election campaign; 
and (I) dues, fees, and other payments to a health club or recreational facility. . .
SEC. 303. STRENGTHENING FOREIGN MONEY BAN. . .
(a) Prohibition – It shall be unlawful for – (1) a foreign national, directly or indirectly, to 
make – (A) a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value, or to make an 
express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, 
State, or local election; (B) a contribution or donation to a committee of a political party; 
or (C) an expenditure, independent expenditure, or disbursement for an electioneering 
communication; or (2) a person to solicit, accept, or receive a contribution or donation 
described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) from a foreign national. . .
SEC. 307. MODIFICATION OF CONTRIBUTION LIMITS
(a) Increase in Individual Limits for Certain Contributions – Section 315(a)(1) of the 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 is amended – (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking 
“$1,000’’ and inserting “$2,000’’; and (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking “$20,000’’ and 
inserting “$25,000’’.
(b) Increase in Annual Aggregate Limit on Individual Contributions – Section 315(a)(3) 
of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 is amended to read as follows: (3) During 
the period which begins on January 1 of an odd-numbered year and ends on December 
31 of the next even-numbered year, no individual may make contributions aggregating 
more than – (A) $37,500, in the case of contributions to candidates and the authorized 
committees of candidates; (B) $57,500, in the case of any other contributions, of which 
not more than $37,500 may be attributable to contributions to political committees which 
are not political committees of national political parties.
(c) Increase in Senatorial Campaign Committee Limit – Section 315(h) of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971 is amended by striking “$17,500’’ and inserting “$35,000’’. . .
McConnell v. F.E.C.
540 U.S. 93 (2003)
The implementation of BCRA in 2002 was announced as a great success of American 
democracy, because the law was adopted with the votes of members of both political 
parties in Congress. The authors of the legislation argued that it addressed the most 
controversial effects of the Federal Election Campaign Act, which was the uncontrolled 
flow of soft money and growing impact of political action committees on the electoral 
process. As a matter of fact, during the congressional debates there were some critics 
on both sides of the political aisle, with Senator Mitch McConnell as the leading 
opponent of the new law. Therefore, there was no surprise when McConnell decided 
to challenge it and took the issue to the federal courts. Due to a special procedure 
designed in BCRA, the case was heard by a panel of three district judges, who found 
part of the legislation unconstitutional, and then the case was brought to the Supreme 
Court on appeal.
McConnell v. F.E.C. became the first (but not last) decision in which the highest 
court in the U.S. determined the constitutionality of various provisions of the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act. McConnell challenged two restrictions implemented by the 
campaign finance law: the prohibition of using soft money for election campaigns, and 
broad limitations on political advertisements used for campaign purposes. In a narrow-
margin decision, supported by liberal Justices and Sandra Day O’Connor, the Court 
upheld the challenged provisions of BCRA, arguing that the impact of campaign finance 
restrictions on the freedom of speech of contributors was not significant, and was 
justified by a compelling state interest. As a result, the regulations on soft money and 
electioneering communications remained in force, and the only part of BCRA which 
was struck down referred to limitations on political contributions by minorities. Four 
conservative justices strongly dissented from raising arguments of First Amendment 
protection of candidates and their contributors, thereby assuring that the clash of values 
between the left and right wings of the Court would dominate in its subsequent decisions 
in 2007, 2010 and 2013.
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JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion 
of the Court with respect to BCRA Titles I and II. . .
BCRA is the most recent federal enactment designed “to purge national politics of what was 
conceived to be the pernicious influence of ‘big money’ campaign contributions”. . .
BCRA’s central provisions are designed to address Congress’ concerns about the increas-
ing use of soft money and issue advertising to influence federal elections. Title I regulates 
the use of soft money by political parties, officeholders, and candidates. Title II primar-
ily prohibits corporations and labor unions from using general treasury funds for commu-
nications that are intended to, or have the effect of, influencing the outcome of federal 
elections. . .
Title I is Congress’ effort to plug the soft­money loophole. The cornerstone of Title I is 
new FECA §323(a), which prohibits national party committees and their agents from 
soliciting, receiving, directing, or spending any soft money. In short, §323(a) takes na-
tional parties out of the soft-money business. . .
Our treatment of contribution restrictions reflects more than the limited burdens they 
impose on First Amendment freedoms. It also reflects the importance of the interests 
that underlie contribution limits—interests in preventing “both the actual corruption 
threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public confidence in the 
electoral process through the appearance of corruption.” National Right to Work, see also 
Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. (Colorado II). 
We have said that these interests directly implicate “ ‘the integrity of our electoral process, 
and, not less, the responsibility of the individual citizen for the successful functioning of 
that process.’ ” National Right to Work. Because the electoral process is the very “means 
through which a free society democratically translates political speech into concrete 
governmental action,” Shrink Missouri, contribution limits, like other measures aimed at 
protecting the integrity of the process, tangibly benefit public participation in political 
debate. For that reason, when reviewing Congress’ decision to enact contribution limits, 
“there is no place for a strong presumption against constitutionality, of the sort often 
thought to accompany the words ‘strict scrutiny.’” The less rigorous standard of review 
we have applied to contribution limits (Buckley’s “closely drawn” scrutiny) shows proper 
deference to Congress’ ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in 
which it enjoys particular expertise. It also provides Congress with sufficient room to 
anticipate and respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to protect 
the integrity of the political process. . .
[W]e apply the less rigorous scrutiny applicable to contribution limits to evaluate the 
constitutionality of new FECA §323. Because the five challenged provisions of §323 im-
plicate different First Amendment concerns, we discuss them separately. We are mindful, 
however, that Congress enacted §323 as an integrated whole to vindicate the Government’s 
important interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption. . .
1. In our view. . . Congress is not required to ignore historical evidence regarding 
a particular practice or to view conduct in isolation from its context. To be sure, mere 
political favoritism or opportunity for influence alone is insufficient to justify regulation. 
As the record demonstrates, it is the manner in which parties have sold access to feder-
al candidates and officeholders that has given rise to the appearance of undue influence. 
Implicit (and, as the record shows, sometimes explicit) in the sale of access is the sug-
gestion that money buys influence. It is no surprise then that purchasers of such access 
unabashedly admit that they are seeking to purchase just such influence. It was not 
unwarranted for Congress to conclude that the selling of access gives rise to the appear-
ance of corruption. In sum, there is substantial evidence to support Congress’ determi-
nation that large soft-money contributions to national political parties give rise to corrup-
tion and the appearance of corruption. . .
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2. Given the close connection and alignment of interests, large soft-money contributions 
to national parties are likely to create actual or apparent indebtedness on the part of 
federal officeholders, regardless of how those funds are ultimately used. This close af-
filiation has also placed national parties in a position to sell access to federal officeholders 
in exchange for soft-money contributions that the party can then use for its own pur-
poses. Access to federal officeholders is the most valuable favor the national party 
committees are able to give in exchange for large donations. The fact that officeholders 
comply by donating their valuable time indicates either that officeholders place substan-
tial value on the soft-money contribution themselves, without regard to their end use, or 
that national committees are able to exert considerable control over federal officehold-
ers. . . Either way, large soft-money donations to national party committees are likely to 
buy donors preferential access to federal officeholders no matter the ends to which their 
contributions are eventually put. As discussed above, Congress had sufficient grounds to 
regulate the appearance of undue influence associated with this practice. The Government’s 
strong interests in preventing corruption, and in particular the appearance of corruption, 
are thus sufficient to justify subjecting all donations to national parties to the source, 
amount, and disclosure limitations of FECA. . .
3. Plaintiffs argue that BCRA itself demonstrates the overbreadth of §323(a)’s solicitation 
ban. They point in particular to §323(e), which allows federal candidates and officehold-
ers to solicit limited amounts of soft money from individual donors under certain circum-
stances. The differences between §§323(a) and 323(e), however, are without constitu-
tional significance. We have recognized that “the ‘differing structures and purposes’ of 
different entities ‘may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the integ-
rity of the electoral process,’” National Right to Work, and we respect Congress’ decision 
to proceed in incremental steps in the area of campaign finance regulation, see Federal 
Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.; Buckley. The differences between 
the two provisions reflect Congress’ reasonable judgments about the function played by 
national committees and the interactions between committees and officeholders, subjects 
about which Members of Congress have vastly superior knowledge. . .
4. In Buckley, we rejected a similar argument concerning limits on contributions to 
minor-party candidates, noting that “any attempt to exclude minor parties and indepen-
dents en masse from the Act’s contribution limitations overlooks the fact that minor-par-
ty candidates may win elective office or have a substantial impact on the outcome of an 
election.” We have thus recognized that the relevance of the interest in avoiding actual 
or apparent corruption is not a function of the number of legislators a given party 
manages to elect. It applies as much to a minor party that manages to elect only one of 
its members to federal office as it does to a major party whose members make up 
a majority of Congress. It is therefore reasonable to require that all parties and all 
candidates follow the same set of rules designed to protect the integrity of the electoral 
process. . .
5. Nothing on the face of §323(a) prohibits national party officers, whether acting in their 
official or individual capacities, from sitting down with state and local party committees 
or candidates to plan and advise how to raise and spend soft money. As long as the na-
tional party officer does not personally spend, receive, direct, or solicit soft money, §323(a) 
permits a wide range of joint planning and electioneering activity. Intervenor­defendants, 
the principal drafters and proponents of the legislation, concede as much. Brief for 
Intervenor­Defendants. . . The FEC’s current definitions of §323(a)’s terms are consistent 
with that view. . . Given the straightforward meaning of this provision, Justice Kennedy 
is incorrect that “[a] national party’s mere involvement in the strategic planning of fun-
draising for a state ballot initiative” or its assistance in developing a state party’s Levin­money 
fundraising efforts risks a finding that the officers are in “‘indirect control’” of the state 
party and subject to criminal penalties. Moreover, §323(a) leaves national party commit-
tee officers entirely free to participate, in their official capacities, with state and local 
parties and candidates in soliciting and spending hard money; party officials may also 
solicit soft money in their unofficial capacities.
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Accordingly, we reject the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge to new FECA §323(a). . .
Several plaintiffs contend that Title I exceeds Congress’ Election Clause authority to “make 
or alter” rules governing federal elections, U. S. Const., Art. I, §4, and, by impairing the 
authority of the States to regulate their own elections, violates constitutional principles of 
federalism. In examining congressional enactments for infirmity under the Tenth Amendment, 
this Court has focused its attention on laws that commandeer the States and state officials 
in carrying out federal regulatory schemes. See Printz v. United States; New York v. United 
States. By contrast, Title I of BCRA only regulates the conduct of private parties. It im-
poses no requirements whatsoever upon States or state officials, and, because it does not 
expressly pre-empt state legislation, it leaves the States free to enforce their own restric-
tions on the financing of state electoral campaigns. It is true that Title I, as amended, 
prohibits some fundraising tactics that would otherwise be permitted under the laws of 
various States, and that it may therefore have an indirect effect on the financing of state 
electoral campaigns. But these indirect effects do not render BCRA unconstitutional. It is 
not uncommon for federal law to prohibit private conduct that is legal in some States. See, 
e.g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative. Indeed, such conflict is in-
evitable in areas of law that involve both state and federal concerns. It is not in and of 
itself a marker of constitutional infirmity. See Ex parte Siebold.
Of course, in maintaining the federal system envisioned by the Founders, this Court has 
done more than just prevent Congress from commandeering the States. We have also 
policed the absolute boundaries of congressional power under Article I. See United States 
v. Morrison; United States v. Lopez. But plaintiffs offer no reason to believe that Congress 
has overstepped its Elections Clause power in enacting BCRA. Congress has a fully legit-
imate interest in maintaining the integrity of federal officeholders and preventing corrup-
tion of federal electoral processes through the means it has chosen. Indeed, our above 
analysis turns on our finding that those interests are sufficient to satisfy First Amendment 
scrutiny. Given that finding, we cannot conclude that those interests are insufficient to 
ground Congress’ exercise of its Elections Clause power. See Morrison. . .
Finally, plaintiffs argue that Title I violates the equal protection component of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it discriminates against political parties 
in favor of special interest groups such as the National Rifle Association (NRA), American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and Sierra Club. As explained earlier, BCRA imposes numer-
ous restrictions on the fundraising abilities of political parties, of which the soft-money 
ban is only the most prominent. Interest groups, however, remain free to raise soft 
money to fund voter registration, GOTV activities, mailings, and broadcast advertising 
(other than electioneering communications). We conclude that this disparate treatment 
does not offend the Constitution. . .
We held in Buckley that a $1,000 cap on expenditures that applied only to express advo-
cacy could not be justified as a means of avoiding circumvention of contribution limits or 
preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption because its restrictions could 
easily be evaded: “So long as persons and groups eschew expenditures that in express 
terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, they are free to 
spend as much as they want to promote the candidate and his views.” The same is true 
in this litigation. Any claim that a restriction on independent express advocacy serves 
a strong Government interest is belied by the overwhelming evidence that the line between 
express advocacy and other types of election­influencing expression is, for Congress’ 
purposes, functionally meaningless. Indeed, Congress enacted the new “electioneering 
communication[s]” provisions precisely because it recognized that the express advocacy 
test was woefully inadequate at capturing communications designed to influence candidate 
elections. In light of that recognition, we are hard pressed to conclude that any mean-
ingful purpose is served by §315(d)(4)’s burden on a party’s right to engage independent-
ly in express advocacy.
The Government argues that §315(d)(4) nevertheless is constitutional because it is not 
an outright ban (or cap) on independent expenditures, but rather offers parties a volun-
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tary choice between a constitutional right and a statutory benefit. Whatever merit that 
argument might have in the abstract, it fails to account for new §315(d)(4)(B), which 
provides: “For purposes of this paragraph, all political committees established and 
maintained by a national political party (including all congressional campaign committees) 
and all political committees established and maintained by a State political party (includ-
ing any subordinate committee of a State committee) shall be considered to be a single 
political committee.”
Given that provision, it simply is not the case that each party committee can make 
a voluntary and independent choice between exercising its right to engage in independent 
advocacy and taking advantage of the increased limits on coordinated spending under 
§§315(d)(1)–(3). Instead, the decision resides solely in the hands of the first mover, such 
that a local party committee can bind both the state and national parties to its chosen 
spending option. It is one thing to say that Congress may require a party committee to 
give up its right to make independent expenditures if it believes that it can accomplish 
more with coordinated expenditures. It is quite another thing, however, to say that the 
RNC must limit itself to $5,000 in coordinated expenditures in support of its presidential 
nominee if any state or local committee first makes an independent expenditure for an 
ad that uses magic words. That odd result undermines any claim that new §315(d)(4) 
can withstand constitutional scrutiny simply because it is cast as a voluntary choice 
rather than an outright prohibition on independent expenditures. The portion of the 
judgment of the District Court invalidating BCRA §213 is affirmed. . .
Many years ago we observed that “[t]o say that Congress is without power to pass ap-
propriate legislation to safeguard. . . an election from the improper use of money to in-
fluence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of self protection.” 
Burroughs v. United States. We abide by that conviction in considering Congress’ most 
recent effort to confine the ill effects of aggregated wealth on our political system. We 
are under no illusion that BCRA will be the last congressional statement on the matter. 
Money, like water, will always find an outlet. What problems will arise, and how Congress 
will respond, are concerns for another day. In the main we uphold BCRA’s two principal, 
complementary features: the control of soft money and the regulation of electioneering 
communications. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the District Court’s 
judgment with respect to Titles I and II.
F.E.C. v. Wisconsin Right to Life
551 U.S. 489 (2007)
The McConnell v. F.E.C. decision upheld all the major provisions of the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act, including those regarding the electioneering communications 
restrictions and the prohibition of those advertisements which directly promoted certain 
candidates for federal offices. Before the elections of 2004, the Wisconsin Right To Life 
corporation publicized three advertisements in which citizens were encouraged to try 
and influence U.S. Senators in their political activities concerning judicial nominations. 
According to BCRA, electioneering communications could not be presented less than 
60 days before the election, which limited the possibility of the corporation to run their 
advertisement during that period. Wisconsin Right to Life challenged the law in the 
District Court, which agreed with their argumentation, and the case was appealed to 
the Supreme Court, which reached its verdict in 2007.
The organization argued that their ads referred to issues and not to direct advocacy 
of a candidate for federal office, whereas the Federal Election Commission stated that 
the controversial advertisements were aimed at influencing the results of the election. 
The Supreme Court supported Wisconsin Right to Life, construing a five-vote majority 
of conservative Justices (Sandra Day O’Connor was replaced in 2005 by Samuel Alito, 
who signed the majority decision). The Court agreed that the advertisements at stake 
promoted issues not candidates, and, therefore, did not violate the BCRA, whereas the 
prohibited advertisements had to leave no doubts as to the intent of the authors connected 
with the supporting of a concrete candidate. The Justices did not find any interest of 
the government in restricting the publication of advertisements which only indirectly 
referred to the conduct of federal election campaigns.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS announced the judgment of the Court. . .
Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 91, 2 U. S. 
C. §441b(b)(2) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), makes it a federal crime for any corporation to 
broadcast, shortly before an election, any communication that names a federal candidate 
for elected office and is targeted to the electorate. In McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 
this Court considered whether §203 was facially overbroad under the First Amendment 
because it captured within its reach not only campaign speech, or “express advocacy,” but 
also speech about public issues more generally, or “issue advocacy,” that mentions 
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a candidate for federal office. The Court concluded that there was no overbreadth concern 
to the extent the speech in question was the “functional equivalent” of express campaign 
speech. On the other hand, the Court “assume[d]” that the interests it had found to “jus-
tify the regulation of campaign speech might not apply to the regulation of genuine issue 
ads.” The Court nonetheless determined that §203 was not facially overbroad. . .
We now confront such an as­applied challenge. Resolving it requires us first to determine 
whether the speech at issue is the “functional equivalent” of speech expressly advocating 
the election or defeat of a candidate for federal office, or instead a “genuine issue a[d].” 
McConnell. We have long recognized that the distinction between campaign advocacy and 
issue advocacy “may often dissolve in practical application. Candidates, especially incum-
bents, are intimately tied to public issues involving legislative proposals and governmen-
tal actions.” Buckley v. Valeo. Our development of the law in this area requires us, 
however, to draw such a line, because we have recognized that the interests held to 
justify the regulation of campaign speech and its “functional equivalent” “might not apply” 
to the regulation of issue advocacy. McConnell.
In drawing that line, the First Amendment requires us to err on the side of protecting 
political speech rather than suppressing it. We conclude that the speech at issue in this 
as-applied challenge is not the “functional equivalent” of express campaign speech. We 
further conclude that the interests held to justify restricting corporate campaign speech 
or its functional equivalent do not justify restricting issue advocacy, and accordingly we 
hold that BCRA §203 is unconstitutional as applied to the advertisements at issue in 
these cases. . .
WRTL rightly concedes that its ads are prohibited by BCRA §203. Each ad clearly identifies 
Senator Feingold, who was running (unopposed) in the Wisconsin Democratic primary on 
September 14, 2004, and each ad would have been “targeted to the relevant electorate,” 
see 2 U. S. C. §434(f)(3)(C), during the BCRA blackout period. WRTL further concedes 
that its ads do not fit under any of BCRA’s exceptions to the term “electioneering com-
munication.” See §434(f)(3)(B). The only question, then, is whether it is consistent with 
the First Amendment for BCRA §203 to prohibit WRTL from running these three ads.
Appellants contend that WRTL should be required to demonstrate that BCRA is unconsti-
tutional as applied to the ads. After all, appellants reason, McConnell already held that 
BCRA §203 was facially valid. These cases, however, present the separate question 
whether §203 may constitutionally be applied to these specific ads. Because BCRA §203 
burdens political speech, it is subject to strict scrutiny. See McConnell, Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce, MCFL, Bellotti, Buckley. Under strict scrutiny, the Government 
must prove that applying BCRA to WRTL’s ads furthers a compelling interest and is nar-
rowly tailored to achieve that interest. . . The strict scrutiny analysis is, of course, informed 
by our precedents. This Court has already ruled that BCRA survives strict scrutiny to the 
extent it regulates express advocacy or its functional equivalent. McConnell, So to the 
extent the ads in these cases fit this description, the FEC’s burden is not onerous; all it 
need do is point to McConnell and explain why it applies here. If, on the other hand, 
WRTL’s ads are not express advocacy or its equivalent, the Government’s task is more 
formidable. It must then demonstrate that banning such ads during the blackout periods 
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. No precedent of this Court has yet 
reached that conclusion. . .
When the McConnell Court considered the possible facial overbreadth of §203, it looked 
to the studies in the record analyzing ads broadcast during the blackout periods, and 
those studies had classified the ads in terms of intent and effect. The Court’s assessment 
was accordingly phrased in the same terms, which the Court regarded as sufficient to 
conclude, on the record before it, that the plaintiffs had not “carried their heavy burden 
of proving” that §203 was facially overbroad and could not be enforced in any circum-
stances. The Court did not explain that it was adopting a particular test for determining 
what constituted the “functional equivalent” of express advocacy. The fact that the student 
coders who helped develop the evidentiary record before the Court in McConnell looked 
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to intent and effect in doing so, and that the Court dealt with the record on that basis in 
deciding the facial overbreadth claim, neither compels nor warrants accepting that same 
standard as the constitutional test for separating, in an as-applied challenge, political 
speech protected under the First Amendment from that which may be banned.
More importantly, this Court in Buckley had already rejected an intent-and-effect test for 
distinguishing between discussions of issues and candidates. After noting the difficulty of 
distinguishing between discussion of issues on the one hand and advocacy of election or 
defeat of candidates on the other, the Buckley Court explained that analyzing the question 
in terms “‘of intent and of effect’” would afford “‘no security for free discussion.’” It 
therefore rejected such an approach, and McConnell did not purport to overrule Buckley 
on this point—or even address what Buckley had to say on the subject.
For the reasons regarded as sufficient in Buckley, we decline to adopt a test for as-applied 
challenges turning on the speaker’s intent to affect an election. The test to distinguish 
constitutionally protected political speech from speech that BCRA may proscribe should 
provide a safe harbor for those who wish to exercise First Amendment rights. The test 
should also “reflec[t] our ‘profound national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’ ” Buckley. A test turning on 
the intent of the speaker does not remotely fit the bill.
Far from serving the values the First Amendment is meant to protect, an intent-based 
test would chill core political speech by opening the door to a trial on every ad within the 
terms of §203, on the theory that the speaker actually intended to affect an election, no 
matter how compelling the indications that the ad concerned a pending legislative or 
policy issue. No reasonable speaker would choose to run an ad covered by BCRA if its 
only defense to a criminal prosecution would be that its motives were pure. An intent-based 
standard “blankets with uncertainty whatever may be said,” and “offers no security for 
free discussion.” Buckley. The FEC does not disagree. In its brief filed in the first appeal 
in this litigation, it argued that a “constitutional standard that turned on the subjective 
sincerity of a speaker’s message would likely be incapable of workable application; at 
a minimum, it would invite costly, fact-dependent litigation”. . .
“The freedom of speech . . . guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the 
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous 
restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.” Bellotti. . . To safeguard this liberty, the 
proper standard for an as-applied challenge to BCRA §203 must be objective, focusing 
on the substance of the communication rather than amorphous considerations of intent 
and effect. See Buckley. It must entail minimal if any discovery, to allow parties to resolve 
disputes quickly without chilling speech through the threat of burdensome litigation. See 
Virginia v. Hicks. And it must eschew “the open-ended rough-and-tumble of factors,” 
which “invit[es] complex argument in a trial court and a virtually inevitable appeal.” Jerome 
B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. In short, it must give the benefit of 
any doubt to protecting rather than stifling speech. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.
In light of these considerations, a court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent 
of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other 
than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate. Under this test, WRTL’s three 
ads are plainly not the functional equivalent of express advocacy. First, their content is 
consistent with that of a genuine issue ad: The ads focus on a legislative issue, take 
a position on the issue, exhort the public to adopt that position, and urge the public to 
contact public officials with respect to the matter. Second, their content lacks indicia of 
express advocacy: The ads do not mention an election, candidacy, political party, or 
challenger; and they do not take a position on a candidate’s character, qualifications, 
or fitness for office. . .
Looking beyond the content of WRTL’s ads, the FEC and intervenors argue that several 
“contextual” factors prove that the ads are the equivalent of express advocacy. First, 
appellants cite evidence that during the same election cycle, WRTL and its Political Action 
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Committee (PAC) actively opposed Senator Feingold’s reelection and identified filibusters 
as a campaign issue. This evidence goes to WRTL’s subjective intent in running the ads, 
and we have already explained that WRTL’s intent is irrelevant in an as­applied challenge. 
Evidence of this sort is therefore beside the point, as it should be—WRTL does not forfeit 
its right to speak on issues simply because in other aspects of its work it also opposes 
candidates who are involved with those issues.
Next, the FEC and intervenors seize on the timing of WRTL’s ads. They observe that the ads 
were to be aired near elections but not near actual Senate votes on judicial nominees, and 
that WRTL did not run the ads after the elections. To the extent this evidence goes to WRTL’s 
subjective intent, it is again irrelevant. To the extent it nonetheless suggests that the ads 
should be interpreted as express advocacy, it falls short. That the ads were run close to an 
election is unremarkable in a challenge like this. Every ad covered by BCRA §203 will by 
definition air just before a primary or general election. If this were enough to prove that an 
ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy, then BCRA would be constitutional in 
all of its applications. This Court unanimously rejected this contention in WRTL I.
That the ads were run shortly after the Senate had recessed is likewise unpersuasive. 
Members of Congress often return to their districts during recess, precisely to determine 
the views of their constituents; an ad run at that time may succeed in getting more 
constituents to contact the Representative while he or she is back home. In any event, 
a group can certainly choose to run an issue ad to coincide with public interest rather 
than a floor vote. Finally, WRTL did not resume running its ads after the BCRA blackout 
period because, as it explains, the debate had changed. The focus of the Senate was on 
whether a majority would vote to change the Senate rules to eliminate the filibuster—not 
whether individual Senators would continue filibustering. Given this change, WRTL’s de-
cision not to continue running its ads after the blackout period does not support an infer-
ence that the ads were the functional equivalent of electioneering. . .
Because WRTL’s ads may reasonably be interpreted as something other than as an appeal 
to vote for or against a specific candidate, we hold they are not the functional equivalent 
of express advocacy, and therefore fall outside the scope of McConnell’s holding. . .
This Court has long recognized “the governmental interest in preventing corruption and 
the appearance of corruption” in election campaigns. Buckley. This interest has been 
invoked as a reason for upholding contribution limits. As Buckley explained, “[t]o the 
extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current 
and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is 
undermined.” We have suggested that this interest might also justify limits on election-
eering expenditures because it may be that, in some circumstances, “large independent 
expenditures pose the same dangers of actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements 
as do large contributions.”
McConnell arguably applied this interest—which this Court had only assumed could jus-
tify regulation of express advocacy—to ads that were the “functional equivalent” of express 
advocacy. But to justify regulation of WRTL’s ads, this interest must be stretched yet 
another step to ads that are not the functional equivalent of express advocacy. Enough 
is enough. Issue ads like WRTL’s are by no means equivalent to contributions, and the 
quid-pro-quo corruption interest cannot justify regulating them. To equate WRTL’s ads 
with contributions is to ignore their value as political speech. . .
A second possible compelling interest recognized by this Court lies in addressing a “dif-
ferent type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of 
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form 
and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political 
ideas.” Austin. Austin invoked this interest to uphold a state statute making it a felony 
for corporations to use treasury funds for independent expenditures on express election 
advocacy. McConnell also relied on this interest in upholding regulation not just of express 
advocacy, but also its “functional equivalent.”
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These cases did not suggest, however, that the interest in combating “a different type of 
corruption” extended beyond campaign speech. Quite the contrary. Two of the Justices 
who joined the 6-to-3 majority in Austin relied, in upholding the constitutionality of the 
ban on campaign speech, on the fact that corporations retained freedom to speak on issues 
as distinct from election campaigns . . . The McConnell Court similarly was willing to 
“assume that the interests that justify the regulation of campaign speech might not apply 
to the regulation of genuine issue ads.” And our decision in WRTL I reinforced the validity 
of that assumption by holding that BCRA §203 is susceptible to as-applied challenges.
Accepting the notion that a ban on campaign speech could also embrace issue advocacy 
would call into question our holding in Bellotti that the corporate identity of a speaker 
does not strip corporations of all free speech rights. It would be a constitutional “bait and 
switch” to conclude that corporate campaign speech may be banned in part because 
corporate issue advocacy is not, and then assert that corporate issue advocacy may be 
banned as well, pursuant to the same asserted compelling interest, through a broad 
conception of what constitutes the functional equivalent of campaign speech, or by rely-
ing on the inability to distinguish campaign speech from issue advocacy. The FEC and 
intervenors do not argue that the Austin interest justifies regulating genuine issue ads. 
Instead, they focus on establishing that WRTL’s ads are the functional equivalent of express 
advocacy—a contention we have already rejected. We hold that the interest recognized 
in Austin as justifying regulation of corporate campaign speech and extended in McConnell 
to the functional equivalent of such speech has no application to issue advocacy of the 
sort engaged in by WRTL.
Because WRTL’s ads are not express advocacy or its functional equivalent, and because 
appellants identify no interest sufficiently compelling to justify burdening WRTL’s speech, 
we hold that BCRA §203 is unconstitutional as applied to WRTL’s “Wedding,” “Loan,” and 
“Waiting” ads.
These cases are about political speech. The importance of the cases to speech and debate 
on public policy issues is reflected in the number of diverse organizations that have joined 
in supporting WRTL before this Court: the American Civil Liberties Union, the National 
Rifle Association, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Focus on the Family, the 
Coalition of Public Charities, the Cato Institute, and many others.
Yet, as is often the case in this Court’s First Amendment opinions, we have gotten this 
far in the analysis without quoting the Amendment itself: “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” The Framers’ actual words put these cases in 
proper perspective. Our jurisprudence over the past 216 years has rejected an absolutist 
interpretation of those words, but when it comes to drawing difficult lines in the area of 
pure political speech—between what is protected and what the Government may ban—it 
is worth recalling the language we are applying. McConnell held that express advocacy 
of a candidate or his opponent by a corporation shortly before an election may be pro-
hibited, along with the functional equivalent of such express advocacy. We have no oc-
casion to revisit that determination today. But when it comes to defining what speech 
qualifies as the functional equivalent of express advocacy subject to such a ban—the 
issue we do have to decide—we give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship. 
The First Amendment’s command that “Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the 
freedom of speech” demands at least that.
Davis v. F.E.C.
554 U.S. 724 (2008)
Just one year after the Wisconsin Right to Life decision, the Supreme Court came across 
another dispute concerning the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act. The issue referred to section 319(b) of the legislation, called the ‘Millionaire’s 
Amendment’, which imposed special exceptions to contribution limits made by certain 
candidates in federal elections. The law demanded special information before the 
electoral process from candidates who planned to spend more than $350,000 from their 
own funds, which, in turn, provided the possibility to their opponents of increasing 
campaign spending, by allowing them to raise the donation limits they could accept 
from individual contributors and their national political party. A millionaire, Jack Davis, 
a Republican turned Democrat, challenged the BCRA provision, arguing that it violated 
his rights provided by the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.
The Supreme Court decided Davis v. F.E.C. on appeal in 2008. Five conservative 
Justices reached similar conclusions as to the scope of the freedom of speech of candidates 
in federal elections, stating that Davis’ financial status put him in an unequal position 
relative to his opponents in the congressional race. In the majority opinion, Justice Samuel 
Alito declared that the First Amendment was created in order to promote the free exchange 
of opinions, with no regard to the material status of the speaker. For liberals on the Court, 
it was obvious that the ‘Millionaire’s Amendment’ was implemented in order to protect 
the system from the uncontrolled flow of big money into the electoral process, and to 
pursue the idea of the equalization of chances to be heard by non-wealthy candidates. This 
was now held unconstitutional by the conservative majority on the Court.
MR. JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. . .
We turn to the merits of Davis’ claim that the First Amendment is violated by the contri-
bution limits that apply when §319(a) [Millionaire’s Amendment] comes into play. Under 
this scheme, as previously noted, when a candidate spends more than $350,000 in 
personal funds and creates what the statute apparently regards as a financial imbalance, 
that candidate’s opponent may qualify to receive both larger individual contributions than 
would otherwise be allowed and unlimited coordinated party expenditures. Davis contends 
that §319(a) unconstitutionally burdens his exercise of his First Amendment right to make 
unlimited expenditures of his personal funds because making expenditures that create 
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the imbalance has the effect of enabling his opponent to raise more money and to use 
that money to finance speech that counteracts and thus diminishes the effectiveness of 
Davis’ own speech.
If §319(a) simply raised the contribution limits for all candidates, Davis’ argument would 
plainly fail. This Court has previously sustained the facial constitutionality of limits on 
discrete and aggregate individual contributions and on coordinated party expenditures. 
Buckley v. Valeo, Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign 
Comm. (Colorado II). At the same time, the Court has recognized that such limits impli-
cate interests and that they cannot stand unless they are “closely drawn” to serve 
a “sufficiently important interest,” such as preventing corruption and the appearance of 
corruption. See, e.g., McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, Colorado II; Nixon v. Shrink 
Missouri Government PAC; Buckley. When contribution limits are challenged as too restric-
tive, we have extended a measure of deference to the judgment of the legislative body 
that enacted the law. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, Nixon; Buckley. But we have held that 
limits that are too low cannot stand. Randall.
There is, however, no constitutional basis for attacking contribution limits on the ground 
that they are too high. Congress has no constitutional obligation to limit contributions at 
all; and if Congress concludes that allowing contributions of a certain amount does not 
create an undue risk of corruption or the appearance of corruption, a candidate who 
wishes to restrict an opponent’s fundraising cannot argue that the Constitution demands 
that contributions be regulated more strictly. Consequently, if §319(a)’s elevated contri-
bution limits applied across the board, Davis would not have any basis for challenging 
those limits.
Section 319(a), however, does not raise the contribution limits across the board. Rather, 
it raises the limits only for the non­self­financing candidate and does so only when the 
self­financing candidate’s expenditure of personal funds causes the OPFA threshold to be 
exceeded. We have never upheld the constitutionality of a law that imposes different 
contribution limits for candidates who are competing against each other, and we agree 
with Davis that this scheme impermissibly burdens his First Amendment right to spend 
his own money for campaign speech.
In Buckley, we soundly rejected a cap on a candidate’s expenditure of personal funds to 
finance campaign speech. We held that a “candidate. . . has a First Amendment right to 
engage in the discussion of public issues and vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his 
own election” and that a cap on personal expenditures imposes “a substantial,” “clea[r]” 
and “direc[t]” restraint on that right. We found that the cap at issue was not justified by 
“[t]he primary governmental interest” proffered in its defense, i.e., “the prevention of 
actual and apparent corruption of the political process.” Far from preventing these evils, 
“the use of personal funds,” we observed, “reduces the candidate’s dependence on outside 
contributions and thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant risks of abuse 
to which . . . contribution limitations are directed.” Ibid. We also rejected the argument 
that the expenditure cap could be justified on the ground that it served “[t]he ancillary 
interest in equalizing the relative financial resources of candidates competing for elective 
office.” This putative interest, we noted, was “clearly not sufficient to justify the. . . infringe-
ment of fundamental First Amendment rights.”
Buckley’s emphasis on the fundamental nature of the right to spend personal funds for 
campaign speech is instructive. While BCRA does not impose a cap on a candidate’s ex-
penditure of personal funds, it imposes an unprecedented penalty on any candidate who 
robustly exercises that First Amendment right. Section 319(a) requires a candidate to 
choose between the First Amendment right to engage in unfettered political speech and 
subjection to discriminatory fundraising limitations. Many candidates who can afford to 
make large personal expenditures to support their campaigns may choose to do so despite 
§319(a), but they must shoulder a special and potentially significant burden if they make 
that choice. See Day v. Holahan. . . Under §319(a), the vigorous exercise of the right to 
use personal funds to finance campaign speech produces fundraising advantages for 
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opponents in the competitive context of electoral politics. Cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. 
v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal.
The resulting drag on First Amendment rights is not constitutional simply because it at-
taches as a consequence of a statutorily imposed choice. In Buckley, we held that Congress 
“may engage in public financing of election campaigns and may condition acceptance of 
public funds on an agreement by the candidate to abide by specified expenditure limita-
tions” even though we found an independent limit on overall campaign expenditures to 
be unconstitutional. But the choice involved in Buckley was quite different from the choice 
imposed by §319(a). In Buckley, a candidate, by forgoing public financing, could retain 
the unfettered right to make unlimited personal expenditures. Here, §319(a) does not 
provide any way in which a candidate can exercise that right without abridgment. Instead, 
a candidate who wishes to exercise that right has two choices: abide by a limit on per-
sonal expenditures or endure the burden that is placed on that right by the activation of 
a scheme of discriminatory contribution limits. The choice imposed by §319(a) is not 
remotely parallel to that in Buckley.
Because §319(a) imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of the First Amendment 
right to use personal funds for campaign speech, that provision cannot stand unless it is 
“justified by a compelling state interest,” Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life, Inc.; see also, e.g., McConnell, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 
Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm. First Nat. Bank 
of Boston v. Bellotti, Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election 
Comm’n. No such justification is present here.
The burden imposed by §319(a) on the expenditure of personal funds is not justified by 
any governmental interest in eliminating corruption or the perception of corruption. The 
Buckley Court reasoned that reliance on personal funds reduces the threat of corruption, 
and therefore §319(a), by discouraging use of personal funds, disserves the anticorrup-
tion interest. Similarly, given Congress’ judgment that liberalized limits for non­self­fi-
nancing candidates do not unduly imperil anticorruption interests, it is hard to imagine 
how the denial of liberalized limits to self­financing candidates can be regarded as serving 
anticorruption goals sufficiently to justify the resulting constitutional burden.
The Government maintains that §319(a)’s asymmetrical limits are justified because they 
“level electoral opportunities for candidates of different personal wealth.” “Congress 
enacted Section 319,” the Government writes,” “to reduce the natural advantage that 
wealthy individuals possess in campaigns for federal office.” Our prior decisions, how-
ever, provide no support for the proposition that this is a legitimate government objective. 
See Nixon, Randall. On the contrary, in Buckley, we held that “[t]he interest in equalizing 
the financial resources of candidates” did not provide a “justification for restricting” 
candidates’ overall campaign expenditures, particularly where equalization “might 
serve. . . to handicap a candidate who lacked substantial name recognition or exposure 
of his views before the start of the campaign.” We have similarly held that the interest 
“in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of 
elections” cannot support a cap on expenditures for “express advocacy of the election or 
defeat of candidates,” as “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some 
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign 
to the First Amendment”. . .
The argument that a candidate’s speech may be restricted in order to “level electoral 
opportunities” has ominous implications because it would permit Congress to arrogate 
the voters’ authority to evaluate the strengths of candidates competing for office. See 
Bellotti. Different candidates have different strengths. Some are wealthy; others have 
wealthy supporters who are willing to make large contributions. Some are celebrities; 
some have the benefit of a well­known family name. Leveling electoral opportunities 
means making and implementing judgments about which strengths should be permitted 
to contribute to the outcome of an election. The Constitution, however, confers upon 
voters, not Congress, the power to choose the Members of the House of Representatives, 
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Art. I. §2, and it is a dangerous business for Congress to use the election laws to influence 
the voters’ choices. See Bellotti.
Finally, the Government contends that §319(a) is justified because it ameliorates the 
deleterious effects that result from the tight limits that federal election law places on 
individual campaign contributions and coordinated party expenditures. These limits, it is 
argued, make it harder for candidates who are not wealthy to raise funds and therefore 
provide a substantial advantage for wealthy candidates. Accordingly, §319(a) can be seen, 
not as a legislative effort to interfere with the natural operation of the electoral process, 
but as a legislative effort to mitigate the untoward consequences of Congress’ own 
handiwork and restore “the normal relationship between a candidate’s financial re-
sources and the level of popular support for his candidacy.”
Whatever the merits of this argument as an original matter, it is fundamentally at war 
with the analysis of expenditure and contributions limits that this Court adopted in Buckley 
and has applied in subsequent cases. The advantage that wealthy candidates now enjoy 
and that §319(a) seeks to reduce is an advantage that flows directly from Buckley’s 
disparate treatment of expenditures and contributions. If that approach is sound—and 
the Government does not urge us to hold otherwise—it is hard to see how undoing the 
consequences of that decision can be viewed as a compelling interest. If the normally 
applicable limits on individual contributions and coordinated party contributions are seri-
ously distorting the electoral process, if they are feeding a “public perception that wealthy 
people can buy seats in Congress,” and if those limits are not needed in order to combat 
corruption, then the obvious remedy is to raise or eliminate those limits. But the unprec-
edented step of imposing different contribution and coordinated party expenditure limits 
on candidates vying for the same seat is antithetical to the First Amendment.
Citizens United v. F.E.C.
558 U.S. 310 (2010)
Although the F.E.C. v. Wisconsin Right to Life decision did not invalidate major pieces 
of federal campaign finance legislation, it revealed the opinions of particular Justices 
of the Supreme Court on the scope of the regulation of money in the electoral process. 
With five conservatives and four liberals, it seemed just a matter of time before the 
next challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act regulations would enter the 
Court’s docket. The discussion on the proper scope of expenditure limits or disclosure 
procedures was also present during legislative debates, but after BCRA the majority of 
Congressmen were reluctant to propose new legislation. Therefore, any changes to the 
meaning of campaign finance could be made by the judiciary as part of the process of 
the constitutional interpretation of money in the electoral process. Such a possibility 
occurred in connection with events that took place during the primary phase of the 
2008 presidential elections, when a conservative corporation – Citizens United – was 
prevented from publicizing a movie concerning the suitability of Democratic candidate 
Hillary Clinton as a future president. The organization challenged the provisions of 
BCRA regarding electioneering communications, which were the source of limitations 
on the broadcast of a politically-oriented movie, arguing that their freedom of speech 
guarantees were violated by the legislation. The District Court denied the arguments of 
Citizens United, so the corporation appealed to the Supreme Court, which reached its 
decision in 2010.
Apart from the main issue raised by Citizens United about the constitutionality of 
regulations on electioneering communications, the Court recognized other important 
aspects of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, which should be interpreted in accordance 
with the constitution, such as the scope of disclosure procedures, the role of campaign 
contributions as political speech, and, above all, the correctness of the McConnell 
holding. Five conservative Justices made the majority, underlining the democratic values 
of freedom of speech, especially referring to corporate communications and contributions 
in election campaigns, which constituted political speech. The majority acknowledged no 
difference between funding by individuals and corporations, which had to be protected 
in order to pursue the ideals of rule of law and democracy. As a result, Citizens United’s 
movie was subject to BCRA’s restrictions on diclosure, which were upheld also on the 
basis of the First Amendment’s guarantees of freedom to the information necessary to 
pursue the goals of the electoral process. Liberal Justices opposed such an approach, 
declaring that corporations’ activities in connection with the election campaigns should 
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be limited, as the main role of the government was to protect the flow of big money 
into the electoral process. The Citizens United v. F.E.C. decision was criticized by many 
liberal politicians and organizations as a threat to American democracy and, following 
a statement from Barack Obama, became the first ever Supreme Court precedent to be 
openly critized by a U.S. president during the State of the Union Address.
MR. JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. . .
Before the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), federal law prohibited—and 
still does prohibit—corporations and unions from using general treasury funds to make 
direct contributions to candidates or independent expenditures that expressly advocate 
the election or defeat of a candidate, through any form of media, in connection with 
certain qualified federal elections. 2 U. S. C. §441b; see McConnell, Federal Election 
Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.. BCRA §203 amended §441b to prohibit 
any “electioneering communication” as well. 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(2). An electioneering 
communication is defined as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that 
“refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and is made within 30 days of 
a primary or 60 days of a general election. §434(f)(3)(A). The Federal Election Commission’s 
(FEC) regulations further define an electioneering communication as a communication 
that is “publicly distributed.” 11 CFR §100.29(a)(2) (2009). “In the case of a candidate 
for nomination for President. . . publicly distributed means” that the communication “[c]
an be received by 50,000 or more persons in a State where a primary election. . . is 
being held within 30 days.” §100.29(b)(3)(ii). Corporations and unions are barred from 
using their general treasury funds for express advocacy or electioneering communications. 
They may establish, however, a “separate segregated fund” (known as a political action 
committee, or PAC) for these purposes. 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(2). The moneys received by 
the segregated fund are limited to donations from stockholders and employees of the 
corporation or, in the case of unions, members of the union.
Citizens United contends that §441b does not cover Hillary, as a matter of statutory in-
terpretation, because the film does not qualify as an “electioneering communication.” 
§441b(b)(2). Citizens United raises this issue for the first time before us, but we consid-
er the issue because “it was addressed by the court below.” Lebron v. National Railroad 
Passenger Corporation. Under the definition of electioneering communication, the vid-
eo-on-demand showing of Hillary on cable television would have been a “cable. . . com-
munication” that “refer[red] to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and that 
was made within 30 days of a primary election. Citizens United, however, argues that 
Hillary was not “publicly distributed,” because a single video-on-demand transmission is 
sent only to a requesting cable converter box and each separate transmission, in most 
instances, will be seen by just one household—not 50,000 or more persons.
This argument ignores the regulation’s instruction on how to determine whether a cable 
transmission “[c]an be received by 50,000 or more persons.” §100.29(b)(3)(ii). The 
regulation provides that the number of people who can receive a cable transmission is 
determined by the number of cable subscribers in the relevant area. Here, Citizens United 
wanted to use a cable video-on-demand system that had 34.5 million subscribers nation-
wide.. Thus, Hillary could have been received by 50,000 persons or more. . .
In our view, the statute cannot be saved by limiting the reach of 2 U. S. C. §441b through 
this suggested interpretation. In addition to the costs and burdens of litigation, this result 
would require a calculation as to the number of people a particular communication is 
likely to reach, with an inaccurate estimate potentially subjecting the speaker to criminal 
sanctions. The First Amendment does not permit laws that force speakers to retain 
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a campaign finance attorney, conduct demographic marketing research, or seek declar-
atory rulings before discussing the most salient political issues of our day. Prolix laws chill 
speech for the same reason that vague laws chill speech: People “of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at [the law’s] meaning and differ as to its application.” Connally 
v. General Constr. Co. The Government may not render a ban on political speech consti-
tutional by carving out a limited exemption through an amorphous regulatory interpre-
tation. We must reject the approach suggested by the amici. Section 441b covers Hillary.
Citizens United next argues that §441b may not be applied to Hillary under the approach 
taken in WRTL. McConnell decided that §441b(b)(2)’s definition of an “electioneering 
communication” was facially constitutional insofar as it restricted speech that was “the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy” for or against a specific candidate. WRTL then 
found an unconstitutional application of §441b where the speech was not “express advo-
cacy or its functional equivalent”. . .
Under this test, Hillary is equivalent to express advocacy. The movie, in essence, is 
a feature-length negative advertisement that urges viewers to vote against Senator 
Clinton for President. In light of historical footage, interviews with persons critical of her, 
and voiceover narration, the film would be understood by most viewers as an extended 
criticism of Senator Clinton’s character and her fitness for the office of the Presidency. 
The narrative may contain more suggestions and arguments than facts, but there is 
little doubt that the thesis of the film is that she is unfit for the Presidency. The movie 
concentrates on alleged wrongdoing during the Clinton administration, Senator Clinton’s 
qualifications and fitness for office, and policies the commentators predict she would 
pursue if elected President. . .
Citizens United argues that Hillary is just “a documentary film that examines certain 
historical events.” We disagree. The movie’s consistent emphasis is on the relevance of 
these events to Senator Clinton’s candidacy for President. The narrator begins by asking 
“could [Senator Clinton] become the first female President in the history of the United 
States?” And the narrator reiterates the movie’s message in his closing line: “Finally, 
before America decides on our next president, voters should need no reminders of . . . what’s 
at stake—the well being and prosperity of our nation.”
As the District Court found, there is no reasonable interpretation of Hillary other than as 
an appeal to vote against Senator Clinton. Under the standard stated in McConnell and 
further elaborated in WRTL, the film qualifies as the functional equivalent of express 
advocacy. . .
As noted above, Citizens United’s narrower arguments are not sustainable under a fair 
reading of the statute. In the exercise of its judicial responsibility, it is necessary then for 
the Court to consider the facial validity of §441b. Any other course of decision would 
prolong the substantial, nation-wide chilling effect caused by §441b’s prohibitions on 
corporate expenditures. Consideration of the facial validity of §441b is further supported 
by the following reasons.
First is the uncertainty caused by the litigating position of the Government. As discussed 
above, the Government suggests, as an alternative argument, that an as-applied challenge 
might have merit. This argument proceeds on the premise that the nonprofit corporation 
involved here may have received only de minimis donations from for­profit corporations 
and that some nonprofit corporations may be exempted from the operation of the statute. 
The Government also suggests that an as-applied challenge to §441b’s ban on books may 
be successful, although it would defend §441b’s ban as applied to almost every other form 
of media including pamphlets. The Government thus, by its own position, contributes to 
the uncertainty that §441b causes. When the Government holds out the possibility of ruling 
for Citizens United on a narrow ground yet refrains from adopting that position, the added 
uncertainty demonstrates the necessity to address the question of statutory validity.
Second, substantial time would be required to bring clarity to the application of the 
statutory provision on these points in order to avoid any chilling effect caused by some 
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improper interpretation. It is well known that the public begins to concentrate on elections 
only in the weeks immediately before they are held. There are short timeframes in which 
speech can have influence. The need or relevance of the speech will often first be ap-
parent at this stage in the campaign. The decision to speak is made in the heat of polit-
ical campaigns, when speakers react to messages conveyed by others. A speaker’s 
ability to engage in political speech that could have a chance of persuading voters is 
stifled if the speaker must first commence a protracted lawsuit. By the time the lawsuit 
concludes, the election will be over and the litigants in most cases will have neither the 
incentive nor, perhaps, the resources to carry on, even if they could establish that the 
case is not moot because the issue is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” WRTL, 
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC. Here, Citizens United decided to litigate its case to 
the end. Today, Citizens United finally learns, two years after the fact, whether it could 
have spoken during the 2008 Presidential primary—long after the opportunity to persuade 
primary voters has passed.
Third is the primary importance of speech itself to the integrity of the election process. 
As additional rules are created for regulating political speech, any speech arguably 
within their reach is chilled. Campaign finance regulations now impose “unique and 
complex rules” on “71 distinct entities.” These entities are subject to separate rules for 
33 different types of political speech. The FEC has adopted 568 pages of regulations, 
1,278 pages of explanations and justifications for those regulations, and 1,771 advisory 
opinions since 1975. In fact, after this Court in WRTL adopted an objective “appeal to 
vote” test for determining whether a communication was the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy, the FEC adopted a two-part, 11-factor balancing test to implement 
WRTL’s ruling.
The ongoing chill upon speech that is beyond all doubt protected makes it necessary in 
this case to invoke the earlier precedents that a statute which chills speech can and must 
be invalidated where its facial invalidity has been demonstrated. See WRTL, Thornhill 
v. Alabama. For these reasons we find it necessary to reconsider Austin.
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom 
of speech.”
. . .The law before us is an outright ban, backed by criminal sanctions. Section 441b makes 
it a felony for all corporations—including nonprofit advocacy corporations—either to ex-
pressly advocate the election or defeat of candidates or to broadcast electioneering com-
munications within 30 days of a primary election and 60 days of a general election. Thus, 
the following acts would all be felonies under §441b: The Sierra Club runs an ad, within 
the crucial phase of 60 days before the general election, that exhorts the public to disap-
prove of a Congressman who favors logging in national forests; the National Rifle Association 
publishes a book urging the public to vote for the challenger because the incumbent 
U.S. Senator supports a handgun ban; and the American Civil Liberties Union creates a Web 
site telling the public to vote for a Presidential candidate in light of that candidate’s defense 
of free speech. These prohibitions are classic examples of censorship.
Section 441b is a ban on corporate speech notwithstanding the fact that a PAC created 
by a corporation can still speak. See McConnell. A PAC is a separate association from the 
corporation. So the PAC exemption from §441b’s expenditure ban, §441b(b)(2), does not 
allow corporations to speak. Even if a PAC could somehow allow a corporation to speak—
and it does not—the option to form PACs does not alleviate the First Amendment problems 
with §441b. PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and 
subject to extensive regulations. For example, every PAC must appoint a treasurer, forward 
donations to the treasurer promptly, keep detailed records of the identities of the persons 
making donations, preserve receipts for three years, and file an organization statement 
and report changes to this information within 10 days.
And that is just the beginning. PACs must file detailed monthly reports with the FEC, which 
are due at different times depending on the type of election that is about to occur. . . PACs 
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have to comply with these regulations just to speak. This might explain why fewer than 
2,000 of the millions of corporations in this country have PACs. . . Given the onerous 
restrictions, a corporation may not be able to establish a PAC in time to make its views 
known regarding candidates and issues in a current campaign.
Section 441b’s prohibition on corporate independent expenditures is thus a ban on speech. 
As a “restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political com-
munication during a campaign,” that statute “necessarily reduces the quantity of expres-
sion by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the 
size of the audience reached.” Buckley v. Valeo. Were the Court to uphold these restrictions, 
the Government could repress speech by silencing certain voices at any of the various 
points in the speech process. See McConnell. If §441b applied to individuals, no one would 
believe that it is merely a time, place, or manner restriction on speech. Its purpose and 
effect are to silence entities whose voices the Government deems to be suspect.
Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials ac-
countable to the people. See Buckley. The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, 
and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government 
and a necessary means to protect it. The First Amendment “ ‘has its fullest and most 
urgent application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.” Eu v. San 
Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., see Buckley.
For these reasons, political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, 
whether by design or inadvertence. Laws that burden political speech are “subject to strict 
scrutiny,” which requires the Government to prove that the restriction “furthers a com-
pelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” WRTL. While it might be 
maintained that political speech simply cannot be banned or restricted as a categorical 
matter, see Simon & Schuster, the quoted language from WRTL provides a sufficient 
framework for protecting the relevant First Amendment interests in this case. We shall 
employ it here.
Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against attempts 
to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entertainment 
Group, Inc. Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, al-
lowing speech by some but not others. See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. As in-
struments to censor, these categories are interrelated: Speech restrictions based on the 
identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content. . .
We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the Government 
may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead us to 
this conclusion. . .
Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, 
and the dissemination of information and ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to foster”, 
Bellotti. The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations 
or other associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment simply 
because such associations are not “natural persons”. . .
The Court is thus confronted with conflicting lines of precedent: a pre­Austin line that 
forbids restrictions on political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity and 
a post-Austin line that permits them. No case before Austin had held that Congress could 
prohibit independent expenditures for political speech based on the speaker’s corporate 
identity. Before Austin Congress had enacted legislation for this purpose, and the Government 
urged the same proposition before this Court. See MCFL, California Medical Assn. v. Federal 
Election Comm’n. In neither of these cases did the Court adopt the proposition. . .
If the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or 
associations of citizens, for simply engaging in political speech. If the anti­distortion rationale 
were to be accepted, however, it would permit Government to ban political speech simply 
because the speaker is an association that has taken on the corporate form. The Government 
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contends that Austin permits it to ban corporate expenditures for almost all forms of com-
munication stemming from a corporation. If Austin were correct, the Government could 
prohibit a corporation from expressing political views in media beyond those presented here, 
such as by printing books. The Government responds “that the FEC has never applied this 
statute to a book,” and if it did, “there would be quite [a] good as-applied challenge.” This 
troubling assertion of brooding governmental power cannot be reconciled with the confidence 
and stability in civic discourse that the First Amendment must secure.
Political speech is “indispensable to decision-making in a democracy, and this is no less 
true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual.” Bellotti, 
Buckley, Automobile Workers, CIO. This protection for speech is inconsistent with Austin’s 
anti-distortion rationale. Austin sought to defend the anti-distortion rationale as a means 
to prevent corporations from obtaining “ ‘an unfair advantage in the political marketplace’ 
” by using “ ‘resources amassed in the economic marketplace.’ ” But Buckley rejected the 
premise that the Government has an interest “in equalizing the relative ability of individ-
uals and groups to influence the outcome of elections.” Buckley was specific in stating 
that “the skyrocketing cost of political campaigns” could not sustain the governmental 
prohibition. The First Amendment’s protections do not depend on the speaker’s “financial 
ability to engage in public discussion.”
The Court reaffirmed these conclusions when it invalidated the BCRA provision that increased 
the cap on contributions to one candidate if the opponent made certain expenditures from 
personal funds. See Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n. The rule that political speech 
cannot be limited based on a speaker’s wealth is a necessary consequence of the 
premise that the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political speech 
based on the speaker’s identity.
Either as support for its anti-distortion rationale or as a further argument, the Austin ma-
jority undertook to distinguish wealthy individuals from corporations on the ground that 
“[s]tate law grants corporations special advantages—such as limited liability, perpetual life, 
and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets.” This does not 
suffice, however, to allow laws prohibiting speech. “It is rudimentary that the State cannot 
exact as the price of those special advantages the forfeiture of First Amendment rights.”
It is irrelevant for purposes of the First Amendment that corporate funds may “have little 
or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” All speakers, 
including individuals and the media, use money amassed from the economic marketplace 
to fund their speech. The First Amendment protects the resulting speech, even if it was 
enabled by economic transactions with persons or entities who disagree with the 
speaker’s ideas. . .
The purpose and effect of this law is to prevent corporations, including small and nonprof-
it corporations, from presenting both facts and opinions to the public. This makes Austin’s 
anti-distortion rationale all the more an aberration. “[T]he First Amendment protects the 
right of corporations to petition legislative and administrative bodies.” Bellotti. . .
Even if §441b’s expenditure ban were constitutional, wealthy corporations could still 
lobby elected officials, although smaller corporations may not have the resources to do 
so. And wealthy individuals and unincorporated associations can spend unlimited amounts 
on independent expenditures. See, e.g., WRTL, Yet certain disfavored associations of 
citizens—those that have taken on the corporate form—are penalized for engaging in 
the same political speech. When Government seeks to use its full power, including the 
criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her information or what dis-
trusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought. This is 
unlawful. The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.
What we have said also shows the invalidity of other arguments made by the Government. 
For the most part relinquishing the anti-distortion rationale, the Government falls back on 
the argument that corporate political speech can be banned in order to prevent corruption 
or its appearance. In Buckley, the Court found this interest “sufficiently important” to 
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allow limits on contributions but did not extend that reasoning to expenditure limits. When 
Buckley examined an expenditure ban, it found “that the governmental interest in pre-
venting corruption and the appearance of corruption [was] inadequate to justify [the ban] 
on independent expenditures”. . . Limits on independent expenditures, such as §441b, 
have a chilling effect extending well beyond the Government’s interest in preventing quid 
pro quo corruption. The anticorruption interest is not sufficient to displace the speech here 
in question. Indeed, 26 States do not restrict independent expenditures by for­profit 
corporations. The Government does not claim that these expenditures have corrupted the 
political process in those States. . .
When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing 
corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo 
corruption. See McConnell, The fact that speakers may have influence over or access to 
elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt: “Favoritism and influence 
are not . . . avoidable in representative politics. It is in the nature of an elected represen-
tative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and con-
tributors who support those policies. It is well understood that a substantial and legitimate 
reason, if not the only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candi-
date over another is that the candidate will respond by producing those political outcomes 
the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on responsiveness”. . .
The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose 
faith in our democracy. By definition, an independent expenditure is political speech pre-
sented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate. See Buckley. The fact 
that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to spend money to try to persuade 
voters presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence over elected officials. This 
is inconsistent with any suggestion that the electorate will refuse “ ‘to take part in demo-
cratic governance’ ” because of additional political speech made by a corporation or any 
other speaker. McConnell. . .
This case is about independent expenditures, not soft money. When Congress finds that 
a problem exists, we must give that finding due deference, but Congress may not choose 
an unconstitutional remedy. If elected officials succumb to improper influences from inde-
pendent expenditures; if they surrender their best judgment; and if they put expediency 
before principle, then surely there is cause for concern. We must give weight to attempts 
by Congress to seek to dispel either the appearance or the reality of these influences. The 
remedies enacted by law, however, must comply with the First Amendment; and, it is our 
law and our tradition that more speech, not less, is the governing rule. An outright ban 
on corporate political speech during the critical pre-election period is not a permissible 
remedy. Here Congress has created categorical bans on speech that are asymmetrical to 
preventing quid pro quo corruption. . .
Due consideration leads to this conclusion: Austin should be and now is overruled. We 
return to the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government may not 
suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity. No sufficient 
governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for­profit 
corporations. . .
Given our conclusion we are further required to overrule the part of McConnell that upheld 
BCRA §203’s extension of §441b’s restrictions on corporate independent expenditures. 
The McConnell Court relied on the anti-distortion interest recognized in Austin to uphold 
a greater restriction on speech than the restriction upheld in Austin, and we have found 
this interest unconvincing and insufficient. This part of McConnell is now overruled. . .
McCutcheon v. F.E.C.
572 U.S. 12–536 (2014)
The form and character of corporate participation in the electoral process was defined by 
the Supreme Court in the Citizens United case of 2010. Three years later, the judiciary 
once again found itself at center of political discussion over the scope of the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act’s regulations. This time the issue concerned the restrictions the 
law imposed on contributions, both from the perspective of the amount of individual 
funds given to candidates for federal elections, and the amount of contributions donated 
in the two-year election cycle, called aggregate limits or overall limits. An Alabama 
businessman, Shaun McCutcheon, who was deeply involved in contributing to 
Republican candidates in state and federal elections, challenged the aggregate limits; 
this prevented him from donating more funds in the 2011–2012 electoral cycle. The 
McCutcheon v. F.E.C. dispute was first adjudicated by the District Court, which found 
for the Federal Election Commission, upholding the BCRA provisions, and later by the 
Supreme Court, which announced its verdict in 2014.
Voting along ideological lines, the Justices declared the unconstitutionality of 
the aggregate limits imposed by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, using similar 
arguments to those in the Citizens United decision. According to the conservative 
majority, freedom of speech prohibited the government from setting strict limits on two-
year election cycle contributions, as it did not serve a compelling state interest, which is 
to protect the system from corruption and an uncontrolled flow of money. The Justices 
argued that aggregate limits had no direct relation to the purposes of the campaign 
finance laws, and their functioning endangered the proper operation of the electoral 
process as they did not allow contributors to donate to all of the candidates they wanted, 
thus impairing the right to equal participation in election campaigns. Importantly, one 
of the Justices, Clarence Thomas, underlined in a concurring opinion the necessity 
remove all limitations to campaign contributions, which was at the heart of American 
democracy. Such an approach was criticized by liberals on the Court, who saw in the 
majority decision a danger to the integrity and effectiveness of the electoral process, and 
a serious limitation of the right of ordinary citizens to participate equally in the process 
with rich contributors. Generally, both sides of the conflict used the same arguments 
in order to argue their opinions, but due to the distribution of votes, the conservative, 
Republican-supported version of the constitutional interpretation of campaign finance 
laws has prevailed.
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MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS announced the judgment of the Court. . .
There is no right more basic in our democracy than the right to participate in electing our 
political leaders. Citizens can exercise that right in a variety of ways: They can run for 
office themselves, vote, urge others to vote for a particular candidate, volunteer to work 
on a campaign, and contribute to a candidate’s campaign. This case is about the last of 
those options. . .
The statute at issue in this case imposes two types of limits on campaign contributions. 
The first, called base limits, restricts how much money a donor may contribute to 
a particular candidate or committee. 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(1). The second, called aggregate 
limits, restricts how much money a donor may contribute in total to all candidates or 
committees. §441a(a)(3). This case does not involve any challenge to the base limits, 
which we have previously upheld as serving the permissible objective of combatting 
corruption. The Government contends that the aggregate limits also serve that objective 
by preventing circumvention of the base limits. We conclude, however, that the aggregate 
limits do little, if anything, to address that concern, while seriously restricting participation 
in the democratic process. The aggregate limits are therefore invalid under the First 
Amendment. . .
The First Amendment “is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from 
the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced 
largely into the hands of each of us, . . . in the belief that no other approach would 
comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system 
rests.” Cohen v. California. As relevant here, the First Amendment safeguards an individ-
ual’s right to participate in the public debate through political expression and political 
association. See Buckley. When an individual contributes money to a candidate, he ex-
ercises both of those rights: The contribution “serves as a general expression of support 
for the candidate and his views” and “serves to affiliate a person with a candidate”. . .
Buckley acknowledged that aggregate limits at least diminish an individual’s right of 
political association. As the Court explained, the “overall $25,000 ceiling does impose an 
ultimate restriction upon the number of candidates and committees with which an indi-
vidual may associate himself by means of financial support.” But the Court characterized 
that restriction as a “quite modest restraint upon protected political activity.” Ibid. We 
cannot agree with that characterization. An aggregate limit on how many candidates and 
committees an individual may support through contributions is not a “modest restraint” 
at all. The Government may no more restrict how many candidates or causes a donor 
may support than it may tell a newspaper how many candidates it may endorse.
To put it in the simplest terms, the aggregate limits prohibit an individual from fully 
contributing to the primary and general election campaigns of ten or more candidates, 
even if all contributions fall within the base limits Congress views as adequate to protect 
against corruption. The individual may give up to $5,200 each to nine candidates, but the 
aggregate limits constitute an outright ban on further contributions to any other candidate 
(beyond the additional $1,800 that may be spent before reaching the $48,600 aggregate 
limit). At that point, the limits deny the individual all ability to exercise his expressive and 
associational rights by contributing to someone who will advocate for his policy prefer-
ences. A donor must limit the number of candidates he supports, and may have to choose 
which of several policy concerns he will advance—clear First Amendment harms that the 
dissent never acknowledges.
It is no answer to say that the individual can simply contribute less money to more 
people. To require one person to contribute at lower levels than others because he wants 
to support more candidates or causes is to impose a special burden on broader partici-
pation in the democratic process. And as we have recently admonished, the Government 
may not penalize an individual for “robustly exercis[ing]” his First Amendment rights. 
Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n.
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The First Amendment burden is especially great for individuals who do not have ready access 
to alternative avenues for supporting their preferred politicians and policies. In the context 
of base contribution limits, Buckley observed that a supporter could vindicate his associa-
tional interests by personally volunteering his time and energy on behalf of a candidate. 
Such personal volunteering is not a realistic alternative for those who wish to support a wide 
variety of candidates or causes. Other effective methods of supporting preferred candidates 
or causes without contributing money are reserved for a select few, such as entertainers 
capable of raising hundreds of thousands of dollars in a single evening. Cf. Davis. . .
[T]here are compelling reasons not to define the boundaries of the First Amendment by 
reference to such a generalized conception of the public good. First, the dissent’s “collective 
speech” reflected in laws is of course the will of the majority, and plainly can include laws 
that restrict free speech. The whole point of the First Amendment is to afford individuals 
protection against such infringements. The First Amendment does not protect the government, 
even when the government purports to act through legislation reflecting “collective speech.” 
Cf. United States v. Alvarez; Wooley v. Maynard; West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette.
Second, the degree to which speech is protected cannot turn on a legislative or judicial 
determination that particular speech is useful to the democratic process. The First 
Amendment does not contemplate such “ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and 
benefits.” United States v. Stevens. . .
Third, our established First Amendment analysis already takes account of any “collective” 
interest that may justify restrictions on individual speech. Under that accepted analysis, 
such restrictions are measured against the asserted public interest (usually framed as an 
important or compelling governmental interest). As explained below, we do not doubt the 
compelling nature of the “collective” interest in preventing corruption in the electoral 
process. But we permit Congress to pursue that interest only so long as it does not un-
necessarily infringe an individual’s right to freedom of speech; we do not truncate this 
tailoring test at the outset. . .
[W]hile preventing corruption or its appearance is a legitimate objective, Congress may 
target only a specific type of corruption—“quid pro quo” corruption. As Buckley explained, 
Congress may permissibly seek to rein in “large contributions [that] are given to secure 
a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders.” In addition to “actual 
quid pro quo arrangements,” Congress may permissibly limit “the appearance of corrup-
tion stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime 
of large individual financial contributions” to particular candidates.
Spending large sums of money in connection with elections, but not in connection with 
an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to 
such quid pro quo corruption. Nor does the possibility that an individual who spends large 
sums may garner “influence over or access to” elected officials or political parties . . . And 
because the Government’s interest in preventing the appearance of corruption is equally 
confined to the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, the Government may not seek to 
limit the appearance of mere influence or access. See Citizens United. . .
“When the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the 
constitutionality of its actions.” United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. Here, 
the Government seeks to carry that burden by arguing that the aggregate limits further 
the permissible objective of preventing quid pro quo corruption. The difficulty is that once 
the aggregate limits kick in, they ban all contributions of any amount. But Congress’s 
selection of a $5,200 base limit indicates its belief that contributions of that amount or 
less do not create a cognizable risk of corruption. If there is no corruption concern in 
giving nine candidates up to $5,200 each, it is difficult to understand how a tenth candidate 
can be regarded as corruptible if given $1,801, and all others corruptible if given a dime. 
And if there is no risk that additional candidates will be corrupted by donations of up to 
$5,200, then the Government must defend the aggregate limits by demonstrating that 
they prevent circumvention of the base limits.
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The problem is that they do not serve that function in any meaningful way. In light of the 
various statutes and regulations currently in effect, Buckley’s fear that an individual might 
“contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through the use of un-
earmarked contributions” to entities likely to support the candidate is far too speculative. 
And—importantly—we “have never accepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First 
Amendment burden.” Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC.
As an initial matter, there is not the same risk of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance 
when money flows through independent actors to a candidate, as when a donor contrib-
utes to a candidate directly. When an individual contributes to a candidate, a party 
committee, or a PAC, the individual must by law cede control over the funds. The 
Government admits that if the funds are subsequently re-routed to a particular candidate, 
such action occurs at the initial recipient’s discretion—not the donor’s. As a consequence, 
the chain of attribution grows longer, and any credit must be shared among the various 
actors along the way. For those reasons, the risk of quid pro quo corruption is generally 
applicable only to “the narrow category of money gifts that are directed, in some manner, 
to a candidate or officeholder.” McConnell.
Buckley nonetheless focused on the possibility that “unearmarked contributions” could 
eventually find their way to a candidate’s coffers. Even accepting the validity of Buckley’s 
circumvention theory, it is hard to see how a candidate today could receive a “massive 
amount[ ] of money” that could be traced back to a particular contributor uninhibited by 
the aggregate limits. The Government offers a series of scenarios in support of that pos-
sibility. But each is sufficiently implausible that the Government has not carried its burden 
of demonstrating that the aggregate limits further its anti-circumvention interest. . .
Buckley upheld aggregate limits only on the ground that they prevented channeling 
money to candidates beyond the base limits. The absence of such a prospect today belies 
the Government’s asserted objective of preventing corruption or its appearance. The im-
probability of circumvention indicates that the aggregate limits instead further the imper-
missible objective of simply limiting the amount of money in political campaigns. . .
Quite apart from the foregoing, the aggregate limits violate the First Amendment because 
they are not “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.” 
Buckley. In the First Amendment context, fit matters. Even when the Court is not apply-
ing strict scrutiny, we still require “a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; 
that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is ‘in 
proportion to the interest served,’. . . that employs not necessarily the least restrictive 
means but. . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.” Board of 
Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox. Here, because the statute is poorly tailored to the 
Government’s interest in preventing circumvention of the base limits, it impermissibly 
restricts participation in the political process. . .
Based on what we can discern from experience, the indiscriminate ban on all contributions 
above the aggregate limits is disproportionate to the Government’s interest in preventing 
circumvention. The Government has not given us any reason to believe that parties or 
candidates would dramatically shift their priorities if the aggregate limits were lifted. 
Absent such a showing, we cannot conclude that the sweeping aggregate limits are ap-
propriately tailored to guard against any contributions that might implicate the Government’s 
anti-circumvention interest.
A final point: It is worth keeping in mind that the base limits themselves are a prophy-
lactic measure. As we have explained, “restrictions on direct contributions are preventa-
tive, because few if any contributions to candidates will involve quid pro quo arrangements.” 
Citizens United. The aggregate limits are then layered on top, ostensibly to prevent cir-
cumvention of the base limits. This “prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis approach” requires 
that we be particularly diligent in scrutinizing the law’s fit. Wisconsin Right to Life.
Finally, disclosure of contributions minimizes the potential for abuse of the campaign finance 
system. Disclosure requirements are in part “justified based on a governmental interest 
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in ‘provid[ing] the electorate with information’ about the sources of election-related 
spending.” Citizens United. They may also “deter actual corruption and avoid the appear-
ance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of pub-
licity.” Disclosure requirements burden speech, but—unlike the aggregate limits—they do 
not impose a ceiling on speech. Citizens United. . . For that reason, disclosure often 
represents a less restrictive alternative to flat bans on certain types or quantities of speech. 
See, e.g., Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.
With modern technology, disclosure now offers a particularly effective means of arming 
the voting public with information. In 1976, the Court observed that Congress could regard 
disclosure as “only a partial measure.” Buckley. That perception was understandable in 
a world in which information about campaign contributions was filed at FEC offices and 
was therefore virtually inaccessible to the average member of the public. Today, given 
the Internet, disclosure offers much more robust protections against corruption. See 
Citizens United. Reports and databases are available on the FEC’s Web site almost imme-
diately after they are filed, supplemented by private entities such as OpenSecrets.org 
and FollowTheMoney.org. Because massive quantities of information can be accessed at 
the click of a mouse, disclosure is effective to a degree not possible at the time Buckley, 
or even McConnell, was decided.
The existing aggregate limits may in fact encourage the movement of money away from 
entities subject to dis-closure. Because individuals’ direct contributions are limited, would-
be donors may turn to other avenues for political speech. See Citizens United. Individuals 
can, for example, contribute unlimited amounts to 501(c) organizations, which are not 
required to publicly disclose their donors. See 26 U. S. C. §6104(d)(3). Such organizations 
spent some $300 million on independent expenditures in the 2012 election cycle. . .
For the past 40 years, our campaign finance jurisprudence has focused on the need to 
preserve authority for the Government to combat corruption, without at the same time 
compromising the political responsiveness at the heart of the democratic process, or 
allowing the Government to favor some participants in that process over others. As Edmund 
Burke explained in his famous speech to the electors of Bristol, a representative owes 
constituents the exercise of his “mature judgment,” but judgment informed by “the 
strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with 
his constituents.” Constituents have the right to support candidates who share their views 
and concerns. Representatives are not to follow constituent orders, but can be expected 
to be cognizant of and responsive to those concerns. Such responsiveness is key to the 
very concept of self­governance through elected officials.
The Government has a strong interest, no less critical to our democratic system, in com-
batting corruption and its appearance. We have, however, held that this interest must be 
limited to a specific kind of corruption—quid pro quo corruption—in order to ensure that 
the Government’s efforts do not have the effect of restricting the First Amendment right of 
citizens to choose who shall govern them. For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
aggregate limits on contributions do not further the only governmental interest this Court 
accepted as legitimate in Buckley. They instead intrude without justification on a citizen’s 
ability to exercise “the most fundamental First Amendment activities.” Buckley.
Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar
575 U.S. 13–1499 (2015)
There are at least two controversies over putting the Williams-Yulee Supreme Court 
decision among other documents relating to federal campaign finance laws. Firstly, it 
refers to rules which were created by the Florda Bar and applied to the professional 
conduct of lawyers within the state of Florida. Secondly, the election process, which 
became of the Court’s interest, was a judicial election and action undertaken by 
a candidate for Florida county court, not the legislative or executive departments. Still, 
there is a necessity to include the decision, as it also concerns the general problem of 
conducting electoral campaigns, and the Court’s argumentation is connected with the 
interpretation of the First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause. Additionally, it is 
important to acknowledge that, despite the existence of a conservative block on the 
Court, Chief Justice John Roberts, jr. decided to move towards a more liberal approach, 
and delivered the majority opinion, thus revealing possible divisions in Justices’ ideology 
in future campaign finance cases.
Lanell Williams-Yulee participated in the judicial election campaign in Florida, 
during which she decided to personally solicit campaign donations, which was 
inconsistent with the rules of the Florida Bar. She also made some inaccurate 
statements in the media during her campaigning process, misleading public opinion 
about her opponent in the judicial race. Although there was a possibility of ending the 
disciplinary procedure against her with a formal reprimend, William-Yulee decided 
to file a suit, in which she claimed that her freedom of speech rights were infringed 
by the rules of the Florida Bar. When the case reached the Supreme Court, five 
Justices ruled against Williams-Yulee, arguing that the ban on personal solicitation 
of campaign funds by candidates for judicial posts was consistent with compelling 
state interest. The majority underlined the value of freedom of speech, especially in 
election campaigns, but the Justices wanted to protect the integrity and sovereignty of 
the judicial department, which was endangered by such conduct as Williams-Yulee’s. 
Therefore the Court, despite harsh criticism from four conservatives, demonstrated that 
the interpretation of campaign finance regulations depends mainly on the individual 
approaches of the Justices towards the scope of First Amendment guaranteees, as well 
as the meaning of ‘compelling state interest’, which may be different in cases regarding 
different branches of government.
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MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court
Our Founders vested authority to appoint federal judges in the President, with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, and entrusted those judges to hold their offices during good 
behavior. The Constitution permits States to make a different choice, and most of them 
have done so. In 39 States, voters elect trial or appellate judges at the polls. In an 
effort to preserve public confidence in the integrity of their judiciaries, many of those 
States prohibit judges and judicial candidates from personally soliciting funds for their 
campaigns. We must decide whether the First Amendment permits such restrictions on 
speech.
We hold that it does. Judges are not politicians, even when they come to the bench by 
way of the ballot. And a State’s decision to elect its judiciary does not compel it to treat 
judicial candidates like campaigners for political office. A State may assure its people that 
judges will apply the law without fear or favor—and without having personally asked 
anyone for money. We affirm the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.
The First Amendment provides that Congress “shall make no law. . . abridging the 
freedom of speech.” The Fourteenth Amendment makes that prohibition applicable to 
the States. Stromberg v. California. The parties agree that Canon 7C(1) restricts Yulee’s 
speech on the basis of its content by prohibiting her from soliciting contributions to her 
election campaign. The parties disagree, however, about the level of scrutiny that should 
govern our review.
We have applied exacting scrutiny to laws restricting the solicitation of contributions to 
charity, upholding the speech limitations only if they are narrowly tailored to serve 
a compelling interest. See Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc. As we have 
explained, noncommercial solicitation “is characteristically intertwined with informative 
and perhaps persuasive speech.” Applying a lesser standard of scrutiny to such speech 
would threaten “the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institu-
tions.” Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington).
The principles underlying these charitable solicitation cases apply with even greater force 
here. Before asking for money in her fundraising letter, Yulee explained her fitness for 
the bench and expressed her vision for the judiciary. Her stated purpose for the solici-
tation was to get her “message out to the public.” As we have long recognized, speech 
about public issues and the qualifications of candidates for elected office commands the 
highest level of First Amendment protection. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic 
Central Comm., Indeed, in our only prior case concerning speech restrictions on 
a candidate for judicial office, this Court and both parties assumed that strict scrutiny 
applied. Republican Party of Minn. v. White.
Although the Florida Supreme Court upheld Canon 7C(1) under strict scrutiny, the Florida 
Bar and several amici contend that we should subject the Canon to a more permissive 
standard: that it be “closely drawn” to match a “sufficiently important interest.” Buckley 
v. Valeo. The “closely drawn” standard is a poor fit for this case. The Court adopted that 
test in Buckley to address a claim that campaign contribution limits violated a contribu-
tor’s “freedom of political association.” Here, Yulee does not claim that Canon 7C(1) 
violates her right to free association; she argues that it violates her right to free speech. 
And the Florida Bar can hardly dispute that the Canon infringes Yulee’s freedom to discuss 
candidates and public issues—namely, herself and her qualifications to be a judge. The 
Bar’s call to import the “closely drawn” test from the contribution limit context into a case 
about solicitation therefore has little avail.
As several of the Bar’s amici note, we applied the “closely drawn” test to solicitation 
restrictions in McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, overruled in part by Citizens United 
v. Federal Election Comm’n, But the Court in that case determined that the solicitation 
restrictions operated primarily to prevent circumvention of the contribution limits, which 
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were the subject of the “closely drawn” test in the first place. McConnell offers no help 
to the Bar here, because Florida did not adopt Canon 7C(1) as an anti-circumvention 
measure.
In sum, we hold today what we assumed in White: A State may restrict the speech of 
a judicial candidate only if the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling in-
terest. . .
The Florida Bar faces a demanding task in defending Canon 7C(1) against Yulee’s First 
Amendment challenge. We have emphasized that “it is the rare case” in which a State 
demonstrates that a speech restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling inter-
est. Burson v. Freeman. But those cases do arise. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
McConnell, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, Here, Canon 7C(1) advances the State’s 
compelling interest in preserving public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary, and 
it does so through means narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessarily abridging speech. 
This is therefore one of the rare cases in which a speech restriction withstands strict 
scrutiny.
The Florida Supreme Court adopted Canon 7C(1) to promote the State’s interests in 
“protecting the integrity of the judiciary” and “maintaining the public’s confidence in 
an impartial judiciary.” The way the Canon advances those interests is intuitive: Judges, 
charged with exercising strict neutrality and independence, cannot supplicate campaign 
donors without diminishing public confidence in judicial integrity. . . Simply put, Florida 
and most other States have concluded that the public may lack confidence in a judge’s 
ability to administer justice without fear or favor if he comes to office by asking for 
favors.
The interest served by Canon 7C(1) has firm support in our precedents. We have rec-
ognized the “vital state interest” in safeguarding “public confidence in the fairness and 
integrity of the nation’s elected judges.” Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. The impor-
tance of public confidence in the integrity of judges stems from the place of the judi-
ciary in the government. Unlike the executive or the legislature, the judiciary “has no 
influence over either the sword or the purse; . . . neither force nor will but merely 
judgment.” The Federalist No. 78. The judiciary’s authority therefore depends in large 
measure on the public’s willingness to respect and follow its decisions. As Justice 
Frankfurter once put it for the Court, “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” 
Offutt v. United States. It follows that public perception of judicial integrity is “a state 
interest of the highest order.” Caperton.
The principal dissent observes that bans on judicial candidate solicitation lack a lengthy 
historical pedigree. We do not dispute that fact, but it has no relevance here. As the 
precedent cited by the principal dissent demonstrates, a history and tradition of 
regulation are important factors in determining whether to recognize “new categories 
of unprotected speech.” Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn. But nobody argues 
that solicitation of campaign funds by judicial candidates is a category of unprotected 
speech. As explained above, the First Amendment fully applies to Yulee’s speech. The 
question is instead whether that Amendment permits the particular regulation of speech 
at issue here.
The parties devote considerable attention to our cases analyzing campaign finance 
restrictions in political elections. But a State’s interest in preserving public confidence 
in the integrity of its judiciary extends beyond its interest in preventing the appearance 
of corruption in legislative and executive elections. As we explained in White, States 
may regulate judicial elections differently than they regulate political elections, because 
the role of judges differs from the role of politicians. Politicians are expected to be 
appropriately responsive to the preferences of their supporters. Indeed, such “respon-
siveness is key to the very concept of self­governance through elected officials.” 
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n. The same is not true of judges. In deciding 
cases, a judge is not to follow the preferences of his supporters, or provide any special 
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consideration to his campaign donors. A judge instead must “observe the utmost fairness,” 
striving to be “perfectly and completely independent, with nothing to influence or 
control him but God and his conscience.” Address of John Marshall, in Proceedings and 
Debates of the Virginia State Convention of 1829–1830, p. 616 (1830). As in White, 
therefore, our precedents applying the First Amendment to political elections have little 
bearing on the issues here.
The vast majority of elected judges in States that allow personal solicitation serve with 
fairness and honor. But “[e]ven if judges were able to refrain from favoring donors, the 
mere possibility that judges’ decisions may be motivated by the desire to repay campaign 
contributions is likely to undermine the public’s confidence in the judiciary.” White. In 
the eyes of the public, a judge’s personal solicitation could result (even unknowingly) in 
“a possible temptation. . . which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and 
true.” Tumey v. Ohio. That risk is especially pronounced because most donors are lawyers 
and litigants who may appear before the judge they are supporting.
The concept of public confidence in judicial integrity does not easily reduce to precise 
definition, nor does it lend itself to proof by documentary record. But no one denies that 
it is genuine and compelling. In short, it is the regrettable but unavoidable appearance 
that judges who personally ask for money may diminish their integrity that prompted 
the Supreme Court of Florida and most other States to sever the direct link between 
judicial candidates and campaign contributors. As the Supreme Court of Oregon explained, 
“the spectacle of lawyers or potential litigants directly handing over money to judicial 
candidates should be avoided if the public is to have faith in the impartiality of its judi-
ciary.” In re Fadeley. Moreover, personal solicitation by a judicial candidate “inevitably 
places the solicited individuals in a position to fear retaliation if they fail to financially 
support that candidate.” Simes, Potential litigants then fear that “the integrity of the 
judicial system has been compromised, forcing them to search for an attorney in part 
based upon the criteria of which attorneys have made the obligatory contributions.” 
A State’s decision to elect its judges does not require it to tolerate these risks. The 
Florida Bar’s interest is compelling. . .
A State may decide that the threat to public confidence created by personal solicitation 
exists apart from the amount of money that a judge or judicial candidate seeks. Even 
if Florida decreased its contribution limit, the appearance that judges who personally 
solicit funds might improperly favor their campaign donors would remain. Although the 
Court has held that contribution limits advance the interest in preventing quid pro quo 
corruption and its appearance in political elections, we have never held that adopting 
contribution limits precludes a State from pursuing its compelling interests through 
additional means. And in any event, a State has compelling interests in regulating ju-
dicial elections that extend beyond its interests in regulating political elections, because 
judges are not politicians. . .
In sum, because Canon 7C(1) is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government 
interest, the First Amendment poses no obstacle to its enforcement in this case. As 
a result of our decision, Florida may continue to prohibit judicial candidates from person-
ally soliciting campaign funds, while allowing them to raise money through committees 
and to otherwise communicate their electoral messages in practically any way. The 
principal dissent faults us for not answering a slew of broader questions, such as 
whether Florida may cap a judicial candidate’s spending or ban independent expenditures 
by corporations. Yulee has not asked these questions, and for good reason—they are 
far afield from the narrow regulation actually at issue in this case.
We likewise have no cause to consider whether the citizens of States that elect their 
judges have decided anything about the “oracular sanctity of judges” or whether 
judges are due “a hearty helping of humble pie.” The principal dissent could be right 
that the decision to adopt judicial elections “probably springs,” at least in part, from 
a desire to make judges more accountable to the public, ibid., although the history on 
this matter is more complicated. In any event, it is a long way from general notions of 
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judicial accountability to the principal dissent’s view, which evokes nothing so much as 
Delacroix’s painting of Liberty leading a determined band of citoyens, this time against 
a robed aristocracy scurrying to shore up the ramparts of the judicial castle through 
disingenuous ethical rules. We claim no similar insight into the People’s passions, 
hazard no assertions about ulterior motives of those who promulgated Canon 7C(1), 
and firmly reject the charge of a deceptive “pose of neutrality” on the part of those 
who uphold it. . .
Our limited task is to apply the Constitution to the question presented in this case. Judicial 
candidates have a First Amendment right to speak in support of their campaigns. States 
have a compelling interest in preserving public confidence in their judiciaries. When the 
State adopts a narrowly tailored restriction like the one at issue here, those principles do 
not conflict. A State’s decision to elect judges does not compel it to compromise public 
confidence in their integrity.
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